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CHAPTER I 
DEMOCRACY AND ABS0LUTIO 
Only when. reflection upon means· and ehoioe of enda are· 
free cu there: be; actual mcie.l planning... Every arrest. ot 
intelligence (and· every tbrm or social dogma ,,.a an arrest) 
obstructs mu·t1nally eupresaes frea·conaideration.a.11d 
choice ot mean,~. . · 
1. 
John Dewey,. e!'hn Dewa;y•s Fnilosoph;)?> (Ratner: ed.) P·•·· 432 
One ot the most acutely urgent problems facing American educ•. 
. . 
at:lon is that or tormttla.ting a philosophy in keeping with a democrat.io: 
outlook on li'te. !he· urgency ot this problem is· attmsted by the nwner-
ous and varied current educational. ptibU.ca:bions·Tthich attempt. to set, 
tortb a. philosophy of education su.itabl e to a demoorat1o society., The 
. . 
Forty•First Yearbook, Part I, ot the lational Society tor the Study of 
Educa:bion• entitled Philosephies·.~.Education.,ts a good a:mmple. But 
herein ts a perplexing problem, for· many of the current l'«'ite~s a.vow 
d$??looratic affiliations despite their conflicting points of view •. 
Fraderick s •. Breed• one of the contributors to the· Forty•First. 
?eerhook oited above, into:rms ue that our educational philosophy' must 
< 1. 
square with democratic principles. Kore or less by indirect im• 
pl ioation he suggests that the various forms of nbeolute idealism are 
not acceptable since they- d~sregard experienoe as a neoessaey element 
in the. acquisition of truth. He oontinues by pointing out ,that both 
pragmatism and realism are more suitable in a democracy since beth: 
represent an experiential approach. He states. 
l. Frederick s. Breed• nEducation and the Real iatio Outlook,'' Phil-. 
osophies 2!. Eduoatio~ Forty-First Yaarbook1 Part I, P• 81.-
'?he foundation ot democracy is naturalJ not to our know,., 
ledge,. supernatural.. It rests o:n generalizations from 
fact., not presumptions ot omnisoienoa. 'Clear' and distinot 
ideas• that are advertised as compelling in their autbority-
beoause they are fresh from the faculty of Reason and the 
Oitidal of Truth., are no more impressive than~he capital 
letter1~that. linger: on as a literary tradition, in philos-
ophy'. ' , . 
2. 
But Breed finds. little community to exist ·between. pragmatism and 
real ism. Ha points out that there. is actually a very great difference 
· between them in matte~s that. have a bearing on one •s social outlook. 
For, example,. he holds that pragmatism ia essentially a :Margaret Fuller 
type of subjectivity inwhioh the observer aooepts and interprets. the . s. 
universe .as his personal· tastes may dictate. · Breed argues that :rrom 
this point it is a logioa.1 step to Rousseau's type of.' individualism 
currently represented by oertain elements within the Progressive Eduoa• 
tion Assooiation. This ~d;vtdualism, he implies., is not aooaptable in 
a democracy. Consequently we must assume that he regards pragmatism 
as non•demooratio •. Braed*s contention is that democracy neoessitiates 
a recognition of •the objectivity of reality and an aooaptanoe or real• 
s. 
ity by conforming to ,it. Ha• clinches· his argument for realism by 
statements such as the followings. 
The.,attitude of tolerance so essential to liberalism and the 
democratic way of life derives its chief justification from 
the rights or others, ••• and introduces intodemooratio so-
cial relations an essential note ot duty and responsibility. 
In a·word,. the·demands ot external entities,.•physioal and 
personal, furnish the foundation of an inescapable factor 
known as discipline in life. 6• 
F •. S, Breed., Forty•First Yearbook of the :N.s.s.E., Part I, P• 136. 
3, Ibid. P• 101. . . . 
4. r-E""appears that Breed has confused prag§nati.sm with subjective 
idealism. 
s. Breed, op. cit. P• 1oi. 
6. Breed, 02• ~it. P• 133. 
The ultimate democratic appeal is to the evidence tor 
authority and to the oapacity or the community to under• 
stand the evidence when presented pro and ,oon by com• 
patent leadership. 7 • - - · 
If Breedts position is oharaoteristio of' realism,, it would ap• 
pear that realism is authoritarian and absolutistic •. _:At this pnint w 
are re~indad of B. H. Bode 1s position that there is " ••• irrecon• a. 
oilable conflict between demooraoy and absolutism," Here, then; is 
the crux of.' our problem; namely, :ls realism. absolutistic·, and U' so. 
does it imply a no:n•demooratio design for living? 
', ' '. 
_ One cannot proceed further, _however, unless t~ese two terms, 
absolutism and demooraoy~ are more fully .discussed~ Absolutism implies 
9. . 
ul timaoy or finality. Wheeler indicates that traditional absolutism 
is based on such conoepts as fixity. completeness; and independence. 
Bode_had this traditional absolutism in mind when he soQrad both ob• 
10. 
jeotiYe idealists who conform to Plato's pattern or thought, and 
subjective idea.lists who like Rousseau accept huma11 nature as absolute. 
Breed's characterization of realism provides us with another good 
example of absolutism in the following statement• 
The principle abcve all others that unifies the realist is 
known brief as the principle~ independence-, 12• 
For subjective idealists the principle of independence applies to .. ''• ________ ....,.. . : 
the "self" or human nature, for objective idealists the truths of the 
11. 
7 e Ibid • ., P• 134. _ . _ . _ . _ • . _ .. ._. . 
8. Boyd H. · Bode, Progressive Education a.t the Crossroads, PP• 112•113, 
9. Raymond Holder Wheeler• 01 Set of .Postulates for Educational Theo• 
ry l · The Baokground1 " .Journal of Educational _ Research, Vol., 28., 
pp~ '322•333, 1935. .. _ _ - •. . 
10. Boyd Ho Bode. Progressive Education at the Crossroads, PP• 21•27., 
11, . Ibid,.: 37 ff• . _ . 
12. _· Breed~ -Forty•First Yearbook, N~s.s.E •• Part It ·p. 93~ · 
4, 
ages ars endowed with this indepandenoaJ and. tor realists* independ• 
ence ie an attribute or matter• That is to say, human nature and 
physical reality are described, as though they ware selt ... contained and 
independent·of ciroum.stanoes. . ' . " . 
Abtfolutists are 'distinctive in that they regard hypotheses as 
unproven assumptions, In contrast, Wheeler, representing a rela-
tivistic position, writes "Soientifio laws are hypotheses,· always hy• 
13. 
potheses, subject to correotion.rr The implication is that the 
scientist does not know if his conclusions are .final,·. Henoe, he is 
continually projecting workable hypotheses tor recurring problems, 
testing them ill their appl,1-oatfon. and revamping or reorganizing them 
in the 1 ight ot experienoe. By 1my of comparison let us see what 
Breed writes about hypotheses.. We read_; 
Over and above the more securely established portions of 
our knowledge known as factual• there are less certain be-
lief's whioh are known as theories or.hypotheses. 14• 
' . . ', ' 
Hypotheses are legitimate in the classroom only i~ care• 
fully labeled so as not to be oonfused with verified re• 
sults. 15• ' 
It is obvious from the above that Breed considers hypotheses 
as suppositions,, That is, they a.re the unproven; whereas. truth is 
f'o1· him the. settled or established., But a settled_matter requires 
i;:; ,. : ' 
no .f'Ur'th'er inquiry. It requires onlr its aooeptanoe and an adap• 
tation to it. Consequently, Breed may be expected to be a author• 
itarian about the ~settled" matters. On the other hand, a rela-
13. R. · H. Wheeler, "Postulates for a Theory ~r Education II, A 
Methodology for Eduoational ResaarohJ" Journal of.Educational 
Research, Vol. 29, P• 187. 
14•. F, S, Breed, Eduoation and the New Realism, p, 16. 
16 • · Ibid, P• 186. 
this·!:; will raga.rd his truths as working hypothese~., and. will be · 
willing to re-examine his a.ssu.>np-bions periodt.oally. Ho has a.cospted 
no explanation or> conolusion as final. !Io retains an•. "open mind.'' 
Turning novr to a disoussion of. deraooraoy., wa find various and . . · · · 1s. 
sundry statomonta portinent there·bo. Thomas Briggs states that 
demooraoy is a blanket torin which ia so broad that it is meaningless• 
By soma m~asure of conoensus he would set up a. dof'inition whioh limits 
tha word and establishes its moaning. It is questionable in the 
minds of :many whtJthor conoensus can ost$.bliah tho meaning of any word,, 
but lat u.s see if there is oonoensus among educo.tora concerning de--
mocraoy. 
In ~ha Forty-First Yee.rbook., Part I of tho M.s.s.E.,. written in 
11. 1a. 
part by Kilpatrick, and ins:-'crumante.list; 
19. 
Horne, an idealists Mo·Guoken,. a Thomist; 
21. 
Breed, a realist; 
20. 
'and Briubacher • an ..... 
a~sol utist, it is intoresting to note that each considers as im-
portant to dernocaroy oorta:in things agreed· to·\by, •the other co-authors. 
For oxrunple: ea.oh holds that respect ibr porsonality is vital to oo• 
m.ooraoy. To one familiar w·ith .the "llritings oi' these men• it ia fair--
ly Qertain that all or at laast most of them do not regard the in• . . . 
dividual as an end in hlmsel:t,. The pr inoiple or respeot for person• 
ality 1.s a means rather than an end. Its purpose is summarized by 
John Dowey in the follow1ng manners 
Thomas Briggs, Prn~tism and Pedagogy,. P• 62 rt. 
William Ho Kilpatric; Forty-First Yearbook, N.s.s.E., Part I.-
P• 54. 
F• s. Breed, Forty-First Yearbook, N.s.s.E., Part I, P• 137. 
Herman H. Horne. Forty•Firat Yon:rbook1 N.s.s.E., Part I,. P• 154. 
William MoGucken. Forty-First Yearbook. N.s.s.E •• Part I, P• 284. 
John Brubo.oher• Forty ... Firat Yearbook, N.s.s.E.,. Part I,. P• sis. 
' . 
A sooiety which makes provision :f.'or participation in 
its good ot all its members on equal terms and which 
· secures flexible readjustment of its institutions, 
through interaction of the di£ferent forms of asso• 
oiated life is in so .far demooraotic. .22 • . • . · 
We can infer from Dewey's statement that each ind.ividual · 
' ;., 
6. 
should have opportunity to share ·1:n•the ·shaping or molding of any: 
institution whioh affects' him. That is,. raspeot for personality 
reflects a faith· in human intelligence and implies an-active par• 
tioipation o!' individuals in group· planning and living. 
There is a second point on whioh several of the authors oi ted 
are in agreement regarding demooracyr namely, that mental coercion 
or indootr:i.nation is undamooraotic. Kilpatrick writes 1 
It ( demooraoy) oannot be taught by indoctrina~~or.r tor 
that is an essentially undemocratic prooHs. • 
Horne agrees with this position £or he writeai · 
· · Just now there is a question 'Whether we should have 
1demooratio propaganda,.·• The phrase is selt•contra• 
diotory. If it is propaganda, it is not fair to all 
· . sides. and eo is not democratic. It" it is demooratio, · 
it is truthful and fair to all sides, and so is not 
propaganda.+ 24 • · . • · 
Breed io less clear-out, but his agreement is implied in the follow-
_. ,,' 
ing statement t 
The protest against the immoderately authoritarian. 
character of the common .American sohool grows apace,· 
based on the conviction that education for life in a · 
democracy is not best attended in the e.~osphere 
generated by a fasoistio schoolmaster. . • ·· 
Underlying these statements is the assumption that · demooraoy . 
is· .founded on the principle of equality of opportunity and respon• 
22. John Deway •. Demooraoy and Education, P• 115.· 
23, . William H, Kilpatrio,k1 21: oit,, P• 78~ . 
24. Herman H. Horne, op •oit •• p';:l.77. 
25. F. s. Breed,. 2.£ .ill,~;-"ji~ 103•104 4 
tibility to make one•tt o,m deoiotoz:u•• · ht is to say• no ono person 
01' group has the :right to assum.t!t control of the ohc.nnela ot oa.nmu• · 
aica.tion with a view towai•d f oroing a particular decision or pat-torn 
or thougb.t. Moreov.:n:, a positive mplioa.tion .follows; namely, that 
social and individual progress ia guaranteed only by an aotiva and 
retleotive participation ot each individual i.n a planrd.ng society. 
A benetioent diotatorehip may @force a progitessivc, social program,. buiJ 
in doing so it is layillg the groundwork for intelleotual dependonoy • 
.A primary purpose ot democracy 11 to assure a continuance or the m.eams 
for social progreas, a responeible, enlightened, and indepondentl,-•· 
l~arning citizenry. 
Further ·e-.m:lnation or the Forty.,Firstl Yearbook, faMI I'• o.f tho 
National Sooi•ty fot' tho Study of Education will Jield othoi- pointa 
of agreement regarding wttacrt.107~. Ono of tho more obvious 1$ that 
democracy ia the social .tunction ot problem • sol vt:ng. It is a means 
by \'l!hicb individuale oaopen:\W in the improvement o~ h'l.\mMl w&lfareo 
this ia more or less implied in th& discussions oft 0 t"eapect £or per-
. aonality' and indoctrinat1on. KUpatriok, Home. and Breed may die•· 
agree in their statamenta or epeoi£io values and enda in a democratic 
sooietyJ however,. they pn,feae to plaoe responsibility upon each indi• 
vidual for his eharo in probl--•ol ving,. and they deolaro that rmmtal 
ooeroion and control ot oonmunioat:ton are undemocratic, Oonaequently,. 
they llU.let admit to no bierar-ohy of knowars nor of the lmow.a •. To be 
consistent• they must regaF<t ourrent sooial :policies as hypothoaea 
which reflect current insight&• That is to siq, an, eoo ial program 
mu.ct be tentative• aubj•ot to reorganization or recoriatruotion in the 
light of experienoe. Thie 11 why John Dewy, Bodo, and many othero 
a. 
declare that d·emocraoy is a planning society rather than one whioh is 
already planned. Henoo, because absolutism implies known or knowable -
social goals mioh become social dogma,, it is in oonfliot with ·de• 
mocraoy. 
!f we · state that damooraoy is ". o. a form of social organization 
which provides equality of ·opportunity for 'participation in a growing 
. 26. 
area of interests mutually shared" ' we· imply a changing society. 
It is a society in which respect for personality and unlimited oppor• 
tunity to share thoughts and experienoe ara nacesd.tated in order to 
allow the greatest play of growing •insights on a multitude of changing 
situations. It is ,a society committed to the development of a citi• 
zenry obligated and equipped to share ·~ reflective social. problem• 
21. -
solving. In other words; demooraoy is not a society conforming to 
. ' .-----.-
absolutes but ona that is constantly !_!forming in the 1 ight of g:rowing 
insights and expanding relationshipso 
What about the relationship 0£ realists to damooraoy? Realists 
as. a group do not ordinarily regard themselves as absolutists.,, How-
ever, in our limited study of Breed,. we have found his brand of realism 
is a.bsolutistio. The question naturally a.rises,. would wa be justified 
in concluding that since absolutism is incompatible With domooraoy., and 
sinoe' realism is absolutistio,/ that realism' too is open to question as 
26. Ernest E. Bayles, "The Relativity Principle e.s Applied to Teach• 
ing,'• University of Kansas Bulletin of Education,, Vol.!V• No. 40 
P• 5.,. , . . 
27.. E. E. Bayles, ,~ oit.,<P•< 5, oxpresses this position in the :fol• 
lowing :manner t ITTollows, therefore,. that education in a de• 
mooraoy must be designed to stimulate and assist each pupil pro• 
greasively to develop a more competent· knowledge or and ability to 
cope with his world, and simultaneously to develop an,' augmented 
ability to learn by him.self • to think ref'leotively." 
it makes its educational reoommendations for demooraoy? · At ,a time 
when Breed's Education and ·the New Realism, Brigg's Pra.gm.2:rbism and 
9., 
Pedagoq. Thorndike's Human Nat~re and the Social Order. Bobbitt's 
Curriculum for !d'odern·· Education, and a host of' other publicatio11s by 
apparent or averred realists are so well ·received by prominent· educators, 
it would be well for us ·to re-:-examine their basic assumption,;r ·to see if 
they are demoora.tioally sound. But ainoe it is impossible to analyze 
the writings of ea.oh end all of these nien within the sQoptf of thfs. dis• 
sertation, attention will be centered on the recent. contributions· of 
Thorndike and Bobbitt; particularly Bi.nee Thorndike ha.sll$de major con-
tributions .to modern educational psychology and aooial dynamics, and 
Bobbitt has contributed so 1 argely to educational ourrioular content 
and organization. 
The purpose of this study, then, is to-outline the assuir.pt:tona un• 
derlying Thorndike •s Human Nature and the Social Order. and Bobbitt •s 
Th8 Curriculum for Modern Eduoationwith-the following objeotives in 
minds 
1. To find whether they are representative of realism 
as a whole •. 
· 2., To indicate the nature or the basic assumpti.ons ot 
these two works when they are deprived of their 
"progressivett vocabulary •. 
3. To show what an aocaptanoe or realism. implies with 
regard to an interpretQtion or human nature., society_.· 
and the eduoative process. 
A great maey realists have featured signifioantly in modern edu• 
cation. A.'llong the first ranks is Edward Lee Thorndike with h1s, oontri• 
butions. to .. educ~tional psychology and social dynamics, . ·Next Yte might· .. 
mention Lewis M., Terman, who during the first World War gave impetus· to 
tha testing movement whioh, in turn, has bsen inoorporatad in the·pre ... 
10. 
sent ~idanc& moirement. George D. Strayer applied realism to ad• 
ministrative problem•• A. s. Barr promoted the realiatio "line•and• · 
staff,. conception ot administration. And Barr and Frudtlin Bobbitt 
contributed man, ot the taolmiq'lles we might ·designate as objective au• 
pervisi011 or education. 121 th& psychology ot readittg Willi.Am s. Gray, 
•···. ·~ Em.mett A. Betts,; and Arthur Gatee are noteworthy realists. These men 
set up objective criteria £or.the reading process which implies that it 
is a mechanical prooeas • And in the history or curriculum construction 
the names. ot .David Snedaen, Frederick G. Bonier, Wherrett ;w. Cha~ers, 
Charles o •. Peters,, and Franlr.lin. Bobbitt are assor.dated as s peoif'io ob• 
jeotivists.- ·But these a.re, not the only conttibutors to the realistic 
moveme,nt. We must not overlook Peter Sandiford as an outstanding con., 
11eotionist • Dor can wo .forget the gnat host ot men who have been and 
' ' . 
a.re, working with objective intelligence. achievement. aptitude» and 
· personal it:, tests and O\\ aio,r,;.s"T,t '4 s.s11m1ti"o" •· 
· Speoifio objactiviata (reali,sts) have not flourished without keen 
. 28 •. 
criticism leveled against then. \ Aaiearly as 1896, ·when the cur-
rent realistic movement in psychology was in its infancy., John Dewey 
critioiaed on theoretioal grounds the :ref'lax aro concept and its im-
plied passivity of the mind.. In 1922., WUl:l&m o. Bagley beratod the 
intelJigenoe testers before the rational Education Assooiation concern• 
ing the undemooratio and deterministic implications of' .their concept., 
and shortly a.rterward the:,,Tennan•Bagley feud waxed hot. From. that 
time on there have been numel'oua oritic~sms and negative evaluatiOlUh 
28. John Dewey, "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology." !:_syoholO£iiOail 
Review, 18961 Vol. S, PP• 357•370. . · 
ii. 
Much or the •literature. published by Gestalt psychologists iii in direct 
opposition to a apocitic""()bjtctivist oomept ot connectionia-. Sit,n.• 
. . 
ilarly, the publioationa ot Boyd R., Bode and John Dewey are direot U1 
th&ir attack upon real ism and its conn&ctionis'b pa,ohology. Recently 
two oi Bode's students made fmporlant studies 'c.,onoeming the realistio 
implicatiorus tor learning. a.· Gordon.Hullfiah'.publi1th&d hir; "Asp&ota 
. _ ·. _ ,: _ 29. . . .· . . .· ·. . ,· . 
ot !rhomdike•a Psychology" in l'lhiob hep:,inted out that Thom• 
' . 
diklaniam. implies e. passive lee.:rneSI'. Pietr• i. Orate. worked on "The so. 
Th$0ry ot Identical Elstmts,:n end· crone to the conclusion that 
thomdike!a theory of transf$1' is au_ atomistic theorj implying bond .. 
tormatlm and that it is not a theory or trans.f'er but an assumption 
. . . ' 
. ' ' 
Wheeler. Perkins• and Bartley in th~ Payobologioal Review. 1933; 
jointly_ publhhed a critioal e.nal7sis of varlou~ ps,ohologioal pointer 
. 
of' -.riew, .. · among which oonneotionim was .featured. In 1935• R. H. Wheel• 
er summarized. oertaitt assumptions ot oonneotton.l• and their im.plioa• . 
tions •. Re oontrasta mechanism with vitaU.mn and thowa tho manner- in 
31. 
whioh relativism resol'Yes Qontlicts involved in both ther;,ries. 
Wheeler's study leads to the. oonolueion that a _reaUstio frame of re• 





lb Gordan Hulltiah;. "'Aspects of !hornd:ike 's P~hology," Ohio State 
UniV'er,sity Studies, (!otttribttbions .!!:, Pr.!D,oiple,s_ e£. Education, Jlo. r. 
Pietro ;J,. Orata, uThe Theory, o:f' Id0ntioal lUemants, n tihio &4tate 
University stud.ios1. Cont:ributions in PrinelEles or .Education'• lo. s. 
itaym.ond ff. vifia13ler1 "lioiitula:t:;aa lore Theory o? Rucation II• A 
Methodology tor Ec;iuoational ltasear.oh• tt Journal of Eduoationa.1 Ro• 
eearoh, 1935• Vol. 29• PP• 187•1&5. 
published a number of artioles which present a relativistic anti• 
a.bsolutistio outlook on educationo One of the most concise., yet oom.• 
prehensive e>f these is nThe Relativity Pr:inc:l.ple as Applied to Tea.ch• 
32. ' 
In addition, ther6 are also available ~t the Univorsity Qt 
Kansas a number of unpublished studies pertaining to the resolution ot 
oonfliota in eduoat:i.onal aims. thr.ough the application of the Dewey• 
Bode point of' view. Notable among these is the study made by Claude H. 
33. 
the probl• of' absolutism in education b a very r~a.l one, and 
one whioh has vast signifioanoe with regard to an interpratatio~ of de-
·mooraoy and the place or the individual in a demooratio society. One 
may askt Does absolutimn allow for an intelligently active oitizea 
who is aware or the ooneequanoes of'his behavior. and is concerned with 
« progressive and unlimited refinement of himself and the society ot 
which he is a member? The remainder of thiS research shall be oonoarn• 
· ed particularly with the problem. of whether Thorndike •s Human Nature and 
the Scoial Order. and Bobbittts The Curriculum for Modem Education are 
adequate guides for education in a demooraoy. The basio assumptions 
of'realism will be outlined as they apply to an .interpretation ,;, hu• 
man :nature, society, thi:t adugt?,:b'iv~· process, and 'tihe oh~ioa· ot subjaot• 
matter in, education •. 
' ' 
32. E. E. Bayles. "The Relativity Principle a.a· Applied to Teaching/' 
. Uil:lversi of' Kansas Bulletin or Education, Vol •. IV., No., 4, Feb• 
--- }c:- ---- '·' ruar,v, l .~ , P• 3 1:£'., , · .· ·. , · · , · · ' · 
Claude Ho Brown:,· "The Conflict Between the Theoretioal and the· 
Practical in Mathamatios and 'Mathematics Teaching," Abstracts of' 
Doctoral Dissertations In Eduoation,Univeroity of Kansas Publt:' 
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CHAPTER II 
BASIC ASSUMPTIONS OF THORNDIKIAN REALISM 
Ignoring tha taot that truth can be bought only by 
the adventure of experiment, dogmatism turns truth 
into an insurance company. 
John Dewey, Human Nature Conduct, P• 237 • 
13. 
That a philosophy should be basic to every serious consideration 
of human nature and society seems axiomatic. It is impossible to plan 
a program. of research• be it soientitic, educational, or otherwise., 
. without first acoepting an underlying philosophy. Rusk ·substantiates 
this when he says, 
The real answer to every educational question. is ultimately 
influenced by our philosophy ot life. Although tew men form• 
ulate it, every system of education is relative to the aim of 
life. Philosophy .formulates what it conceives to .be the end 
of lif&J education offers suggestions how this end: ie to b_e 
achieved. 1 • · 
Rusk even goes so far as to say that an eduoator•s philosophy has boar• 
ing on such detailed items as• l. choice of texts. 2. whether or not 
. he will use fairy tales in his teaching, 3. how he will use leisure 
moments, and other equally specific items. It would seem then• in 
studying the educational plan of any person or group of persona we 
must first determine what are the basic assumptions underlying the 
plan. 
Thorndike, an aoknowledged realist; holds that educational prao• 
2. 
tioes are dependent on opinions regarding educational topics., but he 
does not bother to state his own underlying philosophy. Human Nature 
1 • R• R. Rusk1 Tho Philosophical Bases or Education, P• 15. 
2. Edward t. Thorndike, Educational Psyoholoq, (1903}, P• 2. 
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and the Social Order, his recent book~ bears no denial of the value of ---------
philosophy as a. forerunner oi' research, but it ie replete with impli• 
cations that any such theory or philosophy must await the outcome of 
an unbiased investigation or reality before it can be stated. In other 
words, it is doubtful that Thorndike regards theory and philosophy as 
necessary in the scientific process. 
It is not important that we observe Thorndike's reluctance to com• 
mit himself to an underlying philosophy, but it is important that we 
try to discover whether or not ha has ma.de any commitments 'Which would 
necessitate a definite course of action. For it is quite possible 
that despite his reluotanoe to state a fundamental position with re• 
faranae to human nature and society. he has nevar•the-lass committed 
himself by following patterns of thought which rightly may be desig• 
natad as basic theories. In tact• it is quite proper to regard his 
plan of action as involving certain basic assumptions whioh. though 
unstated. are never .. the•less active and effeotu.al controls in determ• 
ining both the generalized and the particularized oharaoteristios of 
the plans. In general we will concern ourselves with ascertaining 
1'horndike•s assumptions bearing upon these three problamsa 
1, What is the nature of' reality? 
2. What is the nature of truth? 
a. What are the means of asc&rtaining truth? 
But before we analyze the philosophy or Thorndike., it is well £or 
us to remember that the various sohools of thought, suoh as idealism"' 
realism, and relativism. eaoh has its OWll educational theories and 
praotioes when it oomas to these three problems. Each has its own con• 
oepts oonoerning the nature of reality and truth and the means of as• 
15:. 
oertaining truth •. ,When an educator seriously chooses to become an 
absolutist (either, a. realist or an idea.list), or :a relativist he de•· 
tennines to a large extent.his frame of reference for educational 
practices. Following ia a•briet.summarization ot the principles in• 
vol ved in the positions mentioned· as they pertain, to reality and to 
truth~ 
A. The Nature of Reality. 
While we may classify patterns of thought as being idealistic. 
:realistic• :or relativistic. we are prirnarilyd.nterested in identifying 
absolutism ,and in contra.sting it with relativism with regard to the 
basic issues involved. Actually it matters little whether realitY' ,:ls 
taken to be metaphysical or whether .it is taken to be mati,rial. What 
does matter is whether reality is assumed to be fixed and settled or 
'Whether it is found to be ma:l;Uly- a :f'lux or ohanging relationships. , The 
person who takes raalit7·to be ·settled and independent, attributes to 
it an immutable fixity. For him reality is selt•oontained, and in 
order to disoover what it is. be must examine its oontent. · Ultimate• 
ly be, the realist• 'Will find that he must depend upon the electrons 
and protons to aooount tor the nature of any reality •. Ha .finds the. 
meaning or reality only within its properties or oontent. That is to 
say, by a reduo~ion of any supposedly self•oontained reality into its 
elements, a. realist attempts to discover the independent and fixed mean• 
i~g or any reaU.ty. Thus. realists must not only hold that reality 1s 
fixed, but also that its meaning is fixed. 
Relativists represent a position distinctly different from this 
absolutistio one. In the first. place., relativists hold that reality is 
to be found not simply in substance.; but also in processes and relation• 
1s. 
ships.·. ·111 f'e.ot, ·the' reality of relationships is taken to be more sig-
nificant than· that 0£, substanoe or inherent elements. · That. •is~ eaoh 
identity is a real:tt;y which may not necessarily be:explained on the 
basis, of its parts. Moreover, the reduotion or: any' identity into its 
elements·destroys·the oontigura.tiona.l relationships and oonsoquently 
obscures the true meaning of that reality. This view is expressed in 
tht statement that ~the whole is more than or dif'fe:ront from. the sum of 
its part!•" As one grasps the notion that the; universe is in a state ot 
flux and ,that it represents a great many changing relationships or: , 
different oonf igurations• it becomes obvious· that particular identi• . 
ties ar& simply .moments or oross•aootions of a process. iVh:1.tehead · 
sta:tes., • 
Nature is a structure ot evolvingprooesses. The reality 
is the process. It is nonsense to ask it the color red is 
~eal.. ·. Thi color rad is ingrediont in the prooea-i or reol• 
iaation. • 
The em.pbasia shifts, then, from the content of identities to the relation• 
ships they represent. Mo:re apeoifioally. a relativist seeks to asoer• 
taiXl the relationships represented by things and persons, the relation• 
ships of things to other things, of things to persons, of persons to 
persons, and of things and persons to the observer. That is, eaoh 
identity may have a variety of significant meanings. These meanings 
are realities. they are not fixed ·a.net independent,. but are ohan.ging as 
they retleot changing relationships. 
,'.'·.( 
· · It is true that some relationships appear to be more or less constant 
with reference to a period of history or the age ot man. For instanoe, 
3. Alfred N. Whitehead. Soienoe and the Modern World• P• 102. --------
the appearaq,oe of th~ sun over the horizon may have a singular and rel• 
atively fixed meaning to a. person or a group of persons. '.?hi_s phanom.• 
enon appears to be absolute. ·.It· is not a'bsoluto1 nor is its meaning 
apaoluta. but its oomparative:consta.noy may lead some to accept it as 
rols.tively absolute. Another type of relationship may recur undor a 
variety ot oiroumstanoea. Thus a. 1!1.8lody roprosants an identity. raga.rd• 
less of the key in which it is played., and laarni.."'1.g usually takes plaoo 
when an individual is oon£ro11ted with a problem and the means ot' obtain• 
ing insights.· These a ra more or less stable relationships which may be 
translated or transposed into a variety o.f' specific situations, They 
may be described Rs relatively absolute. But the emph~sis pro• 
oesses,. changing relationships,. growing insights,. and expanding meanings 
· rather thatl upon fixed st~eture and content restrains the individual 
4, 
from accepting any one interpretation or reality as final., The con• 
sequent ,.open•mindadness" will fo.-oe one ·to anticipate and aotively par• 
tioipate in the reorganization ot spaoifio data oi- phenomena into new 
realities which have new or changed meanings in keeping with the de• 
ma.rid of current insights, 
a. The Nature ot Truth · 
Just as an absolutist assumes reality to be a discoverable enti:t)r,, 
4. Ii' one holds the relatively absolute to refer to absolute relations. 
than ha also becomes an absolutist. For him the shift is from tha 
content of an identity to its relationships. In his thinking• the 
relationship is .:f'ixed and changeless. Be develops a nolosad mind" 
that will admit no .reorganization· in the light of experience,· .. If 
there is an absolute relationship• we have no way o.:f' identifying it 
as suoh. To aocapt anything as an abaol ute may- perpetuate an error 
in judgmont. b\lt to maintain a critical and open mintl toward all 
judgments will avoid perpetuating error~ may lead to new disotlveries• 
and yet will not prevent the application of' any workt1bla hypotheses. 
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so he alao claims truth to 'be a discoverable. phenomenon. , to a realist., 
truth is a statement which I is truth.f'ul.· to· the; degree to which it oor• 
responds to and a.oourately measures and reporta upon·· objeotive., ma, .. 
teria1 ·phenomena •. • To an .idealist;,· truth is a: statement· which co:rre•: 
sponda to some eternal principle or-metaphyeioal phenomenon.· Anyona 
familiar with the a:ge•old question• *'What is truth?" will recall· this. 
was one of the chtef points.· of'.· contention between Plato and Aristotle. 
Plato held that truth cori-esponds to conceptual., metaphysical phenom-
ena• and Aristotle held ;tba.:t. truth corresponds-to perceptual, material 
phenomena. 
A relativist does not presume trutb to b·~ ap.y fix~d or ab,so~wtt 
atatemont whioh may ha.vo existed prior to its diaoovery and will con• 
tinue to· exist throughout the ages. To him truth is that quality or a 
statement vm.ich enable$ him to :follow its implioatiomf in order to plan 
and carry out sucoeastul behavio:r which e.ooompl ishes 'What it is intended 
to aooom.plish._ A relativist looks upon truth as a verbal formulation 
,' ' 
or description ot a relationship whioh appoara to the observer to pro• 
vide a batis tor adequate and accurate prediction of observed events. 
Truth serves the funotion ot hypotheses whioh must be tested and re .. 
tested by the observer., Truth is the tentative interpretation of an 
event. prooetu.t. or relationship with a view toward an insightful. goal• 
directed, plan of' a.otion. Raymond B. llheeleJ" describes th• relation .. 
ship of an hypothesis to soientifio laws in this. way. 
Reduced to simplest terms scientific insight 1.nvolveet · 
(l) Comprehending a law or set ot laws, or 1n other words, 
a general tact about nature, at first rf>lativa to only a 
tn observations. (2) A law. thus discovered• through in• 
sight. is dofined aa an h~othesis giving meaning to the 
event, or explaining the act observed. (3) The law,or 
19. 
hypothesis, is then used ill order to plan an· experiment. 
to set up oontrolling observations, and to invent mea.• 
suring davi-0aa • · This in turn is done to determine u. 
under a more oare!'ul procedure, the law or hypothesis 
still hol <ls. No experiment oan ha planned# no set of 
observations can be intelligently made, in the absence 
of' an hypotheais, or" the COI!lp:rehension ot a. natural lavr. 5• 
c. The Method or Ascertaining Truth 
Pi:rl absr;lutist seeks to arrive at truth through some form of rev ... 
elation • .An idealist doee it through such media as intellect. intuition, 
or some kind oi' metaphysical revelation. So· far as being usef'ul in 
the promotion of mental activity, an idealist•s position has ·mttch to 
commend it, but when it aasumea that truth is found• a eriori and is 
eettl ed or fb::ed• then as aura.nee and dogmatism become manifest whore 
reflection and constant alertness should prevail. 
Realists deny the reality of ideas as such. but in the last anal• 
yaia they too hold a poeitio:n agreeable to the "revelation of truth" 
concept. Their amphasia is upon the reality of phyaical matter rather 
than on the metaphysical o · Consequently they do not believe in ideation• 
al revelation. but rather in a substantial or perceptual cne. Brief• 
ly summarized. idealists hold that revele.tion of truth com.ea to ide ... 
e.tionalll sentient boings. whereaa realists hold that nature :reveals 
herself to physioalll!' sentient beinga. In either case the revelation 
is fixed and not open to further inquiry. The criterion for truth is, 
whether or not is parallels oettlad and ultimate reality. 
From a relativistic point 0£ view the problem of achieving truth 
is one of formulating workable hypotheses upon vmioh to. base intelligent 
6. Raymond H. Wheeler. Science 2!_ Peyoholo(q• (Second edition) P• 12. 
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notion. This'probl:811\is one -which concerns itself with an;~"!'aluation 
or a situation in tenns of' -what it will '1e11d to rather •than in term11 of' 
mere awnro11ess to the situation in·~:ich the: individual f'inds llimsel.f. 
This is, an evaluation o.f' '.11 situation through a,, reflective procesa rath.• . 
er thtu:i. through a. aensin& of. physical and physiological stin1ulntion. .An, 
idealist p:roeeed1 front bis baaio assumption by a prooeas or deduction. 
t1.nd a :realist prooa-,ds by a. procosa of induction. But a relativist pro• 
oeeds by a deductive ... ':tnduotive or· tafloctive· process in 'Whic::h he hy-
pothe$iitea · firstll then teate, Md . lf1ter may revamp his hypothosos. '. ?h.$ 
x-elativiutio position implies t~f?dsna,mio prooet'Oil&~ and changing re• 
lat.ionships oe.n be taken, into, account only by assumptions embx·ac ing 
whole 5.dentities. : ~ese assumptions are ·the hyputheses which are put to 
the taJSt and t"evamped a.s changing relationships and growing inaightu may 
require. 
Pawey has this to say ·in connection with the problem ot formule:ting 
truth,. 
Tha r atfonalist -was thus right in denying that sensations 
as such &rQ true elements ot knowledge. • •. • Sensations 
• are not parts ot· a.J:V knowle clge • good or bad,. . superior or 
inferior. imperfect or complete. They are rather pro• 
· vocations• inoitaments. challenges; to an act of inquiry 
which is to terminate in knowledge. 6• 
More specifically, for realt::Jts and idealists the process of arriving 
at truth is more or less terminal• . Once absolute truth is found indi• 
viduals must adapt themselves to it• But i'or a relativist th• process 
ot arriving at truth is postulating a workable plan or aotiqn to s~lve 
a problem• This process oontinues throughout one's li.fe• For this 
s •. John Dewey, Reconstruction !!!, PhilosoP&, P• es. 
reason Pratt tells us a pragmatist•s knowledge is not a. state. but a 
1. a. 
prooesa whioh consists 0£ operations or ways or acting. • · Wheeler· · 
Ruggesta the sama when ha .traats the principle or. dari"lfed meaning. which 
implies that if parts have their meaning on tha basis or relationships. 
then .our notions oonoarning, these .relationships must be aa flexible as 
9. 
the fields are fluid• The assumptions whioh we accept ttas if" · ·· . they 
were workable, provide the first step for aotion. Experience and in ... 
sight will lead to. modification or rejection of these hypotheses., Henos 
Taba. writes, 
tawr:1 as tools should keep their funotiona.1, relationship to 
the events themselves and should represent changes to tho 
same degree that events do. l.o.. · 
And now bei'ore going to Thorndike's assumptions ooncerning the 
. . 
nature of reality., the nature of' truth,. and the·means ot asce1tiiaining 
truth, let us summarize briefly a realist's, an idealist's, and a re• 
lativist•a position with regard to as.oh of these. Idealists and real• 
ists are partially in agreement in as far as both assume the f'ixed and 
independent qualities of reality. A·relativiat bolds that reality is a 
quality of an object or idea rather-than an entity in and ·or itself'. 
Absolutists, both realists and idealists, assume that truth is the oor• 
respondenoe of a stat81Ilent with reality. And it follows that if reality 
' ' ' 
7, James Bissett Pratt., Adventures in Philosophy and Religion, P• 10. 
8. Raymond H, Wheeler,. So0ienoe oi' Psychology (194o};' P• 25 ff., ' .. · · · 
· 9, Kilpatrick uses "as if" to desori'be an hypothesis upon. which a plan 
for aotiOn is initiated. The aooeptanoe of a· statement is telita• • 
tive, as if it oan be tested. Dewey implies the same with his use 
of "if-; ,then,.• If, this is' true, then I may.•~ • • "As if / 1 "it 
then," and induot!on-deduotion all imply the initiation of a pro• 
cess rath3r than the oonolusion or a truth-finding formula, One 
who postulates is obliged to apply the test of experience. 
10. Hilda Taba. .. The Dynamics· of Education, P• 58. ----------~ 
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is fixed, truth must also be fixed,.. Idealists and realists differ from 
each other at this point only in that idealists hold truth to ba reveal-
ed by intuition. divine intol'vention, revelation, or by :reason, 'Whereas• 
realists hold truth to bo revealed to tho individual through his senses. 
Hera a.gain relativists are distinctly different in that they qonsidar 
truth a working hypothesis., a :f'ormulo:tion of' ideas 'Which servo as the 
basis for further operation. 
Both idealists and realists hold that truth ia revealed., This as• 
aumos a passive individual, And in this truth•revelation, tho finding 
of truth is an end in itself, But when a relativist formulates truth. 
he does hi,~ hypothesizing for the purpose of' planning a future course of 
action. He is neither passive to truth nor is ho stopped at the achieve• 
mont of .a acientifio law. Rathai<, he continues to be active both .in re-
gard to re•evaluating his hypothesis and in applying the principles in• 
volved,. 
D. Thorndike's Assumptions Regarding Reality and Truth. 
In the l~ght of the previously cited interpretations of reality and 
truth, we should now be prepared to ascertain just what position Thorn-
dike maintains. We must bear in mind that if' ha is a realist, as ha 
professes to be, ha may .very likely bo an absolutist and may represent 
an undemoaratio outlook on life, There are three questions 'Which should 
point up our thinking in this raga.rd. Thay are, 
1. Does Thorndike assume reality to have fixed and in-
dependent qualities, or is it presun:ed to be relative? 
2. Does Thorndike take truth to. be_adoscription or reality 
'Which can. be treated· in isolation and as settled:. or is 
. it a working proposition having bearing upon a plan of 
action? 
3. Does Xhorndike expect truth to be revealed to. him.,. . or 
does he expect to formula.to 1 t as a working hypothesis? 
1 11 . Thor,;idika ts .Conoept of the Natm:'e of' Reality , 
•In the past,. Thorndike •.s. position has been described a.s rea.listio, · 
beoausa ha holds that reality hair a substantive Ris ;statement--. - n. 
that, "Vfu.a.tever ex:ists at all, exists in some. amount,. U.' · . is somewhat 
_indicative of' this position• ,However, many years have ela.psad since-
Thor_ndika made th_is sts.tement, and he may since then have .changed his 
position. Granted that this may ba true, let us examine some of hif 
more reoent statementa1 
Wo f-ind for· instance that he has taken what ·appears to be a re~ 
. . 
lativistia position with raga.rd. to social relations. and sooial ,conoapts, 
As to: the group, ha holds t tt • • • a person is not simply one tenth in 
12. 
an amorphous group of tan,., (p. 757) That is to say, the v,hole 
group is more than the sum or its .members+ .· Traditionally'.this ia .an or-
ganismio position and is therefore opposed tQ the atomistic position 
ordinarily associated with_ Thorndilte• In this aame connection he also . 
· 13. 
states that consoienoe 1.s a function of time and the sooia.1. situation,._ 
However, Thorndike does, not take the relativist:Lo posltion very-
aeriously- for in many instances he indicates that the reality o.f' human 
nature ts to b«t .found within the absolute gene..,determined, structure of 
. the individual •.. for .. instanoa• With referenoe to the ft'Otector or pro• 
tected role an individual ma;y play in society, . Thorndike writes that "It 
has roots in the genes.» (p• 741).:. Or 1'fith re.farenoe to rulers• he . . 
states that nature impe;]s ·them tt> crave po~r• (p• 441) · Another ax• 
ll • N.s.s.E., Saventeenth-.Yearbook• Part II1 P• 16,, 
12• References· in parenthesis rsf"3r to Thorndik3 's recent nublioationt 
Ruman Nature.and the Soo!al.O:rder unless otharwisein.d1oated. 
13,. '*cfonscienoe has urged .billfons of men to conduct which is good.~for 
the group :tn whioh they hava been brough'b up~ • • " (p. 733) _ 
ample is ,the differentiation of producer and oonaumer on the basis of 
gene•determination. · He writes that "Some . produoers produce because 
their natures impel them to do s.o • .,..," (p. 640). Thorndike does not 
neoessa.rily preclude sooial :factors. 1.n his accounting .for these types 
of behavior-, but ha stressas inho:rent, gene ... detarm.ined factors in des-
cribing human nature. The poi.nt is that ha attempts to ascertain the 
reality of human nature by reducing it to its eanetio pa:rta. For in• 
stance, in another place he wri tee, 
Certain combinations or genes o.re favorable to the pro• · 
duction of feeble ... minded, insana,. moral perverts,. grafters 
·. and others vrho do the world more harm than good• 449) 
It is possible that a small paroentage or our feeble-minded are so de• 
tarmi:ned by an unfortunate combination of tho genes, but 'tl:mra ia su!'• 
!'ioiant evidence to indicate that .raeble-mindodness is lar'gely an in• 
dex of a 1 aok of' oul t ural opportunities• S imila.rly I insan11 ty,. per•, 
versions., and criminal oonduot are largely refleotio,,1s of' individuals 
interacting with abnormal situations. But Tho:rndiko attributes these 
patterns of· conduct mainly to absolute determiners within human nature• 
A z•alativist would• not ignore the part that heredity playa in de• 
termining human nature, however,. he would find human nature to represent 
a prooess or interaction .of hereditary forces with environmental forces. 
For inste.noe, J'ennings writee "• • • what the .body as a whole shall be-
come • depends not alone on what it contains • its 'heredity• • but •al-
14. 
so on its relation to many other conditions,. on. its envlromnent." · 
'lhus the difference between Thorndike•s position and a relativistic 
one is one.of.emphasis• But the aignifioanae of this emphasis is 
25. 
that Thorndike attempts ·.to account for· tho reality of' human nature 
mo.inly on tho basis of the ganas rather than on tho genes and their 
r-alationship to environment as .Jennings doos. 
In another rer:peot Thorndike reduces the human organism into its 
elements in order to nscert~.in .its absolute natura. He otatos., 
A man's na.1;ure at any given stag:o ,vould be exprensed by 
a list ot R•e which ha would make to vrhatever S's could 
happen to • • (p. 5) 
. In describing tho hmnan organism it may be important to mention the 
neural pathways and the pa.rt they are assumed to play in human behavior. 
But Thorndike does not limit himself to this t;ype o.f' deaol'iption,. rath• 
er ha makaa n. statement that commits him to an abaolutistio position. 
By daooribing the reality of human nature as a group or reflex aros he 
attributes to human nature an .independanoe inherently explicable. This 
:ts just another inatanca of hia absolutistio intarprata.tion of a real-
ity and his accounting for its meaning by means of in..~erent qualities. 
A third example of Thorndike's realistic absolutism and its im• 
plied reduction of a reality ta ita po.rts in order to ascertain its 
nature is an outright· assertion that human nature oa.n be reduced to 
its a.tomio elements.- :tet us first observe what l'Voiss1 an acknowledged 
realist_, states in this ?'egard. Ha writes. 
The formulation of the.behavioristic position is then a~• 
pressed in the st~tement that. all human conduct and achieve• 
mants reduoaa to ,nothing buti {a) di.ff"arent kinds of electron.-
proton groupings oharaotar1zed aooording to geometrio at:ruot• 
ureJ (b) the motions that ooourwhen one atruotu.ral dynamic 
form changes into another. 15. 
"' 
Weise. "Behnviorimn and Bchavior.n Pyschologicnl Review, Vol. 
31• 1924• pp~ 39-40• 
Thorndike0 although he writes·less incisively., holds that;. 
Man is creative, :not because he is in part supernatural' or' 
extra•na.tural and imposes a super• or axtra•natural will on nature. but precisely because he is,. in part <>r alto• 
gather. a natural ob;Jeot• .linked in the oham or no.tural 
ce:usation, and playing a role in nature •s long· drrunil. The 
fundamental basis of th111t drama may be vaey simple, nothing 
but moving eloctronn and protons ·which perhe.pt ;have ah,aya 
been an.d alvm.ys vr.i.11 'be the same ... ., •" (p •.. S!J7) . . 
Here, Thorndik0 pratically closes the door to ··,my other interpreta• 
\' ' . 
tion of human nature but that of' a realist. He reduoas the reality ot 
' ' ' ·,.i, I ' 
hum.e.Jl nature·to genes on the one hand, to the reflex are on another 
hand, and in this instance to its electron-proton oonten~. It is 1-ea• 
sonably certain that for Thorndike elements or human nature have ab• 
solute qualities which at-e regarded as being fixed and indapondent., 
2, The Nature of Truth Aoool"ding to Thorndike. 
In disoussing the difference beti.vs8n absolutists and relativists 
regarding the nature of truth, W$ noted that both real:tats and idealists 
agree that .truth is a statement which corresponds. to reality. The 
plioe.tion ws must not fail to note is that if' suoh truth is achieved, 
it must hava soma degree or objective independanoe,. or.inherent stabil-
ity. Thot'ndiko assumes this whan ha 17?'ites• 
The truth,. iu the sense ot these ldaas about reality ,ihioh 
correspond to it, anabl'e ·us to predict it, and lead us to 
adapt ou:rsel ves to it; and· 1t to 1.vants 'Which are satisfiable 
by it, is a pure good. (p, 346) 
This statement seems to imply that any truth he.s within itself the es-
senoe o!' 'the eternal to the e:ctont that it corresponds with reality • 
.Absolute truth is established only when there is perfect correlation 
between a statement and reality. Its test would probably bo the fre-
quency of its ocou?~oe,. · Its emphasis is on what has happened rather 
than on what shall be done. Thorndike does not ragal:"d truth as a work• 
able plan of ttction,. Intrtaad, it is a cr--Jstnllha.tion of' tibat:1rvod 
phenomema npn~ from the e1be&Mt'.)r • J!oraova1", it ia o. B~ttlod mattor 
by v."hioh !ndi'rlduals atlnrt tha:?,mGl vea to t"eal ity, 
' ' 
e.nd in such a proaisa ~ann';Jr that ,vo aceept a desc,:,ipt:ton of th<> pho:u.o-
' ' mona.·as being trutt.t l!ovorthale:,n, these :t'l')Out .. rtnt! phranomen!,l aro parts 
of !l whols situation, and maY ch.nn{tO €1$ the whole grt\dually 'changes. 
i!~reover• trutlt is rrso.ll~r a po.stulation tha.t l'u:ts ro.fe1•enoo' to a pl.an or. 
aotion, and 1n tM.s rcspl1'ot t1futh muirt boat" tmt tiniy .on tha noturo ()t 
' ' ' 
l ' ' ' -' \ 
th0 regularly l."'ec1;.Trina; 1ncid'i)Ut1 b,xt nlso upon the ,lndividunl 's CQll• 
duct pertaining tharet0., It eno tn.koa into c02isid11rn.tiot\1, than, thi?.t a 
phenomenon may bi, oxpeoted to i-epoat itaalf only if oartain relation-
ah:tps per:?!ist, and tt-n:t; in ev::iry in.:ltt1na<1 it ho.t:f a part:teuiarbod m.ean-
in(!: with reforence to o. S]>8<:1t1o plan or a.otion, a.. detoi•iption of it 
cannot beoomi, an is :,lntod da;tu:m or prinoiplrh. Truth must be a. part of 
a. r,latm:tng or problom .. zolving life, not an item to big ntn~trnat<ld1 la• 
bl)led nlld shelved• ,Tl,.onu11lte fHJ81'#3 to ha.VO th1o in mind ·~an ht> ,n-itee, 
Demonstrable truth trill be relati'V'Qly inert and aterue' •· 
educationally U'' it tails to tell whe.t ought t<S be doxu1, 
"lfflat :ts good$ fine, htmlnnt'• 16• · 
HQ\'iaver. 1n H'1.mi.an Nature &.tld 1~h• Social Ord~- ho tUt,YtJ, 11 <JI • • it te 
, b~tter to add to the truth than.distribute it ,to.more perm>nss ti • •" 
(pt 453) • Ia hrt 1mply1.nt that tt-uth can ba e.ooumulated and deposited 
.,into a ban.'! ot lmowledgo apart ft'an aituntioua and problar.u~? ,!n thie 
ratipeot truth booom-os on ,ond ,in itself• Thia nu9h 1a oertaitt, trtith i1 
' ' lG• liidward Lo Thorndike• Tho Teaohing of Oontl"oversial Subjoots,. P• 12 • 
. --------' 
28. 
for .. Thorndike something that is decided upon as EJettled onoe and for 
all. Truth, then, appears to have an independent value a.pa.rt from 
problematic situations e>r a planning society.· This position iden• 
tifies Thorndike rather diatinotly as an absolutiat.-
3. Thorndike• s Means of Achieving Truth 
It there is any doubt a.a to Thorndike's conoeption of reality and 
truth, a study of the devices ho uses to find truth should bring him out 
into the. open. We .might use the analogy of a highly s peoia.lized fisher-
man who fishes only .for oertaiu kinds of fish in oer-fUlin bodies of water. 
By examining his taokle box it should be easy 'b~ ascertain what fish he 
believes can be caught in any one body of water •. Let us then examine 
Thorndike's tttackle box" to find \that he is going after and what methods 
he will use to achieve truth. 
We will start by quoting his sentiments concerning the part :rev• 
elation plays in truth•tindingJ uThe God of soienoe is revealed in real• 
ity, • • •,. (p. 351) • The point he makes in his discussion of this is 
that soienoe does not necessarily test by means of experimentation the 
plans or thinking man and women. Instead, soie~oe is a vast oolleotion 
of' the sense perceptions of these men and womea. Tb.is is not much dif• 
ferent from Aristotle •s realistic theory of knowledge. The same theory-
is f'ound bl the writings of Thanas Paine who _refused to aooept :religion 
al truth on the basis Of Biblical revelation. He chose instead to ac• 
11. 
oept it only on the basis ot revelation through. nature. 
Tbonidikats way of arriving at truth is nothing more than a be• 
havioristta ooncept of knowledge in whioh the stimulus is the :revelation~ 
17, Thomas Paine, "A D:tsoourse,tt The Works of Thoma• Paine. P• 280, 
' ----
29. 
This implies a passive• non•seleotive., yet highly sensitive being .who is 
oo:nstantly subjeoted to stimulating, impacts from with.out• ,t.ogica.lly_ 
this concept can. be carried to the point of: non•selectivi ty wherein 
organized research or n1ooking: fQ,: truth" has no :pla,oEh Thorndike talks 
about looking for truth, and ha mentions testing opinions under certain 
1d.tuations. but actually we shell observe t'hat he assumes objective ob• 
iservers to be. passive to the impact of reality upon the sensory organs. 
· To Thorndike truth•i'inding is an objective procese. It is a mes.• · 
surament of' .what already exist1.t., He says, UWbateve1(.exi.sts at all• 1s. . 
exists in some amount." · At!.d the way to beoane sure of these e:d.sting 
things is to observe or measure them objectively. Objective tacts ·are 
. 19 •. 
the only data which are impartial. Objectivity alone i,s reliablt'h 
lie writes of objeotive soienoe. 
The soienti:fio · method is' dependable. Proposed treatments to··· 
cure political. aoonomio• or other sooial ailments should be 
studied as far as. possible by the impartial method of soienoe. 
• • • (p. 958) . 
When Thorndike i-etera to the scientific method,: he means an impartial, 
objective method of ascertaining truth in which everything is treated 
quantitatively. This implies that induction eventually leada to truth 
. -
if' there are s uff ioient oolleotad data at hand• · He goes on to say, 
The first important faot ia that all things which can be 
experienced or thought by man can be valued by him• .... oan 
be judged goodt bad; or indifferent. (p. 340) · 
If; than, experiences can be evaluated, they oan also be sc:,aled qua.n• 
titatively even thought they are personal and involve such things as 
18. Seventeenth Yearbo.ok• N.s.s.E., Part II• P• 16• 
19. Thorndike writes, "The ideal judge is absolutely- impartial,'ibut 
this is a psyohologfoal impossibility exoept in treating entire,. 
ly objective .. tacts •. ~··. (p. ~17) · 
We know and measuI"Et man ts, fflll'lts• pleasures. etc. ,as.,v-e 
know and measure their heights and weights and body tem-
peratures,: by the data. or our senses treated by our· '. 
inttlleots. (p, 166) 
30. 
By following this tr$1n of thought; Thorndike eventually arrives at a 
position which makes truth absolute. a thing apUt from the pbaerver 
and scmething which can be abstracted or. isolated into strict categories 
,· • -l . • 
er types ot phenomena.. He wt-ites, '-'statistios lie much less otten than 
1S'lu1tistioi~• and non•~tatiatioians l,ie ~ftenest of all•" (p,. 810) · 
. "- . ) 
Truth has been, achieved if. thez-e !a a high coef'f'ioien:b of oori-elat~on. 
' 
All:lo, by recording the frequency or incidence, truth 'is achieved. Iso• 
lated data in and of themselves, without regard for the inquiring mind 
using the date., a:re presumed to possess self .. contained truths which the 
so•called objective inquirer can ascertain and then impart to. the masses • 
. · .. 
Thorndike neatly illustrates his 'belief in the energanoe of truth 
from a mass of data; end that the taote speak ror them.eel ves when he 
makes this· statemei::dl,. 
· • • we are ploo:ming to work with· facts betore we talk 
about them• We will know what we are talking about 'When• 
· "the time come1·t. . (p. 725) 
InanotheJ"·Oonneotion he 'WX'ites, "the psychologist awaits the taots." 
(p; 852} In other words, the psychologist· does not formulate truth, he 
awaits a :revelation.of truth through £aote •. 
, When we assume that facts will apeak for themselves, nnd when we 
assume the "data of our senses treated by our- intellects" (p. 166) will 
yield tru:th1,. we are Qommitted "to the propc.,s_!tion that meaning ia in• . 
her.ent in the data and not that data are instrumental to testing by'# 
potheses in a eoientifio, problem•solving process. For when meaning is 
31. 
independont or self•oontained in so-called objective data.,. the indi• 
rldual incidences are self .. explana.toey. The electrons and protons ex• 
plain the nature of man and of the. universt'h 
Yes, Thorndike has committed himself to an atomistic eoncopt of 
reality and its associated procee:s of induction aa the manns or dis• 
covering truth. It follows. then. that in so far as he is biaaad to• 
ward atomistic induction as the means of arriving at truth,. ha pro• 
20. 
nounoas him.self to be an abaolutist. 
In consequence to bis notion of fixed truth, Thorndike rsoommends 
an aooum.lation of truth for the improvement or aooiety. Ha says,. "• •• 
it is better< to add to the tru·bh than to distribute it to more persons 
• • • .•• (p. 453) In another oonneotion he says,, "• • • things good in 
themselves are better, other things being equal, than instrumental goods." 
21. 
(p. 375) Listed among these intrLl1nioally. good things is truth. To 
roturn to our analogy of thG fisherman. it would seem Thomdi.ke has 
equipped his taokle box ,vith the nooaaaary gadgets to catch atomistic 
absolutes. 
4. A S'lllll!!lary of Thorndike*a Basic Assumptions and Thelr Democratic 
Implications. 
Thorndike, has definitely taken his a"l;;and with the absolutists in 
his interpretation of' reality,. the nature or truth, and the means ot 
20., Support £or the contention that the atomistio outlook,, by leaning 
heavily on induotion alone, reflects an absolutistic frame ot 
reference is treated more adequately elsewhere. · Two exe$1lent dis• 
oussions of this are found in Raymond H. Wheeler. The Laws of Ruman, 
Nature. fllld J. F. Brown. Psychology e.nd the Sooiel-:-order:;r-
21. "some events and acts are almost puregooTa. Almost ili their con• 
sequences ,produce muoh satisf'aetion and little or no disc,omf'ort. 
The discovery 0£ truth by a man of science. the oomposition of a 
fine symphony. the painting or a picture., ..... suoh make the creator 
happy and enrich mankind. 11 (p. 373) 
32, 
arriving at truth. To him, reality is fixed and independent of the ob• 
server •. and truth ia ravealad to a passive recipient through sense im• 
pressions. • '1'\"'1;.th is a body of' settled oonolusions. Reality is round in 
the elements, .arid it .oa.n ba measured as we measure Aleotrona and protons. 
~he elements of an identity a.rapresum.od to contain the meanings in .. 
. . . ·. ;.;1, 
herent to that identity. Thus, Thorndike :ts a realistic absolute. We 
can assum.e that with. regard to the ."known" or true,. he will be an au• 
thorita.rian. 
While it is true that Ruman Nature and the Sooial Order doos not 
presume to attack the problem. or reality and truth., it does sat forth 
Thorndike's self•imposed limitations. For the moat part, his analysis 
of'., reality and truth, and the devioas he usas for asoerta~ing truth 
are strictly atomistic and abaolutistio. To be consistent, Thorndike 
must prasoriba an educative pro0$1:UJ and a social organization in kaep.-
ing with his £undo.mental assumptions,. . If ha does,. wa shall be in a. 
position to judge for .ourselves whether an absolutistio :.realism is ao• 
c:septable for a demooratie design for living. 
,C!Ii'.PTER. , III · 
BUMAN NATURE AND DETERMINISM 
You have already grasped the notion that the behaviorist 
is a striot determinist-the child or adult has to do 
mat he does do. The onlyh':'8-l he oiii' be madTToact ' 
dilferentlyiato uiitrain. 1m ancr tliin~o ratrirn 7i'Iin. 
· · . J'ohn B. ·Watson., 'Behav'rorimn,;1i.§So). p.'"Tss. 
A,· Co:noeptions of Human Nature 
1. Absolutism. and Relativism 
33. 
In the procecling chapter wa fQund Thorndike, for the most part. ab• 
solutistic in his interpretation of truth end reality. The problem 
now oonfx-onting us ist Will he allov, this aama absolutistio :frame of re• 
f.erenoa to ai'feot the o onolusions he draws concerning human nature? • The 
point at issue is that if he is absolutistio with regard to human nature, 
he is probably deterministic. It is pbvioua that in a democratic so• 
ciet3) where the individual must be free to make his own deo:tsions and 
weigh: coneequenoea,. there can btt no determinism, whethar it ba by .vir• 
tue of' imposed authority, toroes• or- inherent behavior patter:nfh 
'" 
Among the e.bsolutistio approaches to human nature there ara two 
distinot positions,. the vitalistic and tha atomistic. A vitaliatio po ... 
sition seeks to account for human organization. the continuity or the 
individual .. and the differences in personality on the basis or an im• 
posed~.!.:. maohina. This has been described by some as the horm;t.c 
or personalistic point or view• 
The atomistic position has already been touched upon in the· dis., 
cussion or a real istio interpretation of human natura. It accounts for 
human organization, ~ontinuity, and personality differences on the bt'.sia 
of elemental content. Titohanerts psychology, lmown as struoturaliSlll> 
holda r,uch a position., but is at present passe. Behaviorism, which 
professes to be in conflict .with atruoturalimn.i is also atomistic. 
Despite its .funotional emphasis, it resorts to an ~alysis of an or• 
ganism*s content in order to acoount for its bel-i..avior. Wheeler writes 
of beha:viorimn. in the following manner t 
In the logical framework of its assumptions and working 
principles; behaviorism was structuralism over a.gain on 
tha sida of The psychologies o.f Wat• 
son and '.fitohener were t.vina, the one on one side and the 
other on the other side of the dualistic barrier. The 
only exouse behaviorism had for olaim.ing a title to her 
funotional system was its use .of the torm behavior and its 
effort to predict. 1 • 
Both structural ism and bahaviorism may be o onsidered as atomistic be• 
. . ' . . •. . .i. '. ' 
cause they hold that human nature is reducjtble to elemental parts. 
Thay find meaning inherent in the parts. And because the parts are 
w - ' . ' " 
deemed absolute they ate presumed to be determiners of human nature. 
Vitalistio psychologists differ from a.tomists in that they insist 
the meaning of human nature cannot be found by a mere examination of 
the parts. Both agree that maa:ning is inherent and fixed. But vita• 
lists presume the organism ·to be dominated by ndrives•" ''instincts, n 
"ego," "the selt, n and other imposed f'oroes, And, presumably,. back of 
it all is an "eternal," t1continuing" principle or plan whioh keeps 
human nature going 5.n the right direction, Both vital ists and atom• 
., 
ista may place a !\motional interpretation on factors whioh control 
human nature,. but i:n the last analysis they are absolutistie sinoe they 
derive meaning from the nature and oontent of an absolute., 'l'he absolute 
prinoiple or f'aotor is usually assumed to be the determining element 
' ' 
ot. human conduct. So whether the absolute is physical or metaphysioal 
1,. R, H, Wheeler, ~!:.!.!!.!!_Ruman Nature, p~ 42., 
is unimportar.,:t• The point ts that human llature is aooounted tor by 
~Jisoh1tes and may .be ~•garded as independent of time. or cirownatanc,eth 
Thue vital ism, which ia ideal1stio• and atomiam, which is realistic, 
are both deterministic• 
. . -th.Lt 
At this point lt might be well to note"the ttig!d lim:tta.tione, ot 
. b~th idealism an¢l realism are resolved by most ab&olutistia peyohologtsts 
by their adoption or an ei.eoticlmit- Soma abeolutistiQ psychologists 
.' 
who stresa the phya1ce.1 qualitiea ot the human organism and aoneoquent• 
lJ loan heavily on an atcrd.etlo interpretation <>f. human nattu-e, will 
resort to a vttalisttc explanation when they .aooount tor tho "whole" 
personal i:tJ'• SimilarlJ, idealists, \'nabl.., to. account V8'f7 ee:t.isfac• 
torily for physical etruoture will often ahU'b to an ato.miatio poaition 
1n their.accounting tor apeoltlo aota ot behavior. In thetr tluotu• 
atione, howevGr1 they 'lUtually ahitb from one abaolu.tt.em to another sines 
they believe that an identity ~ua,t be a.ooounted tor by ~ome self-con• 
tained substance ot" pr1no1ple• 
A relativist avoids the pitfalls of the two extremes. idealism and 
'real ism, by t inding the meaning. ot the organism extat ing bl the relation-
ships it represents rather than in fixod part,. He points out that a 
part. euch as a neut-al path•Y• has mean~g ,.in its relation to
1 
the whole 
' , :. . , .. ' . , ·. . . . . I 
organima. He makes no dualistic distinction between a 'Whole and lte 
parts •. ?{either doea he consider ,the whole QR the ;a,um or lte parts. The 
parts are meaningful onl:, ia terms of their f\ulotional relationship to 
the whole, · in their intora.otion with the whole a~ul with othor part a• 
They are part and paroel of the whole orge.niem, and not a imply domi• 
: nated by it. That 11, mind and body or personality and body are all 
'' . 
part and parcel ot a d~io field of energy, the Utdividualt Ex• 
as. 
pressed otherwise, it may be said that tho nervous systEl!li. is an emer-
gence to f'acil itate the solution of one type of human problem·, the en• 
docrine system is another., mind is .another. But to describe human na-
ture as a. oomposite ot these systems is to work in re11erse. These sys-
tems are aeoounted .for by the organism. ?,loreover, ·specific acts are 
C • • • , ' ' 
said by relativists to require no different explanat'ion than human oon• 
tinuity, for the acts are part of a pattern of oonduot reflecting spe-
cific interactions of the individual in the progression or relation• 
. ships •. Consequently, no parts of the ind:i.v:tdual are held to have ·m• 
hare~t, qwtli:ties whioh determine: in and of thanselves' specific modes of 
conduct of the organism. 
2. Determinism 
' ; Vital ism implies determinism through deus maohina. That is· to 
say, vitalists expect to ·find certain dominating and integrating forces 
imposed upon the physical elements of an organism. Some say this foroe 
is metaphysical or supernatural. Others say it is biologionl or super• 
animal and finds expression in mating. reeding. self-protection and sim• 
\ 
ilar types of' drives or inatinots. But in both instanoes the individual 
himself has no control over itJ basically he is passive to supernatural 
f'oro.as or biological drives. The, element of' personal choice must there-
fore be subservie?J.t to a dominating drive or spirit •. This is the kind 
of determinism. William James refers to when he writes, 
It proi'esses that those parts ot the universe already .laid 
down e.bsOl utely appoint and decree what the other parts 
shall be. 2. .. ,., · . 
But one may r.1Jk{ ttwhat hac determinism to do with real ism?" V'italistic 
2. William James, The Will to Bolievo, P• 152 • ................................ " 
determinism. is• often .injected into· raalistio ,psyohology at· its weak·· 
points., It .is reasonable to,expaot a. bit.or vitalism in Thorndike at 
points where a realistic conception .of hum.an nature is inadequate. We 
should ba on the· a:iert :for these shirts to vital istio ·. More• 
over, s:i.noe,.rsalism is. a.bsolutiatio, it is also deterministic,·•. That is,. 
if anything basic to the. human organism is absolute it my possibly :re• 
quire conformation rather than reformation. Thus I a tom.ima may be no · ........... ' ....... 
less deterministic. than vital ism., We raoa.11 that bohn B. Watson writes, . . s. . 
"• t • t'he behaviorist is a .striot cieterminist• ~. • .''., · If' Watson can 
make this assertion because he is a realist* th-n we can expect ~om• 
' dike to follow suit,. 
One of the problema now confronting us is to Eu:1oel'tain if Thorndike's 
realism leads him to aooapt a detl\lrminhtio approach to hu.me.n nature. 
If he shifts .from realistic atomism to vitalimnt. wa shall be alert for 
the deterministio implications of his shi.ftt If he is consistently · 
atomistic• we must be no loss alert• But lot us first find how Watson 
justifies his determinism and then compare and .oontrast 1,'borndike •s po• 
.aition with this pattern. 
At the outse1l it would seem m,. must be particularly aware of tenets 
which bear upon the passivity of the individual and the. amount and ·kind 
of. freedom of ohoioe made available to him•, We musi: ~emembel'.' that de"'!' 
moQraoy does not tolerate, ,foster •. nor intend to ,use passive individuals 
who oanuot make. choices on their own initis:tive~ We.must further re-
member that, at the ·present time, democracy is the only form. of social 
organbation an4, pM,losophy- of life which oo.nsiders. iiha ,individual as 
3, John B • Watson, Behaviorism, , (1930} • • pt .18~ • 
, someone),who.must be refleotiveiy,e.otive.,, In other ,words.- -unless :in• 
dividuals · are· free· to conduct ;themselves on the· basis,: or freedom of,,. 
: ohoioe and,with: referanoe1.to oonsequenoes·;,. thare. oan ,be ,.no. demooraoy.-
·~• ·.·A Realistic· Conception of: Human Nature· 
. a.6 · . Primacy· o:r. · the ·Parts• ': 
· First ot :•11• .we must: recall briefly that· realism assumes the pri• 
· maoy of .the parts, .lt is a· system whereby it~ a$,.arents. endeavor to 
oonstruot wholes. by. Wli ting the. primary. parts• · These parts , are pre-. 
·· sumed to , oontain inherent qualities which. determine their mode of.· · 
• action and which :cause them to be oonsidorad as self•sutfioient. ,In .. 
; 
· def,loribing this position. Wheel ea- reminds uu 
·. It the par:tut 'Come., first, it they are .primary,.; there are. a.t 
first no relations between them~ How· can relations be ob• 
tainad vdlen, in the beginning., the elements are- totally un• ·, 
. related to one another1 when they are oompletaly unimre of 
ea.oh, other1 s erlstenoeJ · .. when their "roroes11 are unrelated? 
Nothing can happen in suoh a world. If you do not begin 
with the. parts and. the .relations., ·too.,. you oaxmot begin at .. 
all• 4 • . - . 
Realhts usually begin with electrons and protons as the primary 
and absolute elements or human nature. Chemical processes ere th9 bases 
for human behavior. J • Bt Watson desoribes behavior thue t 
When a sense structure, like the eye, ear. or nose is playing 
upon a stimulus, ·a -chemical process ·or some kind· is started ': , . 
wh~<;sh relea~es a neural. impulse in the system. of 'conductors. 6• 
The chasm between the o~~o~pt, of chemi~al reactio~ and of neural con• 
duotion is a broad one whi.oh :realist~o psycholo,gista cross blithely and 
with little concern. As Adams wt"itest 
4. R. H, Wheeler, Science ot Psychology, (Second· Ed.). P• 18, 
s. J. B. Watson, Peyoho!.,!f.-~~ Standpoint~!. Behaviorist, 
(Second Ed,), PP• 48 • . . 
Tho matarialhts ,tart with the 1.dea that man ia a 
machine ~. good ~rlciag ~rde~• i'My do not go into 
the quoe..,ion of ;;.ts oritm• · ·~ . 
Rotlli.ata etart with al ~trcnc nnd protone, , and i,uddenl~" they have 
units. f.11.."!.tplo aet·:t or cormeetionn the unity ci' mioh. they de not .tXT 
tc explain 'lla'r"'J ~dequataly. Thosa unite or perts.are tho nati.vo re• 
f1exoe; or which \'Vatson hu th• tcllar.r:lng to aeys 
We. find a. m.ul,titu4moua group or poorly lr:tegratecl re• 
n.exea- oonsis'bil'lg of kioktng• sle.aldng with the band& 
and raet, •nd wrti1tl inr, or tho wholt:t body, and or 
movements the vooal ooraa. '• 
. . ' . ·" . 
1'hat ie to aq. a humu organism. !a poasesaed ot a great many nelll'al 
ccnneo-'bions at birtt1. Tho repertoire or such comiection.s (aote) 1s 
preaumed to bt eompl et•• We:taon etates spaoitics.1171 
. . . . . 
Certainly at birth or shortly thersefteli' the elements or 
unit acts out ot whioh evory heb i,t: ia tomed can lffl :ioteut. 
We mention the contraoticm nnd t'lexion ot the tingel"s, of 
tbs lower and uppt,l" •rm• 'f'a1s1ng and l~rin~ tM head;, 
rotation ot the heiw., bending the trunk from aid• to side 
tmd backward and f0"9.t"da •ll"""aystematb~ movements of 
the legs,- end • hori of others. file oonclu1to11 is forced 
upon ue the.t b1 habit no llffW' elementary movementa a.re 
ueded. there a.re enough present at birth e.nd more than 
Will ever be combined !nto complG'x unita.~ sots.. Sllsoe 
so uny -ot. the psyoholog ioal · texts speak treel.7 of tha 
ronation or "new pathffllye• .h\ habit it aeema well to cui\11. 
attention to the eimple mathe!ll$.t1eal tact that the number 
ot e!m.ple permutations and oambirt!l'.tiona or, ee.y_. one- !'nmdred 
unit aots 1a a stagge:ring number, Such speculatior:u,, though. 
ar-a futile• One Jl994S only to axamine the tiva- •«w· eix-da,-
old infant to be l'~aeonably convlnced that theM ts no need 
tor the tormattcm ot addition.al retle.x al"Os to a.ooount tor-
all 1a.te:r organisation, a. · 
Wbat W•tfJO!l is attempting ·•o do te 'to de:soribe the human orgard.,m by 
an ,u:ialyeio o't ita parts, 
s,. . Adtama,, Evolution• p, 323. · 
?., t1. B~ Vlatson.• f'lloholoG!, .trom the Sta:ad~oiltb ot a ilemv1cr1ot,. 
(Second Bd.),.· p•4• ·•- - "'" ' --.. "' - -
a. Watsoo. !l o1t. P• 293" 
Relativists have no argument with ·acientlst$ who would attempt · 
to describe the, ohEflli.ica1 processes or . the mural struoture ot, -the human 
organism,· but tney resent any attampt ta describe ·the tunotion of l\ 
whola · organism in tarms ot· tha al amental ·parts or processes. w-, find 
in tb.'a· :f'ollowing trbB:tetaont what Wheeler and Fe?:'kina have to · say about 
. this atomistio approach,. 
r ' ' ., 
The mecha:nistio conoe,ptiOtt ot nature is based upon ~e Cal se 
~asumption that tho .complex is to bo · explained in terms of·· 
thtt simpl.e• This mea.na that ~otes are to be explained in 
'terms ·o·t parts. which in turn implies tba:b p'a:rt& cane first.· 
For eD.tnpla., & ohomioal ,oompoutid is··.to be ·explainGd 1n terms 
of el ements1 too body by means ot oellsa conao iausnes$ by 
mearu.t of mental elemanta known ·as sa!lso t ilnpressicns, t ideas · • 
and .teeling1 movemonta by means of elements known as reflexes.· 9., 
:with regard tt, the futility or analyzing personality tro• the a\omistio 
standpoint .. we read; 
The personaU .. ty $voiv~s. o.. t!nf).e patrbtlt? ot behavior. with 
each act .depend1ng upol'l every other whilt'l .!!,.. ~merf£i?'lfi:• 10. 
The point they make ts that to endow th~ parta. ot an. individt\al .w1th 
abaol ute and detterntltd.ng· qua.li ties is a eui1ent1fio. error• . The hl.Ullail 
orga.nism., , and p~rticul ar system within· q organism; develops in 
totality, in whole a,_ and the parts emerge as the .runotional require• 
men.ts tor them appear. I~ oth.e~ words, any- part must bs intct'preted .. ht 
the light of its relation ta, the whole. loural conductors are obviously 
present in the human organism• ~ere are some responses 'Which ooour 
with suoh ease that they- -appear to be neural connections• But to a.c• 
oo~t for human nature on the basis or the neural pathways _or the tac• 
Ue integrating matter between thatu:1 pathways is erron$ous., Lashley 
reports. 
Oul" dats. se001 to provo that the structural elemonts are 
relatively unimportant for integration and tho.t the common 
elements must bo a ome $Ort of dyno:mio patterns• determined 
by the t1;1lations or ratios amon.g 'the parts of the syetan 
aud not by the spaoii'io neurona activated+ 14 • 
We are rWl.inded the.t in way Watson believes tl:ult ·l.ihu orga.i:tism opar• 
a.tea as a wholx,. but in aooounting fo1• the organism,; ha reduces it to 
' . -phasia upott thei parts whioh take on absolute and deturmi.ng qual itieeo 
. ' I\ 
It would be more appropriat.a ·to aooomrc .for these afort--mentioned parts 
in terms of the !\m~rb ional rela't. ionships thay me.intain with tho ·oholo 
ly are not seU' ... detsnnlnera,, nor illd&pendeut determiners or the qWll• 
ities or systems or ttwholee" to whioh they belong. 
B2d.e:fly,. let us ewmn4l.ri&e tho di:rfioul·ty oonfronted by th1l atom-
iatio position as it dee.la with tho problem. of human natur<h In the 
t:trst place,. it is false to aasW11.t that by a p.N)<HHJ$ of J:"1$)duoing the 
organism. to its oonatituent {;fU'ta '\V& oan learn to know what it ho By 
an atomistic fltlalyais wa find only a decoription of oont.tm·ts and veey 
little. if anything, that may ind1oato meaning or function• The pa.rte 
in and or themselves cannot account tur organbmic integration. tcroro• 
over the practice or reduction implion that the parts are g.bsolute,. If 
they e.ra absolute they dete-rm!no in and or themacl 'tJaa what the nature 
and conduct of the organie:n will bo. 
b • The Orcaniza.tion ot the Rumen ?Jass 
Weedless to S&)r, the sm.octh operation o:f a human machine requires, 
even for a raalist" acxi1a overall a.rrangoments and diraotion. A vita• 
42. 
list can easily explain how this is doneJ he simply endows a heter-
ogeneous mass of life with "self," "spirit," or some other ageno;y a• 
part from the mass itself. But Watson and other realists object stren• 
oualy to this kind of explanation. and treat it as a remnant of prim• 
itive beliefs. Consequently realists must endeavc,r to explain organ• 
iaation on the ba.si• ot physioe.1 premises, and this is no easy matter. 
There are a number ot distinct aspects to this problem. We shall under• 
take an examination of sane ot the most proncunoed0 including 1 
1. Initial organization and continuity or human na.ture. 
2. The acquisition of new organizations. 
{l) Initial Organization and Continuity or Human Nature. 
To begin with, we should keep in mind that a realist skips from 
the primary elements ot electrons and protons to reflexes which· are or• 
gan:tzed electrons and protons without making an adequate explanation 
for this skip, But even if we grant him the use or the reflex as a 
simple element or human nature, he still races the problem or bringi~g 
together and integrating these reflexe.a in order to have any united ac• 
tion ot the organism, To indicate the nature ct this problem we might 
12. 
cite the work of Beohterew 'Who e:x:perim~nted with a deoerebrate 
pigeon. The bird• standing on a hot peroh, would first raise one foot 
and then the other baoause ot the discomfort or the stimulation, but it 
appeared to be unable to integrate its actions to the point of flying 
· from the perch, Such an adjustment to suoh a situation. appeared to re• 
quire an overall organisation which was not torthooming, Critics or 
realism find this eame laok of explanation of overall organisation in 
the reflex aro concept of human nature. In 19301 Watson denied the 
12. Oited by Wheeler and Perkins, Principles of Mental Development, P• 69. . - - · - . 
43. · 
existence of any integrating .f'aotor for the independent reflexes, but . 
earlier in his career he used the highly questionable term· "inatinot" 
in the sense of an integrating factor. In attempting to find it, ha 
suggested ·that one should study the child "and contrast it with animals 
in order to determine what :native ·systems of integrations belong pe• -· 
13, 
culiarly to ms.n~tt ·•At another point Watson wrote, 
••• when the· infant ls put in a situation to whioh it ·is 
not adjusted, it displays its re:eerto.ire of' instinctive 
and reflex movements. l'Z¼., • 
But apparently realizing the inoonaistenoy of ·this vitalistio notion 
of instinct as compared with the rest or his concepts, Watson writes 
later. 
But we are now .almost at tha point of throwing away the 
word "instinot.n Still there are a lot o:f' thinga we do · 
that we do not have to learn••to perspire. to breathe, 
to have our heart beat, •• • to show fear response when 
a loud noise is given. 16. 
We notice that Watson does not dispense completely with the idea 
of instinct• Since he accepts aa unlearned and integrated responses 
suoh things as rear and self•proteotion* it must be admitted that he 
has found it neoessary to introduce some kind ot deus ex machina op• 
'• . ·; ~----
orating or oontrolling the initi~al ma.ss of reflexes. We also note 
I :: I f-~, 
that these instinctive or unlearned fa.oil ities are fixed within the or• 
' . •;; ,, ... 
ganism. and that they are not subject to active intellectual choice. 
They describe behavior in terms of implanted design• and consequently 
. . . 
may be regarded as vitalistio impositions no lees than instincts. In 
13. J. B. Watson~ Psyoholo~ StandJ?2in~ !!_!.Behaviorist, 
(Second Ed.}, P• ill,.. · • ·. · . · - . 
14. Ibid., P• 329. , 
16. J.B. Watson, Behaviorism, (1930) P• .17. 
this. conneotio~Wats.on write,, 
1. Man 1a supplied with a larg& number o!' dirootly o.daptive 
lifet-conscrving activities which care for th~ intake• 
digestiott and distribution o.f food produots and for tht. 
elimination or waste and for prooreation. • • • 
2. •Man at birth and at varying per:f.ods thareafter is supplied 
· Wi.th a serieys of protective attack and dete:ttse mao·han:ismi • 
••• • 
· s. 1'hen follow the ,O(')ooupational activities (manipulation) 
· oonsisting mainly of habit' • seen in collection,. hoarding. 
building of blocks, hammering, and the, une of t'bol e: · 
generally, drawing, modeling in clay, etc. In the crude 
stage of theH activities, instinctive t"aotors may be 
· Gp~ratiV&, but their presence is hs.:rd to demonstrate. ••• 
•·• 4 • · Individuality seems in aom~ way to dopen.d upon man 1 s un• 
learned behavior., not upon the prasenoe of' compl ~ted · 
pattern types Qf responses ••• • 
5. • • :-· the prinaipal role of'·ail unloaM1od aC"tivity.,, neg,.. 
leoting tbEl vageta.tive and prooraative. • • . • is to 
· initiate the process of l.eal"ning. 16. . - -______ ...__ ______ ..., 
~ei:'Ga then are s¢m'-' of. the reasons why native. integraticna are irl• 
troduoed.. They are employed in order to e.eeount tor human behavior 
and f'Qr human qualities, and to e,q;,le.in sp~i.flcall:r ths orga.nication 
oft 1. life•oons•rving activities, 2. prooreat'.iv$· 0.ativittes. 3. 
sslf•proteotio:n, 4 •. $.epeots of the _manipulative traits; 5, special 
personality traits and a'bilitiee, e. basic nteohanisms which achieve 
adaptation. 
To an -.bsolutist. the explanation or theso mor1' or less universal 
modes of b9ha'V':ior must be found in terme of dotcndttitJtic agoncios. 
He. cal'.lno-t find a olm, to these inter:rations vd.thin th& slamer..ts, nnd 
oonseqtumtly- must a ss,.xme them to be vital istieally .imposed orgnnba• 
tions in order to guarantee partioular mode~ or behnvior. This much 
16. Wats01111 Psycholo£_ From the Standpoint of! a Behaviorist, (Second 
Ed.) pp.2&1•289 9 -- - -
is certain. they are independent ot the consequences, and the il'ldi• 
vi.dual is not free to e:ceroioe freed.o.m. <>f ohoico iu term.a of tha. oon~ 
· sequences. 
Emotions are also considered as innate organiza.tions· v,hioh ·have a 
particular £unction in determining th$ poaitive and negative attitudes 
or per$Gr1.S. Each stL~ulus ia presumed to set in m~tion a number 0£ 
neural impu.1 aea. It nay se;t ·err a particular reflex# or. it may sa:b 
' ' /. 
ott a sories of ootm.aotion~ whioh are oalled :instinots or habits. 
Along ,vith this diraot reaction to stinu1ua there· is a.notha-r ,. a ome• 
'What less di~rect but jU.st 8.$ highly orgs:n:1.s,(ld1 namely emotion. ·It is 
emotion which determines to ao:ms e·rbent the- nature of the total re• 
aponS<t -to· a situation. ·. Watson daacribes the prooess as follows 1 
l ,, , ,, 
Th$ omotiana.lly exoiting object :rel~aa~s µiportant intomal 
secretions v1hioh,. without initia:ting nw (part) rea.otiou, 
rainforeo .or inhibit thoae actually in progres~;11. -
Emotions, are 1 .. egarded aa controlling organbatione -v1hieh giva genitral 
direction and oontinuity to the person. In certain situations a. fear 
reaction is demanded, and in other ,instanoea love or rag~ are neo-,. 
asaary. Through operation or his smotional organiza.tion1 a parson be• 
haves in a positive or a nogati"V"o ms.nne,r in keeping with what is 
generally called biologioal solf•defense or s<,lf'•presarvation. Since 
these f'eeling•stntes are toleologioa.1 and :not simple tensions tha7 must 
be assumed to be imposad upon , the organiSTr1. H~re aga.~n the indi:vidual 
is not presumed to a.ct_ wit~ fora sight of oonssquena,a. Henoc this eon• 
oept is also deterministic. 
(2) The Aoquistion of New Organizations 
We recall that Watson vrrites that ''unlaa.rnod activity., negleot• 
ing the vsgetative and procreative, •• ., is to initiate the process 
18. · · -- .. -
ot lea.ming.'' · In the la.st analysis this amounts to the "ooordi• ------
nation or chaining together or the loosely knit acts into what we call 
1911 
Watson also says. 
Tho new or learned element in habit is the tying to-
gether or :integration of separate movements in auoh a 
way as to produoa a new unitary activity. And by 
uniting activity we mean nothing more than the <'!YVar:y- · 
.day acts of life, 20. 
Native patterns of behavior a.re held to be basio to learning in other 
respects also.. For example, Watson says, 
Furthermore, many of the perfectly normal instincts must 
be brought under social control before tlf individual ia 
prepared to mingle with his fellow-men. • 
Here he implies that learning may be in part the modification of an 
instinctive aot. Thusi> for Watson. learning is the integration and 
modification of native patterns or oonduct, 
One way in which Watson attempts to integrate or modify native 
behavior patterns is through emotional direction,. We must recall 
that emotions a.re considered by Watson to be native behavior patterns 0 
and that they are aroused along with other activities, The emotions 
that are ~r.otised by a stimulus determine whi~h other responses will 
be 'made. Their relationship,to learning is discribad by Watson in 
te.rms not unlike that of readiness to learn;. 
18.- Ibid0 . P• 289. 
19• Tiiid., P• 4., 
200 !'i:iid, P• 293,. 
21,. Ibid, P• 284 -
Every object either by virtue of tha original oonsti• 
tution or the individual or through assooiative con• 
nections or one kind or another (conditioned reflex or 
ha.bit) calls out, in addition to the ordinary overt or 
delayed response in the striped musculature, a defi• 
nite and complex group of reflex activity in the 
erogenous zones. Whan thus stimulated thb area may 
, according to the way in which it has been excited 
arouse.two fundamental kinds 0£ impulses• (1) a group 
connected with tumescence,· rhythmical oontraotion ••• • 
This group. in functioning alone, would lead to positive 
seeking movements, and u1 timately to the unfolding or 
the instinctive mechanism • .., • (2) A group connected 
with detumesoence inhibition and relaxation of other 
muscular tissue and w:i.th inhibition of secretions. 
These impulses gaining the motor centers :would,. if' no 
inhibitory f'aoi~ra were present, release the movements 
of avoidance. • . 
47. 
This moans that an emotional state· is aroused by any stimulus, and· 
this emotional state gives direction to th.a response.. And so firmly 
does Watson believe that it gives direotion to response that ha writes. 
u •. • • if the objeot fails to arouse either positive or negative re• 
23. 
aotion tendencies no habit can be i'onnulated.tt According to Watson. 
then, it is by physiological tensions ( emotional beha~ior) that 
direction is given to learned responses• Under thh . etata of feeling. 
habits are rormed and learning takes place. 
We observe, now., that the coordination o~ loosely knit aots, and 
the modification of' native organizations• are by means of automatioal• 
ly aroused feeling states. · Aooording to Watson, the learning process 
is automatic and mechanical. The individual is presumed to be passive. 
Whenever a nav, stimulation occurs, reeling states and tensions are 
evoked. Random activity will also take place, and as the result of 
22. Ibid, P• 271. 
23. T617f, P• 3141 (In Behaviorism,· (1930) P• 166• Watson seems to 
deny thi a pleaaure•pain concept of 1 earning, but he does not take 
his denial seriously.. Ro still accepts punishment as a factor 
which determines loarn~g• Also. see Behaviorism, P• 146.) 
some ttbl ind" response• tension will be relea.1H,d and a satisfied 
feeling state will· ensue. · Thia is called the trial and error pro-
ce.ss. Somewhere in the random responsee,1 a grvup of movements is Buo-
cesatul and the .bl ind activity, ceases and tens·ion' is released. When 
the same. situation arises at a later time, providing there has been 
adequate practice and use• the tension•rel:ievillg response .will be more 
likely to :raolll'., · By such a prooess certain groups of' connections be• 
come fixed. these. repeated connections become ne,., habits in the 
following matmor; 
(1) In most oases where random activity finally leads 
to success the a•Jcoesaful. group or aots is always the 
last one to appear; hence when tho next trial is given 
the last group active in the preceding test (the suo• 
oessful one) is thus the on.a most recently exercised, 
therefore, other things being equal, it will be the 
one most likely to ooour first or at least early in 
tho seoond trial•· (2) In view of the f'aot 'the. t the ran-
dom acts are in.finitely varied tho suooessfu.l act is 
the only one performed each time the stimulus is pre• 
sented .... (3) By reason of the :raot that the final 
,,group of aots always brings food, water, removes a.n · 
irritating object, lessens emotional tension,. eto • ., 
iihe new state • • ,. brings heightened metabolism .... : 
(4) It is possible that when the final group of move• 
manta .. funotion and the:, adjustw.ent is· -completed, the 
situation as a wholi:, beoomes an emotion•produoing one: 
internal glandular secretions are set free which serve 
as reinforcers. 24• 
Watson_ proposes this me_chanical explanation ot the organization ot 
reflexes simply by way of speculation, Its importance is .. not the 
proposal. but the general pattern of thought which realism neoessi• 
ta.tes with regard to the learning process. Oonnootions are made 
mechanically rather than thoughtfully. Habit is developed because it 
24• Watson,. .Psychology from the Standpoint of the Behaviorist. (Seoond 
Ed.), PP• S15•316,---:- - - -
meets certain mechanical requirements ra.thor than baoause it is par• 
tioule.rly helpful to a, problem-solving individual. If there :is any 
satisfaction in success it is not b,aoause of the success itself, but 
because of the physiological release of tension, a resulting tonus of 
the organism, an emotional reeling.: Hera aga5.n the: individual is not 
froe to act with foresight of oonsoquenoes. His oonduot is predetar• 
mined by stimuli, bonds and. tensions.: , 
0 ., A Summary or the Roal istio Conception of Ruman Nat1.u--a. 
Roalism implies specific conooptions with regard to human nature. 
The crux of these conceptions lies in the assumption of the primacy ot 
the parts• In psychology these parts are not electrons or. protons, as 
they are in phyeios and chemistry, but they are individual seta of re• 
.flexes (neural connections)• The parts cannot aooount for anything 
apart from themselves, so the realist has to look into the.parts them• 
selves to find the meaning of behavior and of human nature. Conse• 
quently, despite the functional emphasis of behaviorism. it too becomes 
structural in its outlook as it seeks to e:xpla:ln all behavior in terms 
of the absolute elements within tho organism. Inherent elements are 
individual; basically the simple reflexes. Emotions. and. instinctive• 
type responses are the integrators or the el€ments. The organism. ao• 
quires new organizations or reflexes by mechanical moans also governed 
by these ,integrators. From this standpoint the individual is passive 
to stimuli, the emotions. and the processes of conditioning. 
Instincts or purposeful emotions are introduced primarily to safe• 
guard tha continuance of human life and human modes of behavior. As 
suoh, they represent a vitalistic compromise. Purposive emotions also 
make possible the formatipn of new connections. the modification ot 
50,: 
native responses, and the organization of reflexes into new series .or 
chains. This process is called habit formation. ,Habit formaM.on, in 
turn. is regarded as learning., . Important assuruptions to this learning 
process are: 
1. Repetition {use) eatabl ishes any series of re.fl.oxes 
onoa brought into operation. 
2. · ?lo l oarning can take place without an accompanying 
state of' feeling {positive or nogativo reaction 
tendencies). 
3. The true meaning of any situation or thing lies in 
the response iteangive. (This 1.mplies a s'tatio· 
oonoeption of both the individual and the e ituation. 
It also :impl ios an individual who is pass ho and sub• 
ject to oircumstancas in his mode of living.) 
4. Human nature is determined by inherited patterns· 
and by teleologioa.l :f'eeling ... sta.tas,. 
J. a. Watson .is truly datormini'atic. His doterminism is based 
ma.inly on realistic concoptions of hvman nature. However, Watson does 
accept a vitalistio equivalent of' instincts and in doing so .. he is no 
• less deterministic. Thus by implying that the human organism is en• 
dowed with individual ree.otion patt,:n:ns (ra.f'loxes), and dominated by 
organized purposive modes of conduct ,( instincts) he takes for granted 
no reflective nsizing, up" of a situation nor a contemplation of con• 
sequences. Automatioally a.roused r 1.:i.f'lexes• feeling states, and in• 
stincts a.re presumed to govern oonduct. Truly, as e. behaviorist, 
Watson is a determinist. 
B. Thorndike's Conception of Human Nature. 
1. Primacy of the Parts. 
l,at us now compare Thorndike with Watson. FirQt of all, we muat 
remember Thorndike's statement that in the end• human behavior is 
probably nothing more nor less than the movements of electrons and 
protons. Early in Thorndiko•s Human Nature~~ Sooial Order we 
A man is a physical mass and,,. as such, bahavas in 
a.ooordanoe with gravitation, electrical attraction 
and ropulsion, · and ,other physical laws. • (P• 5) 
51. 
This, is a raalistio ·st_atsment, simple and direct. /Man· is a mass of· 
matter \Vhioh responds to natter. In this mass of ohemioa.l and physi• 
oal elements wo must~ fin.d the explanation of, human behavior. Thorn• 
dike· assumes that this mass of matter will operate in accordance. with 
physical laws. He rests his· case on the operations of electrons and 
protons. · These are tha primary parts in which he findt1 the explanation 
of human behavior •. 
In order to assure activity on tha part or these heterogeneous 
ohemioal elements, Thorndike assumes some kind of combining force, 
valence, or affinity• Thus• he crosses the ohasnf ~atw-san physical 
elements to what may be n,garded as human elements~ In the discussion 
of Thorndike•s realism it was observed .that he found the reality of. 
human nature in its parts,. tha electrons and protons,. the genes. and 
tha neural oonnaotiona,. The genes.~ appear to be his. bridga from the 
inorganic to the organic, from ohemioals to neural connections, For 
instance he writes. »certain combinations .of gones are favorable to 
the production of u·• moral perverts; grafters ... " {p. 449) In another 
instance he writes of the "humane. tend~noies in the human genes• tt (p. 
741) Thus., by means of tha genes, Thorndike leads us to organic or 
human elem.ants, neural oonneotions. He writes that ttA man is an 
organization of S•R connections ••• " (p. 8) Elsewhere he writes.!i. man's 
nature at any givon stage would be expressed by a list of R's which he 
. " . . . 
would make to whatever s•s· could happen to hint. (p. 6) In other words, 
in any analysis of human na.tur8• Thorndike reduces tha wz:iola organism 
into its constituent parts. Undoubtedly his atomistic oonoept~on of 
• human nature which ·we have jus_t. cited above and stated previously re• 
fleote his belief in the absolute qualities of the parts. He i.nsists 
upon .finding the moaning of· human nahure ir1 thtlsa parts. · If Thorndike 
wants- to know what: man is• eventually he tnuat: refer to human elements 
fbr he holds that' they are the essence of' human nature and; the deter• 
miners of conduct. 
2. The Organization or the Human Masts. 
·· a. Initial Organization. 
Throughfout Human Mature and thtf Soo ial Order th are is frequent -----------
referonee to the genes with raspeet to the determination of apeoifio 
elements of human behavior. Several of the representative statements 
have beon cited previously. We note that Thorndike ,does t'lot simply re• 
fer to the genes as carriers of structural characto~istios or field of 
energy traits, but he also deaoribea them as determining speoif'io be• 
havior pa.ttorna. The previously cited stateme~t that there are·"••-• 
certain humane tendenoias in. the ·gel'.,las.-u" (p. 741) carries this im• · 
plication. Elsewhere he ,writes, 
I venture to prophesy that after crediting to conditioning 
all othe~ forms of training everything that belongs to them, 
investigation will· ahow Man ts repertory of, inherited pro• 
pensities or diapoaitions to be not poor:, but rich and 
varied. (p. 295) · 
Uere Thorndike places the propensities and dispositions more or loss on 
the same 'l eval . as hs does oondi tionod responses• · Thus ha holds 
that man inherits not simply the capacity ror apaoi:fic behavior patterns. 
but patterns themselves. This explains why he can write of gene com• 
bina.tions favorable to the production of grafters and perverts (p. 449) 
and why he oo.n :state that "Some .. producer:; produce because their natures 
impel them to do so,u •" (p. 640). 
65 •. · 
Some one may inter~pt at t.his poirit'"f'b'' 1n.dica.te that th~ propensi• 
ties and tendencha to rospond in certain af'ore~entioned pat·terns are 
not speoific neural connectio::is,. but general states of mind or urges. 
. ',, ' ' . ' 
. One may well agreer that thi~ is possible, for 'lhorndiktl dofls describe 
. states of mind and wa.ntn as being gana-de·bermined. Rowe-var, states of · 
mind and urges or 'mnts,. as tound in Thorndik~an psychology; ara ba.sieal• 
ly specific :neural patterns having internal responsos rathor than overt 
responses. This ta verified in ~r.t ,men Thorndike 'l'i:rites that. 
The gen.es have so inn.de human bra.ins tha't Co'rta.:in situations 
-not_ only evoke certain muscular and glandular responses.t but 
also these states or mind •• • • By tho genm; t arrru::igaments 
these. states ot mind tend to bo evoked by aertliin experiences 
and to evoke certain retponmas. (p •. 298) · 
13ttt -we may al so be cer-tain that Thornd.ike · ~oas m.ply tho.t .other 
neural cof!.neetions a.re possibly gane determined. In on.13 1.nstance he 
aaks. 
Can we ~xpoet the g'lnes to provide conneoticns between a. 
hundred s ituation ... pattarns and a hundred more response-
pattams? Can ,:re a ;x:pect them to provide five hundred 
such? Can wo e::1peat them to provide a. thousand such? 
(p. 300) · 
Hif1 own reply is, 
So far as the mars number ~.nd var:tety of the connections 
is concerned there should be no diffioul:V• ?he genes 
provide tens of thousands of spooifio details in making 
sizes ~d shapes and colors of the parts of man's bodyi 
details which we oannot count up in showing ho,,1 oloael7 
alike two twins ate. (.pp. soo ... 301) 
Here then,. we havs Thorndike's i,onoeption of the genes. in tha deter• 
urges and ·wants have in pa.i-t their origin 1n the genes. And,. to quote 
Thorndike, n.,. investigation will. show Man's repertory or inherited 
propensities or dispositions to be not poor, but rioh and varied." 
(p. 295) We observe then, that Thorndike, in agreement with Watson, 
Fol" the present it is inimated.a.1 thrrt 'lhornd1ke 's position is an 
outgrqwth or atomiam,. axoept hi that he assunfeB th.e genns to have a.b~ · 
solute;· fixed. and detet'fflilling charn.otor:istiof;t Thorndi.1<.:e has :m.anau'II!" 
' . ' 
vored hi.'lltHti.f into this .datermin:ti:rtio position by his atomiat:to e.naly. ·· 
sia of human mtur:th Moreover;, by suggesting that inherited propon"" . 
sities &\tld sp$i,1fi? l"taoting ·patterns ma;yba many. ha leaves little tor 
limited human initiative. 
Rel atlvists do not deny that heredity plays a parb in the d$te:r-
?lli.natl0?1 .ot individual eharnoterintios. ,But they· tend to stress 
struotuml determination rather than beha.vfor..,.pattorn determine:t;iQn. 
Moreover-. while Tltorndike11 e.long with other scholars,. will ag~ee that 
an ihdividual is the produot ot 't-oth hered5.ty.an.d e?rt'l?"onment., he tend~ 
to emphasize the parl that hei·adity plays. Relativists hold that the 
· structure 10£ an o:rgardsm is the product o:f.' interaction bat-lvaen hered"" 
. itary and environmental £oroea, We shall eee ·that Thorndike does not 
aoocunt f'o:r the hil.l'lian ol"ge.nism on this basis. 'Rathor, he. delegates 
to the hereditary eg;oncr oerta.:i:.n distinot and absoluto functions e1 Tho 
',,. • •A•~· •• 
en~r~em, is presumed by him s.im.ply ts, add to or ti?dify inherited 
~truel;l.tt'e and behavior tendenei!.!fi::a. 
We notice that in contrast to Thomdike. Jetnings w:-ites •. 
The oharactoristic.s of' th, adult are no more preaent . 
in the gem oelle than are thorn, of an automobile in 
the. zne'talH.e ores out of whioh H; is ul timataly znan~ 
utactu~ea. To get the com.pl ete, normally-,ccting 
organimn, the proper matei"iru.s are essMltial J but 
equally, essential is it that they should itlteract 
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· properly with ea.oh other and with other things. 25• 
Jennings describes the organism as growing in an environment• acting 
upon the environment and reacting to it. In this interaction there 
is a. development that 1s limited by both the genes and the environment 
but not one the.t is a.ceounted for· almost entirely- by the genes. Most 
certainly, it can not be said that the genes account for a rich and 
varied assortment of p:ropons ities and reacting patterns. 'l'hese are the 
products of an interacting prooass. We repeat, then, that 'l'horndika•s 
position is not erroneous because he holds that heredity plays an im~ 
portant part in the development of an organism, but in that he ascribes 
·to the genes such absolute qualities that they may be presumed to de• 
termina to a great extent not. only the nature of the structure but also 
-di:e!iaiber speoifio modes of' behavior. In the first plaoe, research find-
ings such as Jennings' will not justify this position. Moreover, the 
educator who believes that damooracy is based on a complete freedom ·or 
ohoioe and the weighing or oonsequenoes will find this position entire• 
ly inadequate. Behavior should ba based upon conditions within the 
organism, conditions surrounding the organism, and upon insights. 
Thorndike limits much of human behavior to original in•born tendencies 
and response patterns• l'hat is to say• for Thorndike a man may pro• 
/."\ 
duce because his nature impaly him to, do so. In a damooratio sooiety, 
a man should produoe beoause it is a. desirable and n.aoassary function 
both for him and for society. 
We have already seen that Thorndike assumes native organfaation 
260 H. s. Jennings, Prometheus. P• 28. 
to be "rich and <varied.n (p. 295) An examination of thase "itL."lorited 
prop-ensities,'1 reininds one ot the organizatio:ntt outlined by WatsonJ 
namely,. reflexes,. insti.nots., a:ud emotions. And if w should say that 
reflexes are simpl s machani.sms based on native neural connections,. 
. Thorndike would agree with us heartily. Moreover. we recall that in 
Ruman Batu.re and the Social 0:rder. he writes . that the tfgenas have so 
......,.. ....... , ' '-·-
mad& human brain.a that certain situations not only evokE.t oerta.in mus• 
cul ar and glandular reeponses~ but also these states of mind.u (p. 298) 
· In other words,. 'l'homdike apparently is trying to say that not only 
are there simple retlexes., but there are certain generalized responses 
which may be distinguished as "states ot mind.tt these flstates ot mind" 
are really nothing more, 110r less than strong feelings which color the 
reacting process. and hence maybe designated ae enotional responses. 
In the last analysis• 'fhomdike saya both emotions and reflexes, or 
simple S • R organizations. aro nati Vth 
Tho:rndike writes much about "tendencies to respond.u Among these 
tendencies he 1 ists one for mating. lie says• 
With the progress or l>iology and psychology Instinct,, a single 
mystical faculty., was replaoed by instincts. ea.oh an unlearned 
tendency to respond., irrespective of eXPJrienoe., to a certain 
situation or stimulua by a certain act or feeling or thought. 
!'hese instincts were .after the general pattern of tlie reflexes, 
but m.or~ elaborate,, uu,re variable,, and more mod:lfiabla. (p. 287) 
Here Thorndike assumer, a gentral organization which so closely re• 
sembles Watson's that 01'.lly the toms used are dit.ferent, Thorndike goes 
on further to say,. 
& (man} ·is born with certain wants and proclivities 
{called ''drives,n by m~ psychologists) and acquires 
more by growth a.nd experience. These determine in a 
large measure vi.hat he does and what he becomes. A 
man is an organization of S • R connections operating 
in the servic,e of e. group or such wants, "drives" or 
prooJ.ivities. (p •. 8) 
,It is largel;v through suoh wants or proclivities (instincts). that the 
human organism is organized to function afJ a unity. 
b. Ruman Continuity 
.To assure the ongoing of: human mass, Watoon ~titroduoes instincts 
and emotions• They are intro.duoed in order to guarantee · a cont in• , 
uation of tho modes of behavior wo designate as human and also t·or the 
preae?'Vation of human beings..· Whether or not Thorndike aooepts. this · 
position he fails to clarify•· But some aspects of his concept bear a 
very close resemblance to Watson's. Wa reoall .that Thorndike writes, 
Some producers produoe beoauso their natures impel them 
to do so. regardless of whether anybody will ever oen• 
sume the product. {p. 640) 
If a pel"aon is impelled by nature. oithor acquired or native, to do. 
certain things. this, impelling f'oroe must direot blind effort ti;> some 
end,. Some of those forces ,will undoubtedly be those ·which seek self..-
preservation, Thorndike sa.ys they- are tf1Vl. Ha writes~ 
• • • the desires. and aversions pertaini.ng strictly 
to keeping alive and propagating would form a very 
smali .fraction of it~ (p. 112) 
But the principle involving one is no differl!lnt from .. that involving 
lllallji The point is, he accepts an innate vitalistio principle of self• 
preservation~ And the human "Wants, wh:i.oh he endows with ·toleologioal 
aignifioanoa; are also desoribad as native~ He writes, 
•• much in the inventory (of' wants) is not man~mad~ 
and not learned in a human environment or in any other. 
but is due to man•s original, unlearned tendenoiea • 
is due to the constitution of the genes in the twenty• 
four pairs of chromosomes which form thQ start of a 
human life. {p. 114)' 
Moreover, Thorndike insists that some of native human tendencies aro 
umnodi..tiable. It woul,d app$8l" that our function is to discover' them 
and to mab e.daptatiotl. to than, Wo read, 
file effort ;f-c> diaeover, germinal. tendencies is an etfori: 
to discover taotors which are indapenclant or books, 
ohu.rcht,s, . ., • ,. becaus• th• genes cannot be expected to 
be t.dapted to any auek,. lP• 119) 
• . •i' 
. . 
-In other words, man posseruses certain basic wants or drives which are 
-. 
:lrlherent., predetermine his conduct and which appear to baTe for 
. . . 
' ' ., ' ' ' 
!b.orndike e. upurposive."' or teleological 
Aside tram a· fp battier tendencies to react. ?born.dike does not 
accept the ocmnon interpretation of instinct;s and tlleir implications 
' . ' . 
_ for l continuity of hum•· being, and human behavior., On the surtaoe,. 
· 1t seems that he refu.$98 to mako vital istio OC)Dlpromisas a.a Watson did, 
. but further analysis will disclose that the main difference between 
.. 
than is one ot degree and not ot kind. ·_ In other words, Thorndike does 
' not agree to accept lists describing complex insti.Jloti., but rather he 
suggests listing simple nf'lexes or responses which are no less tel• 
eologicel • Be Wl"ites. 
Maxi. 1 l;l. \U'ileamed propensities are in ptu'tioular often much 
more-- or much lesrt apeoielite-d ·thall.· the words -v,ouJ.d ill• 
dioate. Ke ha•• i"or example• n.o general instincts of selt• 
preservation, or nonatructivaness., or rival.Q'• -the real• 
ities in .the first artkCel"ta.ln tandenoies to D'()id large 
missles, etc., by jumpingJ attacks by dodging,: falling by 
olutohingJ to suo'.fct bite, ohew and swallowt to push a.way 
objects that interfere with breathing, et.:.,. {J>P• 295•298) 
. fhen he would a.dd to this list of particularized self•preservative re• . . . 
tlexes another list of lest, specialized significance, namely-., one of 
native desires. Here again there is implied a Tltalistio predetermin• 
' ,· 
,natioa of conduct. ,Fur 1nsttraoo we £ind among the desires mentioned 
the three following, 
i. · bright colors and glitteri sunshine; soft• tinklintb, 
and rhythmical soundsJ sweet_· fruity, and nutty 
te.stes1 touching ?/hat.--is. sort, smooth and aey. 
2. free bodily movement; rapid movement through 1paoe. 
3. healthy normal action of' the digestive.,· oiroulato17. 
excretory. n$nous and other physiological systems. 
: ·(p. 117 ft.) . 
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Thorndike does not state here that wa are attracted by certain scnm.de 
or oolore, &t ootera. by virtue of theit' oontrasti no?' doesJ;1.a :1Dtom 
·,,' -~ _, ,' ·- ; .:, \ ·. ,,. . 
us that we desire freedom of movament in order to aohleve certain ends, 
' . 
He simply states that we deair• these things because wa are 114tivelY" 
endowed with such desires. In other words, vitalistically implanted 
or impoaod desires at-e presumed to predetermiile conduct~ 
We are forced to Qonolude that Thorndike has suooeeded in beoom.• 
1ng mo~e o~jeotive than Watson with regard to native organ.iced aotiv• 
· ities., but in dqing this h& he.a succeeded only in breaking up the 
elements. into !'inar·gradations of the same thing. But for this· reason, 
we au.st ba the more wary. The teleological aspects ot 'lhoradike•a 
vital.ism appear $.Or& t"emote. So, with referellCe to the, Qontinuity of 
. ' 
the human being. Thorndike JUl).im.izos the role of instincts, but he is 
not willing to leave ths or thoir equivalent out of the picture en• 
tirely. In general. ·T110:rndike follows-a pattorn of thought not unlike 
Watson's whioh is-both atcmistio and vitalistich Leaving imt:blata £or 
the moment in order to om.pare Tb.prndike•s and Watson's attitude$ to-
.. .';f 
ward anotions. we find Thornaika~hesitimt in making 001mnitments. We ··· 
. . . ' . . 
will recall that Watson regardtr'em:ottons as af'feotive states-which re• 
sul t i'rom external astimulation. . Those states of toel.ing in·~ g1 ve 
general direction to tha raa~onses made by the indi~idue.l, particularly 
with reference to lov&• hate. or tear. Their .tunction ma3" be desoribed 
largely as self-defense. 
Thorndi:ke states specifically that there are feeling states, and 
that they are primarily gene-formed rsaponse mechanisms. We read: 
'lhe geinea provide man with the ca.pa.city to ha:ve nia..ny ot 
the sta;tes of' mind· and brain which we call internal 
sensations,. emotion• moods,, and the likei. • ·• • 
·the genes have so made human bra.ins that certain s ituaticna. 
not only evoke oorta.in musoulax- .and glandular responses_. 
bu.t also these statoa or ,nb1d,.,. • By the gene's arrange• 
. ments these · states tend to be evoked by certain, experienoes 
and to evoke certain raaponsem. (p. 298) 
Aooordmg to the Gestalt conception,. feeling states_, .f'or instance., may 
· arise as the result of achieving a goal or the . develorsment of new in• 
sights.: But ?horndike doea not e.coap'b this. ;fnstead, he ae-oepts the 
vitalia;tic•teleologioal intorpretatio»: o.t eniotione. For him fear mar 
be evoked by a noise. lt follows that ther" m.ust be a defense•meeh• 
anism open.ting automa:tioallyi a stimulus rather than insight plaoes 
an individual on guard. This is tho only way a mechanist can account 
tor any ot- the states of d"teotivity. But in doing so• he oannot grant 
the individual to be tree to "she up" the situation and to m..a.ke hia 
own ohoioe. 
fb.us. as we obaerve e.nd compare th$ notions of Wateon and Thorn-
dike pertinent to human· oontinuity we must conclude they have much in 
common,. and that they are both camaitted to a vitalistio pradeter• 
mi.nation of human conduct. Both attempt to give a reallstio inter• 
preta.tion to "purposiveness" but by assuming human- purpo&iveness to be 
predetermined. they must assume it to be imposed and hence dsus ex 
. --
· machina. By assuming; purposiveness to be predetemined and !'ixed. they 
must a&it that in one or more areas of human conduot the individual hae 
no treedom of ohoio•• Watson makes :no apologies tor bis determinism. 
It seems fitting that Thorndike: ehould admit his. Certainly we must . ·, 
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conclude that in so far as freedom of choice is denied the individual, 
democracy ie una:tts.inable., 
3. The Acquisition of New Organizations. 
Since Thorndike has remained within the bounds of oonneotionism 
with regard to human abilities and aotivities1 we should be safa in 
assuming that to him learning would be a matter of improving bonds 
already formed and the acquisition or new chains of reflex connections. 
Let us see if we are right in this assumption. 
One of the first assumptions encountered in Thorndike's treatment 
of learning is what he oalls the "asaoo iative shirt~" By this he re• 
fers specitioally to the practice or connecting"• • • desirable em.o• 
tional and appetitive:,responsea with situations o,t life •• , .ft (p. 325) 
This process can well be illustrated in politics. Let us assume the 
' ' 
political orator knows he can achieve a desired response from the 
voters by making reference to "mother." But he also wants the voters 
to respond in a similar manner when he refers to the Republican PartyJ 
how does he do this? He uses the nassociativa shift" in this wayJ He 
will give the "mother" stimulus to the voters an,d at the same time at• 
taoh to it the name ot the ,b.epublioan Party. After a certain. length 
or time wherein numerous repetitions have ocourred, ha oan remove the 
ttmother" stimulus and get the same results by mentioning the name of the 
Republican Party. According to Thorndike,, this new connection has been 
.formed by means of the associative shift• 
The associative shift is a device or practice advocated by Thorn• 
dike for the purpose of changing inborn connections and any modes ot 
conduct whioh hava been acquired early in l He.,_ He :further uses this 
device in tying up old learning with the new learning. It provides the 
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necesaaey bridge between old· and· :new oonneotions. Stated simply. it 
is a process of shifting from formed associations to new ones. 
By proposing the associative shift Thorndike assumes the indi• 
vidual>to>,b• passive to any situation in question. In the last analy• 
sis• the individual has no ohoioa as to which com:ieot ions will be form• 
i 
ed, he does not evaluate a s.ituation in terms of experiances •. -nor can 
' I . ' . 
he plan any action with foresight. of consequences. The elements of a 
situation are presumed to have absolute meaning• specit'io elements in a 
situation ·are presumed to have fixed atimulua•value. and oan in and or 
themselves evoke speoifio responsa1h Earlier Thorndike wrote that;: · 
"• · • • if that part of the situation occurs in a,new,contexh', th9;t part . . . 26. 
of the response has a certain tendency to appear! ., •• • , He still . . . . . 
holds this to be true. for we read, nTo any situation the same person 
. .. ., ' . 
will always make the same reJponae.,. 11 (p. 10). !o be more spaoi!'io we 
Both common praotioe and soienoe have been more interested 
1n what responses the elements of situations will evoke 
tha.Jl in what total situations will evoke. (p. 9) 
Here, then, wa see an individual as being passive to elements of a sit-
uation. The individual does not evaluate the situation but is subject 
to the impulses it evokes •. 'the elements ot a situation and the pay• 
ohologioal bonds associated with them rather than the meaning of a 
.· situation will determine what the individual will do. 
But how oan any element of' a situation become assoo iated with any 
reapons,? .. Or• how does learning take plaoe? In, considering this pro• 
, blem, we must keep in mind that Thorndike 1s frame of rareranoa appears 
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to be rea.list:toii, and ·that thf,l r.,onnaotfon..,.formlng. I,rooaas b in terms·· of 
matter, end of physiological processes.·· Thus, • find sxpt.assed by 
Thorndik& tho ooncept of "sheel;" repetition" e.s a mode of leamin.g;. lfu 
1-\Tl:bes, tot! instance~ 
· lf by persuasion or coercion,. by hook or by c:roo}c,, a person 
is caused to do a. good thing, thero ia much to bo gained,. 
Por contra,. e'!Tery etror is costly. (p .. 958) ----
Thus,. doapite Thorndike •s tendency to discom:r,t tho yalua ot #mere £ra-
quenoy or oecur'Lett (p. 14) he does not regard it as ino~rative. ff~ 
holds that "The occ~oe o~ S•'.R inorea2os thtJ strength of the connect. 
ion. 11 {p .. 14) Obviously.,. this position simply assumes that aonsa :im• 
pressions and responses beoom.a a.utomaticallf·a.ss.ocia:ted :rogardlesa of 
their distinctive.1r,3anings to i."'ldivid.uals at various times. It means 
that tho person "i'lho eon ba ooeroed into a rapatitive pt-coess will baeome 
automatic 'Vrl.th regard to so::ne form of' action regardless of oonsaqu.enoes .. 
!Jost osrtainly. this b not a pioture of' a reflective individual. who is 
deemed to be actively reorganizing expor:te:nec.: 
Some one may protest to this interpretation or Thomdik~ by in~, 
di.outing that his use of the eonoopt "belongingness" :bnplies an i_nsight-
M individual capable of comparing ru1d oontJ.'astillg e~parianoes. ~om• 
· diko does not discuss 'belongingness in Ruman. lia.ture md the Social Order, 
. . . --·------------
but we :indicate at this point the manner in v.bioh this principle 
is ;presumed to operato. By repetition two or mora elements of a st:lm.• . . 
'Ul.us bea0111e aasocie.ted as th~ they ware a composite. It only part· 
of the composite is produced,... a complete :-osponse.will usually not be 
evoked and tho organism will expcrienoe an un.aasiness or tension. . !hen, 
if the missing part of the composite· stimulus is intjr,oduoed. the total 
re1:1ponse is e,roked snd tennion is :.·elieved. The point is that certain 
elements of' situations do have complete stimulus valuo.1 and roquire 
that the po.r·ba which belong with it be praso:at also. Belongingness it 
based on a r.iecrui.ni<?al aanociation,. and not nsoosso.rily on tha basis of 
a paraeived relationship •. For instance, beenuso "bread and butteru are 
often associated together in some ,person's repetitive axpcn:"'iences,. 
»braadtt m.ust be· assooiated with nbuttertt in-ordor to evoke th~ response 
that "bread and buttertt 8Vokas. In other words., st:imuli that are seri-
ally or coincidentally associated are prosumad to belong together· 
im.ather they are dynamically related or not. Of course,. the individual 
is not cognizruit pf role.tionahips in this situation, but is simply 
paSaive to cha.nee associations of stin.uli. 
Returning to the problem of the acquisition of new psychologfoal 
bonds, or new organizations of refloxos,. wo observ3 that Thorndike is 
not willing to trust ths r3petitive process alone to stamp ·in bonds or 
conn0ctions. lie introdueeo a vitalistio factor in the form of wants 
and emot:i.o:ns which ope;ratea as a. rewarding meohanism. Paralleling Wat-
son. Thorndike holdi, then"$ tm1st ba a physiological relaase of tension, 
a feeling rrbs.te vrhich a.rises when the oorreot response is giveti. He 
elahorz:l.tos upon this to n m.uoh zroa.tor anent than did Watson. In 
.speaking about this in connection with tha asaooiativfl shift ho writes, 
Theoretice1.lly the formul.a of p1"ogress,. from. abodr, to abod~i' 
to abcfia. to abfgh' to afghi to. fghij, might result in attach• 
ing a:ny response wha.t'a've'Fto any situation whatever. provided 
only that we arrange a.t.f'Airs so that at every at&p the ro-
aponse X was mote satisfying :tn its oonsequencos than balk ... 
ing or doing anything else that the person could do. 27 • 
fhis means that a physical $te.te of s;tiafaotion or annoyance should 
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should be dirootly attached to the activity. '!'hus1 £or instanoe.,. in: 
discussing th~ n..lianges that take Place in neural connections. Thorndike 
The manges :initiated in human brains ara on tho whole 
sorvioeable in satisfying human wants. Those vm.iob. ar-it 
outcomes of impartial scientific observation and inf$r/3noe 
<liseovermg naturo•s ~nays have b~an spaoially suoees1;rful 
in satisfying human wants,. They opsrate by e."langine; man •s 
own beha Vior into forms more suitable to obtain satis• 
faction from the rost of naturllh .. • (p. !597) 
Rs moans to imply hero that 1'rt\nts ars 11tilized in br:lnr;ing about ohange. 
28. 
Thus_. a reslistie teacher seeks to diraot the associative shift in 
eueh mannor that thel"'l will be satisfaction of hum.an i.vants. The satis• 
faction of wants brings about· a re1~as¢ of peysiologieal tension. This, 
fhorndika holds is the 'pleasant ef'feot whioh Wtl usu.ally os.11 "rM"mrds." 
taaohar who is t.amiliar with the typical ola.ssroom situation realizes 
how often huma..'11vnnts 1u•11 ignored because of their in.expedienoy. Un• 
' doubtedly. Thorndike is a,mre of this. At any rate, ir human ·wants can• 
not be the satisfi$rs. how then oan lto be asa-u.red of tho ongoing of the 
educative process? Thorndike makes this speoific nuggestion1 
••• a satisfier happening to a. man re1nfaroes or 
strengthens any modifiable mental connect ion with 
which it is assooiatad. (p. 102) 
The state of feeling occurring a.t tha end ot the response strengthens 
28. l3y nw Thorndike has sho'Ml himself to ba a m.saha:n.5.stio vitalist• 
Wants imply a tsleologiaa.1 blua .. pr1nt. .And th\l aa.tiafaction of 
wants may releo.ss tension, ·t;he sntl.sfy:tng state ls of-ton an ex-
cited state which cannot ba differentiated objectively from. a 
eta.te or a.nnoym:ic,e,, The feeling state is e ·maohanlo!:il, teleological. 
devi<hh 
when the same stitlul us. is repst1.ted. 1)3r applying this p:rinoiple., Thorn• 
dik~ suggests that ". ,., • the meru;i.s of. curing an idl,:,r :ta to somehow or 
other get h5.m to wo:rk and r~rd him therefore,.,» (l?t 20$) ln other 
words• it 1.s :necessary to arrange far some· spoaial satie!'aotion to fol• 
low the effort ot the idler; but the ra11,'ard need not be fonnd in the 
activity itself. All -vro have to do is·,. by some hook or crook,, got. the 
individual. to do the thing ,....-a want him to do, and then t;Joe to it tbat 
ha is re,•:i1i.rdecl., flo will then continue doing th€: thing we want him t() do. 
The connootion to be fomed is thus exercised e.nd it is also reinfotc<td 
-.11. th a satisfied f"eel ing on the pa.?t of ·tho indi 'rldual in question. In 
an,oth8r insto.noa Thorndiko su:ggeots almoot the som(!) thing: 
• • • by so ttrfUlging ru.uttera tha:b the imm.odiato oon• 
eaquenoes of its operation are satisfying to the person. 
the tendency ean, except for the strong· (.)Ont.ra:cy fol"ces, 
be strengthened. so. by un:t"ortunate attachments, bo1•rible 
parvoraio:i.a rna:r be or.ta.blishod ••• • (p. 957) 
Tl't..e prime t-equisite for the aatisf.ior :111 that :tt follow· tha activity. 
The whol$ prooer!S is a blind on~ ot sensitivity and n.Elura.1 eonn9otions 
in whioh there is no lozica.l noed for the aatii:tt'ier to be intrinsic. 
The faijling•sta.t~ is bioloe;ioally dotormined and therofora. it hae no 
pex-tinon<H) to pur;?Olle• All that. is neoesrm.cy is to ha:lfe "• • • a 
satisi'i$t' happening to a rrian ••• •" (p. 102) 
Tho.rndik~ writes much oonearning an 1:n:t;ellootual proooaa in vhioh 
the rG"t,ard oomos in oonss:1quaneo of a.n intolligent pl:;,,n of' action; but 
on the afHlum~d ultbtate reality of the pa:rtu•-aleotrons and protons • 
. And when ho ~ooks to into:rpret huma.n nattu"e, h'3 doos so wi'lihin the 
!imitations of phyoiologioa.1 prooesseIJ. So, if rovre.1:•ds moan nnything 
in Thorndikia.n psychology• they too must keep within these ,ph:ysi.ii. 
ologioal limits. To illustrate; let us look at Thorndike•s description 
of confirming reaction (a satisfying st~te used to reinforce a reaction 
tendenoy),. 
The conf"ir:rning reaotion do&s not result• meohanically from 
every satisf ior and. does not exert its force· indifferently 
upon whatever connaotions are occurring. A man may e,x. 
perianoa a- condition or intense sa.tis:f'aotion without die• .. 
charging any confirming reaction.,• " ,. He is operating; in· 
a. system where the confirming reaction tends to follow sat-
isfaotions of certain special sorts., and tends to atte.oh •'i,1i'-" 
self to eonnootions to which it nbelong~•! ,(PP .. 1:•JQ4 ... 105) · 
· ;• : · · • , · / .,_·;·r\·1 ./::i·}.}/ · , 
We have in this quotation a fleeting glimpse c:,,f ~n '1ntelligent .obsa:r• 
ver, but only momentari.lJ• The confirming reaction. de::icribed is 
pbysiologioa.1 1 and insi.ght is only incidentally introduced into .the 
picture• Thorndike does not bother to tell us bow· a e onfirrdng react• 
ion might *'tend to attach itself to oonneotions" described .a.s belong• 
29. 
ing, -Basic to this tendency ot the asl'loeiation. or feeling with re• 
sponse is the meohanioaL requisite of biological proximity• Here we 
have it stated in Thorndike's Offll wordsi 
This confirming reaction baa the proptiilty::of strengthening 
any modifiable oonneotion upon which it e.ots. It acts ,upon , 
: a:ny such connection .which is sensitive to its in!'J;µanoe by 
reason of having just tunctioned. The confirming reaot:lon 
thus on the whole . strengthens those tenden!l ie.s which are in 
hal"lll.Ony :with and give aatistaotion to the purpoaea ot man • 
. It ,dons not do .thj.s ,infallibly or by any magical .teleology, 
but as .a biological to~ce in the brain. Sometimes, in .t'aot, 
it spreads or. soatters so as to strengthen., not the con'!"'. . . 
neotion,w:hioh has produ,ced an :e£fec.t satisfactory :to: the the:n 
ruling purposes. of man• but the preoeding,or i'ollowing con• 
neotions\11'. (pp, 393 ... 394) . · · · · 
' ' 
29. The.. oonoept of, "belongingness" is not stntssed: 1J1 .Human Naturo .,and 
the Social Order111 •. However, this quotation and others Isave us m 
alternative but to ·accept "belongingness• as dependent on the 
proximity of the reward response to the overt response. · . ; ' . . - ' . ' ',' ·, .. _ 
The satisfier does not,neoessarily strengthen the con• 
neetion whioh produoes the satisfier, or which is good 
for the person, or -which the person ohoC>ses to have 
$trengthened,, It does so much more often than ohanoe 
would allow, but only by virtue of tha raot that it · 
strengthens most the oo:nneotion to vm.ioh it belongs 
most olosely as a biological event, which ta usu.ally 
the con."1.eotion immediately preoed:ing it in .the strand 
of experience of which the satisfier is a part. (p, 105) 
This conception of effect does not require a.n insightf"ul individual 
who weighs the eonsequencos of his aoM.ons. Rather, it presents a 
highly organized system of connections in whioh the :f'aetor of effect 
is a.a much e. part ot the response as is the overt behavior of the 
individual• 
Probably wa can sea Thorndike •s position more olaa.l'"ly when we 
understand his "'states of mil:id0 oonoeptione Pleasant efi'octs are re• 
garded as satisfying states. To put it a little differently, lot us 
look at this statement, 
Satisfiers may be defined as states of affairs which the 
person in question in the state· of mind and body in question 
does nothing to avoid or rejeot •.•• • {p. 101) 
Just hovr this state oi' mind and body is brought about is not clear,. ex-
cept that it comas in response to a rewarding situation or stimulus. 
We do obsane~ hO'sever., that these states of mind a.re evoked by gene• 
determined neural oonneotions. We rooall that Thorndiko writes •. 
The genes ha.vs so made hµman brains that certain sit• 
uations not only evoke, certain muscular and glandular 
responses# but al so these states of mind. A sudden 
loud sound not only makes e. child tremble and ory but 
also have this inner fear component. (p. 298) 
'l'he ganas blue•pr.int emotional responsos so that feeling states are 
evoked as well as overt behavior. This biologioal eta.to of feeling is 
the "state ot mind" whioh aooom.pan:tes any response. If the feeling 
89. 
state is pleasurable» then the response is automatically strengthened• 
Bu.t just .how a feeling state can reinforce or strengthen a tendency to 
respond is a mystery which Thorn.dike d.Oes not explain. It smacks or 
vital.iSJil,. in which a blind pui-posivism determines hunan condu.ot. this 
mu.oh is certain,, the controlling factor is both mechanical and deter-
ministic. This is veritied by Thorndike •s etatement -that,. 
There is,. however, a fundamental tendency tor a satis• 
fying status to produce a oonfirming reaction t"egard• 
less of a.ny reaso:nablenest or relevance. (p., 105) 
It educators aqoept this position,. they must plan an educational. 
progr8Jl1 that does not depend on nor demand reneot:tve action Qn the 
pari of the learner, but £ollo-w$ instead a oarefully imposed plan dG• 
signed to evoke pleasant biological states. In fact. that is emotl,-
what !h.o:rndike suggests. 
30. 
By rewarding a tend&noy (to thought, · feeling• or action) 
in a person at the time that it 0pera.tes., that is1 by so 
arranging matters- that the immediate oonsequenoes of its· 
operation are satisfying to the person, the tendenoy- can. 
except for strong eon.traey tqroes, be stJ:"engthened. (p. 95?) 
He fortifies this idea by making conclusions such as this• 
Experiments in which everything is kept identical save 
the attachment of a satisfier to th.a situation.-response 
oonneotion at once reveal the satisfier as a powerful 
toroe, and the connection as c,hanging notably in 
strength because of it. (p .. 103) 
That is., we have a physical state of pleasantness arising at the oom• 
pletion of an activity. The reward is not inherent in the aotiv!:t,-. 
it merely follO'WS or is adjacent to the activity. Reward is presumed 
30. The wrd "thoughtrt need not disturb us here. We must remember 
that to Thorndike thought is just a particular kind or response. 
10. 
to confirm a. reaction te.ndenoy. · Thus, it w,a propoi,e to change hu•· 
man oonduot, wo do so by arranging· to have. des ired physiological states 
· e.ccompany speoifio modea of. action. It· is suggested thatt 
A main fa.otor in the, understanding or human behavior 
. is sound knowledge • of the. confirming reaction,. and a 
mab1 · factor in sucoesstul humnn enginaertng is, in• 
· gen.uity in arranging 1ll.$.tte'ro so that oon:firming re-
action vrorks • on one•s: · (p. 106) · .· · 
Any- modification of behavior, then, takes plaoe by- a oe.reful 
"planting" or rewards. Thorndike recommends· this specifically in state ... 
ments s\.toh as this: 
•• \• •· the best means•ot curing e. drunkard- is to reward 
him when he is sober.• (p. 206} 
In order to build up e.n acoeptable :f'orm of human behavior we must talce 
the modes of behavio-r which are present and reward only those which are 
desirable, 
We find, then• that both 'Watson nnd Thorndike agr,~a that the hum.an 
organism is ne.tivoly endowed with simple neural connaotiona and oertain 
oombi:oat:tons of serially connected. reflexe_s. They both· agree that 
reeling eta.tea fao1l:ltat$ and direot the reorganization ot human be• 
havior.. And for both of' them rewards are not necessarily intrinsic to 
. . . 
problem.;.solving. For them native oonnaction1faooount for much of be• 
havior, and inherited oonneotiona or certain .feeling states account tor 
modification of the native responses, Thoy agree that feeling states 
' . - . ' 
are evoked mechanically and indepondently ,ot the consequenoes of be• 
havior. This must mean that the learner is presumed to be passive 
31. Apparently Thorndike does not consider the possibility or subjects 
following a rl)quired plan of aot ion because of the rG\'lard,. but 
rather because the reward confirms the pl~n of aotion, 
71. 
from the beginning to the end of the learning situation as 'it pertains 
to .tho native behavior patterns. . That is to aay• tha native responses 
.are thought to be evoked by st:lmul t. In this operation thei·e 'is no 
conscious a.ffort nor opportunity i'or the individual to sat up and evai• .· 
uate ,a plan of' action. 'Than, ,by means of control of stimuli, a teach• 
er, for instance, is presumed capable or integrating and modifying 
native responSEJs. ':rhis control is two•fold, by strengthan:lng of con• 
nections through repetition and by. evoking or feeling statas. And with 
reference to feeling states the learner is presumed to be pa.sdve. He 
ie roroed into ropetitive activity and is seduced by extrillsio rewards. 
Pleasant reeling states are artificially aroused and are _independent 
of the oonsequences of tho behavior. Obviously, it this is true• the 
individual h not. roquired to be conscious of the consequences of' his 
baha-vior,. for rowards entirely unrelated to the activity may strength• 
en .a connection. If demooracy :t.mpliaa an active individual who be~ 
. ·, . . . ' 
comas increasingly mora independent in his ability to loarn, Thorndike 
32. 
of't'ers no adequate conception or learning. Thorndike seems ,to plaoe 
great ~phasis upon the associative shift in the modification of orig.,. 
inal and early aoquired behavior pa:bterns. However, in desoribing the 
acquisition or new neural connections, he appears to be se.tisf:ted that 
the principle or ntrial and succoas" will impress new bonds on the 
. . - . 
learner. The 0 trie.1"' aspect is o. random activity on the part of the, 
individual. Genorally spe!;lking, any behavior whioh is non-purposive in 
32, The reader will raquira,a positive statem~nt r~garding the tuncti.9~ 
of the learner in a learning· situation1 an adequate conception 0£ 
rewards• and an appropriate· ,conception of education for a demo~ 
ora.cy. Such statements are given briefly on P• 78 ff or this · 
dissertation. 
its outlook implies suoh random aotiv.ity. Any organization which ma.y · 
. aocrua oomes about by chanoe, But since Thorndike is not willing to 
orodit hmnan organization to ohanoo1 he attempts to eo~ine chance with 
feeling statas., Earlisr ill ,his career ho rofel"red to this principle as 
•ttrial · and .orror.'l llovt he has :'.modified thi3 notion so."rlewhat by sub"" 
stituting the :term ·"suoeessrt tor th"l older term ot uerror." However, 
this does no·t .reflect a change in outlook; ;1.t simply rafleots greater 
emphasis upon l"ewards or evoking pleasant feeling; states •. 
; Let ,u~ examine the trial aspeot of this prooe·ss. · Hora is an · 
individual, a passive organisnt ,timulatod and under tonsion. Pre .. 
sum.ably this individual has no plan or action nor is oons~iously aware. 
of consequences . .,. . ,He must. rely wholly on random neural oomieotions to 
make whatever adjustments are necessary in order to• respond to the 
stimulus. Without purpoaa or plan various responses are automatically 
and blindly evoked to relbve the tension or uneasiness. (If this pro-· 
oess ware stated 1n proper Thorndikian .fashion, we would say that the.· 
tension evokes the numerous types of responses ,mioh are adjacent to 
the oonduoting nerve)• 'Watson presents a similar picture. He holds 
that the multiplioity or responses oeases only when the physiological 
tension has oeaaod, And should the stimulus arise again_ the responses 
would ooour again in varying orders until one would bring about an ad• 
justmant. Such a oonoopt of trial and error provides for no oonscioua 
ef'.f'ort on the part of the learner• 
A related method mentioned by Thorndike as a means of acquiring 
nEm organizations or new learnings is tha;t or inducing a oorraot trial. 
as the .first response. By a manipulation of the enviromi:mt oorroct 
patterns ot behavior are evoked, repeated and rewarded. One might des• 
ignate this as learning by a.n imposed design. It ia reoa.lled that 
Thorndike writes, 
If' by hook or by crook, a parson aan be led, to do R as a 
response to S~ he wUlJ in, ao far forth.,, be more ,likely 
in the· future to do R ae·· a response to s.·. The occurrence 
s ... R increases the strength of the oonneotion•, '(P• 14) . . . . . . ' . . ., 
Here we have. the picture or a .Purpooeloas, insightl.ess individual,, 
passive to a stimulus which has bean manipulated by anothar person. . . . . . . : ., '< ' . i 
The stimulus evokes a flow of neural ener(?Y which the teacher, parent., . ·, ,- ' . . ;_ 
or reformer uses to lead the pae~iv$ individual into making the right 
response~ This is Thorndike ta suggestion for soienti,fio efficiency in 
education. For eduoation it implies drill in the right way or living 
; .. : : . . ' . : 
based upon anabsolutistio ttright >answer" approach to problems~ .The 
' ! ' ' ' ., " '' .. f ' • • ' 
learner is presumed to be paosive to. stimuli, unable to deoide goals 
. ' . , . ' ,' ' ' ' . . . ; , 
and oblivious to the consequences of his behavior. 
. . . 
We ob.serve then, that Th~rp,~ike reinstat~s drill ,as an effective 
method ot . teaching . s inoe• .. 
l. An act having taken place onoe is likely to occur again. 
2. Repetition reinforces the conueotion. · , 
3111 The satisfying state or mind which comas in consequence to 
a "readiness" tension, a want tension,. or in subsiding an 
uneasiness ·resulting from stimulation rainf'oroes the 
QOllnOOtion• . . , 
This position does not rees,rd as important such things ast personal. 
motive, personal initiative, and reflection. It assumes that stimuli 
have independent and fixed meanings and that thoy oan evoke identical 
responses whenever they occur. This proposition necessitates a static• 
absolutiatio classification of' both parsons and situations. Moreover, 
when Thorndike suggests that "by hook or crook" a mode of behavior 
should be induced, ha identifies h:\mself' very definitely with an au~ 
thoritarian teaching policy. Ha assumes that aomeone·w111 be able to 
decide what is right and will bo able to ,"sta.ok the oards" i!l order to 
elioit from others the right rosponses. And onae having obtained a 
right t•esponae0 a passive learner will react in this prescribed manner 
simply because he has done it before. Surelf•' _in a ~ociaty where an 
individual is expected to make hie ovm. decisions~· and in w-hieh coercion 
· is .not to be tolerated• realism,. as described here, has no plaoe. 
Thorndikt makes muoh of' the fact that one oocmrrenee, makes more 
likely a reourrenoe. and th~t oontinued repetition makes a ~esponse 
oertai?h We .raoognize this as hie "law of exercise," Years ago he 
33. 
wrote "Exercise st:rengthens and disuse weakens bonds... Apparontl:y 
· he has not char1ged his mind with regard to. this "law;• avon though in 
Human Nature ~•··~ Social Order ha does state that. nMere !'fe411enoy 
' ' 
of ooourranoa · is., however:, a relat:i:vely weak strengthener of oonnaotionsJ' 
' ' 
(p. 14) Actually, he simply relegates his "law of &xeroisen to a less• 
' • • l J 
er position than it formerly held but he does 'not rule it o~t of the 
pioture. 
And whon ha tells .us that repetition is a relatively weak devioa to . ' 
stamp in connections, he gives .· us at. the same iJime a· n sure fire"• trick 
which can be applied. Re says,. "A more important f'aotor is their ac• 
oompanimBnts or immediate a.f'tiE'lr•effecta." (p. 14) An after-effoot · is 
the plea.sure-pain prinoiplu .al:ready mantion~d. It __ implies that a satis• 
fic,d state following an action .iS El. reinforcer of a. bond• .And in this 
'i'ogard inherent prefereno~ and l1readinessn function as p,:,edaterminers 
and rewarders. We read, 
Moreover• the fraquant.evoking;.of a reuponse by a situation 
not only makes that situation likely to evoke it• but it 
33. E. J.. Thorndike• Eduoational .Psychology, Vol. l• P• 12, (1912) 
also associates with that situation an impulse to make the 
response. lot to make the response involves a certat.n 
annoyance. To give way to the impulse, if not positively 
enjoyable, is at least preferable to restraining it. {p. 209) 
That is to say• it an S•R bond is in the process of formation, or has 
already been formed• it is satisfying to the organism to have a re•_ 
sponse ooour! It is annoying not to have R happen after Sis given • 
.Here we have a passive individual responding to a situation as though 
he were rei,,~ased by the trigger ot a gun. 
Implied in Thorndike's use of "annoyanoe9 and ''preferencen is th6 
34. 
vitaliatic conception ot pleasure•pain. as causal factor to bond• 
formation. He shows himself to be unwilling to leave the recurre~oe ot 
an S•R to ohanoe. Each repetition of a response to a stimulus finds a 
greater tendency on the part of the individual to respond in that 
particular manner. 'this ~\endenoy might be described as a tension which 
is followed by a pleasant feeling-state of release or :relaxation upon 
completion of the "correct" response. 
The satisfaction which follows the tension aco~pa.nying readiness 
is not the only feeling effect stressed by Thorndike. Be places a great 
·deal ot emphasis upon the control exercised by human wants. He says. 
He (man) is born with certain wants and proclivities 
(called "drives," by many psychologists) and acquires more 
34. Pleasure and pain seem to be biological functions, and the ea.tis• 
tyingness following the release of a tension is used as a reasonable 
explanation ot this from the raalistst point of view. But it re• 
mains a mystery why satisfaction and pleasure should accompany any 
blind response to stimulus. Basically, hedonism is teleological. 
An objective galvonometer does not distinguish between pleasure and 
pain. Pleasure is often as biologically exciting a.s pain. But 
should pleasure be simply the removal ot tension• .1 earning might 
not take place. Otten the greatest tensions occur just prior to 
their release. · Under this condition the organism might inhibit the 
response and prevent •its completion·. 
by growth and experience. These determine in large measure 
what he does e.ndwhat he becomes. A man is an organization 
of S•R connections operating in the servioe of a group or 
suoh wants. "drivesn or proclivities. .<P• 8) 
Thus, although man•s S•R bonds may be import~t, inborn wants are pro• 
sumed added selective agencies ,which determine'his conduct,. These wants 
are the deux ex maohina ot human nature. And, although they appear aa _______ ..,....____ . ' 
less complex than instincts, the~,:' are nevertheless selective elements 
in human conduct and are no less vitalistic. 
In speaking about forming new patterns of behavior, as well as 
about modifying those whioh are native· to the organism., Thorndike says, · 
"The essential. characteristic of wants is the behavior they cause." (p. 
'99) Wants form new organizations in response to a situation. Presumably 
tension caused by a\'want will be released only- after the want has been 
36. , 
f.latis!'ied• 1 , The,. satisfying stat~ which aooompanies this release of 
I . l 
tension somehow oonf'irma· the response as bein·g ,the right ona. This 
state oan hardly be distinguished 'from Watson•s ;feeling states and is 
just as teleologioal in its· implications or oonsequanoes. A non•ter• 
minal · and recurring want is thought' to' give direction 'to an organism by 
the release experienced when a we.nt•gratii'ying act is petomed. 
In·addition to the satisfaction· v.bioh :f'oilQWS the tension of read• 
inese' and the satisfaction whioh'oomas when behavior serves to satisfy 
' wants. Th~rndike assumes that rewards can be' arranged 'to follow an, aot• 
iv!ty and thereby str'engthen it. · Se applies this principle as 'rollowsi 
But theoreti'cally 'the means· of' ouring an idler is to some• 
how or other get lfiin to :work and reward .him therefor. Simi• 
35. "• • t,~ satisfier happening to a man reinforces or strengthens aey 
modifiable mental connection with which it is associated." (p. 102) 
larl7 the best ~aans of curing a drunkard is to renrd,him 
when he is sober. (p. 206) 
What Thorndib implltu1 here ia that any behavior pattern, can be mad• 
habitual. by supplementing it with an, kind of reward. At tirs'i the 
individual. i.s seduced into aa activity "by hook OF by orook/' then the 
correct response is rewarded• Th• nwat'd ot pleasant effect ii not 
.. , ' 
necessaril7 ,intrinsic to the aot. rho~diko does not state that th• 
I !' :· ,,· - • 
idler will tind. joy in his work aot! in·the f'elated ".oonsequenoes ot his 
\ , •;t ,1 
wort. .- tho only th~ that i • 11ecessary- is to Gee to S. t tbai= the ao't; 
.. 
predetermine4 aa correct is toll.owed by some kind ot t-ewat'd• We have 
already cited Thorndilce•s ·statement that, . . 
,, 
There is·• however. a fundamental tendency for a aatisfying 
status .to produce a. confirming reaction regardless or aq, 
reasonableness e>r relevance. (p. 105) · · 
!rhera are, then, t'.WO ·requiaitea tot ocnfirm.atton through .rewai-dst namely, 
(1) su.ftioient potency or strength to cross tt..e thrt8h()ld of .. sensit~v-
1ty~ and (2) biologicuil ooinoidtUO<h It "The potency ot a oontirm:tng re-
action may bear little ·~elation to the-' intensity of the ·,•·at i~fier ," 
. ' 
(p. ·1e) and it it _n&ed not- be reasonable nor rele-nnt (p. 106b any kind 
ot reward will do. The l'eward will tend to reintoroo all connectioua 
operating at that partioule.~· time,. but particularly the on• ~ecliately 
connected in time and space. we reoall that f.horndiu ,writes, 
The s11tistier does not neoessarily strengthen the con• 
nsotion which produces tm, · satisfier, or which bi gaod. 
tor the person,. or which the person chooses to have 
strengthened. It does so much more often than chance 
would allow, but only by vb:tue of the tact that it 
strengthens most the oounection to·whioh it belongs 
most closely as a biological event, whioh is usually-
the connection immediatelJ preceding it in the strand -
ot experience ot which the satisfier is a part. (p. 105) 
Here it is. then. that we observe Thorndike 1n the throes ot a oontlict 
between :realism and vitalism. Re persists in his mechanistic expla• 
nations of pain and pleasure. He is a vitalist to the extent that he 
presumes biological wants and drives to be impoaod upon. the organism. 
But we must bear in mind that such vital ism is· deterministic• Hance, 
ba he atomist or vitaliat he considers the individual passive in a 
learning situation. Ee readily states, 
By sufficient skill any :response of which a person is 
· capable · oan oonoeiva.bly be attached to any stimulus to 
which he is sensitive. (pp. 19•20) · 
Truly. this conception of learning and motivation is no less dater• 
ministio than is Watson's and hence is no more adequate for education 
in a democracy. 
By way 0£ contrast• we have already noted that beoau.se demooraoy is 
a planning society, individuals must be capable of ,participating in the 
planning. • That ia, individuals must participate in reforming society., 
_.· ·. ....... ''' 
and by this very token they oar.mot be automatona conforming to stimuli. 
'' ' ... :.;· ",, .......... , . 
Bayles points out that .... • th~ democratic oonception is based upon •.· '1J- . ·. . . . 36. · . 
the"'oompatknoe on the part of all ... •" and follows with the state-
ment, 
••• that eduoa.tion in a democracy must be designed to 
stimulate and assist each pupil progressively to develop 
a more oompatant knowledge of' and ability to oopa with 
his world., and simultaneously to develop an auginented37 ability to learn by himself • to think ref'leotively. • 
Moreover, a teacher or a parent can not a~thoritatively plan for the 
learner what neural oonneotions ha will be required to have in the 
tuturei, Helle?&• the teacher. assists the individual in becoming refleo• 
sa. Bayles,, "The Ralati,rity Principle as Applied to Taaohing/' Uni'" 
varsitt o.f Kansas Bulletin of .Education., Vol., IV., No. 4,. 
Bayles. op cit, P• S. ---
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tive, assuming that by placing faith in the reflective mothod the in• 
dividual will bo oapabla of taking oara of'. any type of' situation which 
may arise. 
If' the individual is to ba capable of independent thinking and•, 
learning, the educational prooess must provide him with opportunity for 
development in this direction. Certainly, the S•R bond concept doee 
not provide for it because someone else makaa the deoiaions f'or the 
learner. The "right•anS1rer" technique in which "• ,. • evory error is 
oostly," (p,.. 958) implies that only one answer, the teaohar•s, is right 
and it must be so impressed upon the nervous system. 
Actually,. the data suggestr_; that learning does not take plaoe as 
described by Thorndike• but rather in a mannor quite in keeping with 
38. 
damooraoy. It is not neoassary to seduce or "humbug" the learner 
into a particular mode of' learning conduct. Wheeler and Perkins· point 
out that "No pupil will 1 earn how to study without the · will to learn 
. 39. --
and without a dotinite goal.'' This means that tha learning situ-
ation in and of itself must presont .a problem to the learner. As the 
learner evaluates the problem•situation, ha sets up a goal which he 
wishes to achieve, one which he believes will resolve the dif'fioulty. 
Wheeler and Perkins further indionta that the goal be the laarner,!s • 
They write, 
'l'ha goal is definite, in this case, for it is his own. 
When the imposed goal is the abstract ona of the adult, 
the child will not grasp it; instead, he sets up goals 
38. Ross t. Finney, in A Sociological Philosophy of Education, P• 365, 
states that1 11 Thare-iu a sense in which motivation is affective 
just in the degree in whioh tha teacher suoceeds in hwnbugging 
the child." 
39, Wheeler and Perkins, -Principles 2,!, Mental ~veloeant, P• 403• 
·of his ovm, and if be cannot find them in tho eubjoot 
matter• w:hioh is usually the oase, be wlll find thffl in 
daydreaming. ~etting by, or cheating the teacher,. • · 
so. 
We see, then, thnt in every siti..iation the leamor doos select a. 
goal independently or tt'taoher-pla."lned aativitlas and goals,. But it the 
teacher is busy with e. drill process or with matters that preoen't no 
problem to the learner there is an in&xouaabla waste of et.fort. In· the 
mean time0 the learner loses the ansistanoe a teaohel"' should give him 
in evaluating h1.8 problem, :in planning an a.ttaok upon .t:t,. in observing 
and gathering data,. in oonsidoring alte.rnate solutions,. and in making 
independent decitdonli• 'lb.is ia the assbtanoa a lee.mer requi'ros if ha 
is to became oompetont in a demoore.ay. It is not th& assistance he re-
" 
cei:ves if' he is drilled into modes of conduct already docidad upon as 
correct. e.nd if ho is seduced by rewnrdawhiah may no~ ni,oassarUybe 
relevant to the activities in which he is engaged •. 
And at thla point we note that as the tenohar rabsa problams that 
are a matter or oouoem to.the learner, it will be found that the pro• 
blems in and of themsolves not only t•urnish tho goals, but also the. 
inoontives. That b, the resolution of ,a probl0tn and tha insight.a 
that aoorue are the re,mrde for pex-sistence to follow through until 
the problem is aolved •. Special inducements by way of extrinsic re• 
wards become supm-fl.uouG einoe the problem and its splution furnish 
both goal and re•nard, Spacial inducements by wny of axtri.naio rarrar~c 
arc, not only undemoozta.ti'3, but they are also psyohologioa1ly super• 
flUOUh 
A brief comparison of th& reltttiviatio ooncapt or problem•ra.ieing 
40• Ibid, P• 404• -
81. 
and problem•solving with the realiStio one must lead one to make the 
following observationst 
1. The problem•raising and problem•sol ving- approach is more· 
in. keeping with demooraoy than tho real istio • 
2. · The relativistic concept of goal selection and develop• 
ment of insights iB more in keeping with recent experi• . 
mental data. 41 • . · · ·.: · · · 
3. The insights accrued and the solutions. found a.re rewards 
in and of themselves and do not neoessitate allowing for 
the _use of unsound and undemocratic inducements. 
o. Summary of Thorndike• s Interp:retat ion·;of Buman Nature, .· 
Despite Thorndike •s _use of the phrase, "meaning.t"ul situations," 
'· .. '.., 
(p. 160) he makes no adequate provisions for. it. in his oonoeption ot 
motivation• The three suggestions ho makes most emphatically provide, 
' , , ,,, , ,' , L ! • I , ', , ,. \ ', 
no place for a goal•soeking• problem-solving _individual t'unotioning 
. ,'' ' 
, in a democracy•· Thotndike•s outlook is chief~y a.bsolutistio with re• 
gard to native human nature ,(gene deter.mined}. the meanings of situ-
, ; ' 
a.tions (stimuli and rewards).- and acquired hum.an nature (wants and. 
neural connections)• Three recommendations he makes epitomize this 
. ·; ' . ' : . 
position., They are, 
l • rtBetter genes." (P• 957) . The genes have ~he respon• 
sibility of passing on native wants and connections 
as well as passing on the kind of material out or which 
desirable connections can be made. · ' · ' ' 
2• . ul3etter training 'bi rewards." (p,. 957) · By accompany• 
. ing a desirable response immediately- w:ith a suitable 
reward (pp. 14, 17,, 206• 957) ThorndiJce·assumes that 
improvement will take plaoe. 
41. Extensive bibliographies and a more adequate diousaion of this 
problem will be found in such texts ass 
B. :a. Bode, How We Learn, 
n. s. Jennings. The Biological Ba.sis ot Human Behavior. 
w. Koehler, The Mentality of A.pas. -
Kurt Kof'fk&.The Growth. or-:a,:o Mind. 
K. s. tashley-;-iJro.in M:eclii'nTsms""'aiicf Intelligence, 
Wheeler and Pericins.,. I')rinoiplas ~ntal Davelopn.ent. · 
a. nbatter tn.il'ling by sheer repetitlo:a..·0 (p. $57) ·HG 
· suggests that euthtnios follow the aeohaninic prhl• 
oi~~e '!t t~pet-ition• 
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All 1:" all,. wt ee, ~at Th'>~dike. <loes not V"e••· tat, from thE!t real• 
1,tio pattern ot thought•• •~•p~i~ed b~ Wat_,011- . H•. ~lldow-$ human 
. ,,) , ' 
eltmenta with absolute 4Ua1ities and thus aot·u)un,ts· tor human na:tru.re or.t 
' J ' • \ 1 ., ' , • 
tl'l$ ha.Bid ot. g,enes• bonds• and 1'1Sllta •.. The gan$s a.tie th• ohief d&ter-
minel',i ot· neural oom:ieotiona and wuts.. The intog~~;9r$ ot bumtm. atom.a 
, ' • , • • , 1 • -,.· •• .-i 
are tor Thorndike:, teelJng state·•• pleasu.re•patn.,: burtd.ncta., wanta;lt;: 
• ' '• I • '/ ' • • • + ,1 ' 
and drives. · these tenns ~r• US$d to describe biolog1oal p.rooess!;}g:;·· but 
., ,:J ' 
because thq h.n.pl7 predetermination o: beha. vior they sugget3t a vita• · 
• I • . ' ' .)! 
listio impoeiiU.on ot a deus a And stnce the elements of 
' ' ·-----. . . ' ' . ·' . • ' ' ,_ ' I • -r~ ' , .• 
,ituatio~ ·ar~ pre~td bf him to have~ independent and. tixed meanings• 
' ', ) 
they consequently have: rued sti1ll.ulua value. 
Buman :rature,. the~., oonaiats of ntural oonneotion, and native wants, 
:19h1Qh toge~ with objec>tlY• stimuli account tor beha'f'i<>r• ~is may 
' . . ' ' ' ' 
:, I 
be J:'tgarded as obj.eetivt o~ realiatic determinism 1n which ,orgaization. · 
• • ' ' ' • l 
qt S+R bonda · 1, loosely ao~~ttd tofl by endowing ~• burum. mass nth 
•ttaliatio govotl\ora ·b.o,m ~iously as h~ wantca, desires, emotions, 
• • ' > - I , ' 
dri:v•a• urges, etc. Th& genes. control the deirelo~ent ot all 11&~ive 
orgeiaationt including simple J-efl$xea. 'basi,o instimts and am.otioita. 
fhe,. indi"ri.~1 is pa1sive matter whioh:ts aote.-d upon b:, ~rtimuli• From 
' ' .. ''"; ,•. ' 
·th1$ standpoint the individual .t,s .not. consciously :aotive in problem-
1olving or goal•dit!tcted a~tivity.. The situa:tio11t he <H:mfronts are en• 
dewed with absolute stimulus values and his t)Wn.aatwt ii endowed with 
, ' . 
per·ao~11 'u.1~on~rollable· responses. The responses he· acquires are 
. those cultivated through chance and arranged stimuli and rewards. 
Teaohds and parents •~• expected to arrange etiJlluli and rewards. Atter · 
as. 
; 
aufticient repetition of dosi~a'blo_:responses. enco,iraged by ne many 
rev,ards aa possible. ho is rege.~ded as edµoated, for by this ttn.e he · 
is a SyAtem Of matty responses to many &itus.tiona. 
As it ~oi-ratatld~,. tho practices;. Thorn~H~e advooat'es ·do not permit· 
volitionai problem•solvine;.aotivity on the part ot ~ho -loarrier. Haw,: 
then# ,can Thorndikianiam .or nny.~t~e~ simil~r tonn ot .absolutism ~s 
' . 
acceptable in ·a. deinoora~io ·.educational set~p1 
' -,·' 
:In a. dem.oorao,r it is·: imperative;'..that 'an i.ndividual should be· and 
• , , i ·r ; .. , 
should .oonstetly develop •an ari1ndependent. thinket•, capable ot ohoos• 
~- ' ,, ' .. 
ing his mode. of behavior intenna'of,unmed'i.a~e·and future consequences 
. . '' ! : .. ;' ,. .~·' . ',, . I , •' ' . l. . \ ' ' 'r( ' ' . :·.'· . ):.~ ' 
to himself and to bitt group,i,, ,It ·1s thor,tore highly qucnJtionilblt ,: 
I , • ' 1f ' ' • ' 1 , ·;• . ', 
,wheths:r the_ de~ermin~otio, realism ;ot Thomdike•s, philosophf'.'abould be 
aoo~rded a plaoo in: ~he s~hoo~~ or:_this or- any other _demooraoy; ·· A 
Pl!-Ssive .Jaarnar ca,m;,ot weigh.: th•- oonEJequenoes of, his .actiona•:;no m~t-
ter how- g~eat ia the' bnznediat; sati.stao.tiOll of "hie behaviof •... It ia 
·, ,, 
· impossibfe · for: an, lnclividual, to wrv,elop J.~stghtful.: lonr,~range goal.a ' 
'11 
. ! ' ·, 
by me~ns of- immediate physic~Leati~faction •. .' In a democnoy this .in• ' - : ~.. -. . ' i . ' . ' ·. ( 
aighttul • long~range ., pliuming. is. imporative\to maintain P.rogroiu:slve r~ 
tin~ont on· the·. part. of t~IJ · i~;iv~dual and hie &roup;; ~rthermore. 
, J.' l •• \, • •, , 
progressive . retinem6nt · cam1<;>t . reaul t trom making the best feaponse to .. 
, . ',.. ·; • ., ·' .:.~ c/ ' , .. ! ;·, \ .-\ ,, . :\ ' . , ,J . ·. i 
careMl,t s~le'otad extern~l- or·: internal ·stµnuli_ simply becauae :~he · 
,, •, ' ', ' . ~' . . . . '. ', ;., ', , , : . ' ,; . , 
00ttl8
1
S only when'.' each ;member of ·the 'group partioipateQ; ~ioally. in• 
- , ,• 
telligently •. and·•_intoractivelyi_,ln .the mannat ·and to.the· e~ant to 
' \,, ,, . ' ., ' . 
which he 1s best ·able to cori:tribu.te .to the·.over•all goals: of the group. 
' •'· ·, 
84. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE NATURE O'F SOCIETY 
Thus far in this stud1 of the democratic impli.oations of Thorn• 
dikian realism, we have been forced to conclude that Thorndike is 
: ' : , l , ·, , , • ' j . , , 
absolutistio in his treatment of reality and human nature. We observe 
that he assumes that individuals are pass:l.ve to inherent wants and 
native or stamped•in neural conneotions. For this reason we describe 
Thorndikianism as deterministic and as inconsistent with democracy. 
' . ' . 
However, since Human Nature and the Social Order is not primarily a --- ---- - - ------
treatise on absolutes and determinism, our conclusions have been drawn 
largely by inference. Now as we observe just what kind 0£ society 
Thorndike proposes to set up, we shall f1.nd his statements to be much 
more direct. Yfe shall be able to observe if' the provisions ha pro• 
poses for the individual and for society are essentially democratic or 
not. And if' his ideal is a democratic society, we should observe what 
he doeo about reconciling his absolutism and determinism, to whi.eh he 
is committed, with democracy. But be.fore we proceed, let us review 
briefly some of the mo:;t pertinent e.spacta of democracy. 
It will be recalled that the democratic society may be described as 
"•. • a form of' social organization which provides equality of oppor• 
l. 
tunity for participation in a growing area of interests mutually shared. n 
It we accept this statement as our oriterion for sooiety and aoolal pro-
gress. it moans we must aooept certain related positions. For instance., 
l" E. · E. · Bayles, "The Relativity Principle as Applied to Teaching, 11 
University~ Kansas Bulletin _::! Eduoe.tion, Vol. IV, lfo. 4, p.6. 
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Bayles points out that O • • " the demoora.tio oonoeption is based upon 
2. 
the assumption of competency on the part of all." That is to say. 
eaoh member of a democratic sooiety must be assumed to be competent to 
accept a responsibility .in deciding upon the nature of the institutions 
and practices which affect him~ ln this respect:, faith is placed in 
h~n intelligence. Moreover., individuals must be competent to know 
the consequ(mces or their behaviorJ they cannot be regarded as passive 
to ciroumsta.noes,, drives., innate behavior patterns., nor imposed pol• 
"• . 
ioies. Because individuals are assmnod to be competent,. they must :be· 
free to make their own decisions. 
Democracy is founded on the principle that no one is qualified to 
decide for others ,,hat they should do. This is grounded in. the belie£ 
that no parson or parsons have special access to acceptable goals for 
society. Moreover .. as individuals become more competent. and as·oir• 
~. ' 
oumstanoes change.; the policies which the individual helps formulate 
will change+ Conceqmmtly_. society must be a res<>lving, planning bod)' 
in whioh its members actively partioipate in formulating poU.cieo under 
changing c iroUD;1stanoes and expanding insights• There can be no im• 
position of fixed ends upon this kind of society.. It is a society in 
which the problems common to all serve as a basis tor mutual sharing of 
; : .L:-. 
interests and increased understanding;. On the· one hand the mutual shar• 
ing of interests and experiences is. a means whe.reby the members of a . 
demooraoy become more oompatent andunderstanding or e.aoh other• and on 
tlis other hand· it :is the maa.ns by which sooiaty :v,ill progress. 
2 • Ibid• P• 5. -. 
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· If' we are to evaluate. Thorndike ts conception of sooiety to aa-
oerta;in Us oompatibility·mth de:mooracy 'live ·may use th1:1se .factors aa 
, a•ye.rdstiok .or .rule,. , The .followi.ng ,aro apeoifio criteria with which 
.v.ra my put Thorndiko to, the taste · 
A. Does Thorndike ·aasu.ma. that the members of a society 
are 00.lllpatent to participate in sooial planning? 
Related to :this question a1·e others1 such as, {l) 
Are individuals .free to act? (2) Is·hUlllan nature 
trustworthy? 
a. Does Thorndike provide for a planni:t_j or a plann~ 
f!Ooiaty?. That is .. does '.l'horndike hoid that sooiaty 
is committed to sp8citio ends or absolutes whioh are 
pl:'edaterminad and necessitate·· speo ifio mO"des of con ... 
· duct and an adoption of' particular 11:rig,ht answers"· 
in order to e.ohieve them? 
A, Are the .Members of Sooiety Oompete.nt? 
l• Are Individuals Free to Aat?, 
Earlier in this disse1·tation it wn.e pointed out that to isolate a 
part and to endow it with inherent qualities assumes an inherent e.bso• 
lute. Such praotioe implie_a that the universe an.d any organ within it 
· is made up .of paz1;ioles. which particles in and of themselves have fix• 
ad oharaoteristios that dttterm.ine the nature and oon<luot ot t.h.e whole. 
Also. it has already been pointed out that '.{.'ho:tndike endowed the 
individual With certain properties whioh determine the nature or his 
behavior. Suoh a oonoeption of human nature impl:lea that the individ--
ual is paesi-ve,. That is, neural connections or inherent drives. rather 
than a raflootive consideration of oonsequenoes, determine what the 
individual will doe th,orndike •s position is ,..,.ell summarhed in the 
following atatmnants 
He (man) is born with certain wants and proclivities (called 
ndrives~ by many psychologists) and aoquires more by gro,vth 
and experience. These determine in a large measure what he 
does and what .ha becomes. A man is an organization 0£ s-R 
connootiona oporating in the service of a group of wants. 
"drives» or prool ivities.. (p. 8.) 
Suoh speci.fioations place within man the determining factors of' hia 
nature• That some wants and neural patterns are 1 earned., oha.nges tha 
picture vory little, for the ganos a.re prasumed to detormine to a 
large extent what ha shall 1 os.rn •. 
Moreover, Thorndike o.ssumes that individuals are endowed with pat• 
terns of conduct which may be regarded as statio olass patterns. Re 
writos, for instance, nThera are few men in whom mastery is so strong 
that if' they clo not rule enough e.t home.- they will go far to get 
rule •••• If (p., 804) Elsewhere ha writes,. "Some producers produce 
. . 
because .their natures impel them to do so.., • ., '* (pe 640) These and 
similar statements imply that :i.ncli.vi duals can be olassif'ied on tha 
baaia of innate charnotorist:ics. An. individual., then• follows innate 
pa.ttorns without regard for the s itue.tion in which he .findG. himself. 
Education in suoh an order provides either for th,~ greater unfoldment 
of these patterns, a modification of these po.tterna., or simply greater 
adaptation to thom. Dewey rvritos of this approaoh as follovrs: 
The real diffioul ty is that the ind ividv.el is regarded as 
something ~iven, something already there. Consequontly, 
he oan only bo something to ba oaterad to• something 
whose pleasures ar& to ba magnified and possessions mul• 
tiplied. When the individual is taken as somothi.llg given 
already, anything th&t oan bo dona to him or for h:im can 
only be by :way or external impressions and belonginr,s: 
sensations of pleasure and pain. comforts and saourities. 3• 
Wa have al so noted that 'l'ho:rndike suggests that human nature oan be 
modified in part by two davioes: repetition and revro.rdso Aa for re• 
petition, ano·ther person coerces the learner into a specific pattern 
3. John Dewey. Reconstruction_££. ~hilosophy, PP• 193-194• 
of conduct "by 'hook or by crook,". (p. 14) And -t,hen by the use of r•• 
wards l4 trpotition of that behavior pattern is evoked until it is· firm• 
ly implanted in the learneri: 'We have in this picrtmre someone tmo 
l'ltanipUlates the situation and the h,arnar by clever use of subtorru.ge• 
ooeroion. and rewards •. _.- The learner himself is not f'rea -co a.ct with 
oonecious reflection upon 'his ''behavior. Ha is passive to lllallipulated· 
stimuli. 
- We must oonolude11 then, that with :re.feranoei ·to innate behavior 
pa.tteirna and drivos., · and also with reference' to a wm1pulated envi• -
ronment• ,tho individual is not free to aot .intelligently. He is pre• 
aumed to be ·passive-, And,- as W'8 have already.noted-. if dernoora.oy re• 
quiroe a citbenry oa.pable of reflective a.otion and freedom or ohoioe, 
'.thorndildanism. rans •to provide ,US with suoh individuals. 
2. Ia Ruman miture Competent? 
· Joluf Calvin, who took his inter'pretation. of h1miau nature from. a 
atriot translation or the JH.ble,. relt that all men aro perversei. 
4. 
Rousseau held that coming from the hands of God all things are per• 
feet, but that in tho, hands of man all things· beoonie perverted. He 
trusted only original nature, and he feared the' worst onoe an indi• 
. 5• 
vidual had been in contact with society. Hobbes held that human 
m,.ture in com.t)etit:i.on i& mean: and potty. And under circumstances ot 
doubt, n govermnant. is not only e.n a id to tho individue.l,. b11t al Bo a 
restrictive agency for any.untoward activity in that it asswnea con• 
·· trol ever the individual• The .notions of Calvin• Rousseau., and Hobbes 
4. Jean Jt.oques Rousseau,;. Emile. 
5tt Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan •. 
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are characteristic of' various positions that fail to place their faith 
in the compatenoe of ths individual. This faith is a necessity in a 
democracy, Thorndike, too. makes numerous revealing statements that 
have a bearing on this point •. The following are a few that represent 
his oonoept of human compatenoy, 
Deep dow.n in their nature, most men are robbers. (p. 682) 
And not one man in a hundred is honest with himself about 
himself, (p. 681) 
Manual labor undirected by science would have hardly built 
huts to keep out the weather. and would today make play ... 
things out of the taotories and bonfires out of the 
schools, (p. 580) 
Hare. then., we have an inkling or Thorndike's conception or hum.an na• 
ture• and as such it is not particularly flattering.., Most men are 
robbers and dishonest. the mass ot laborers is not to be trusted• and 
man in both original and acquired nature• has undesirable wants OJ" 
tendencies. Certainly this kind of human being is not in a position 
to know what. is good for him nor what is good for the society in whioh 
he lives. 
But. by way of contrast, wa must observe 'What Thorndike suggests 
concerning some people who are by "1irtue c, f' their very natures to be 
trusted. Thus he writes, . 
What able and good men want is muoh more l ilcely to be 
better for their whole community or nation or race or 
world as a whole than what stupid and bad men want~ (p. 369) 
In another instance he informs ua• 
, ••it would be desirable to tolerate much from persons 
of great ability. As a matter of fact. the errors and 
follies of such persons are relatively raw,.· .. More than 
nine out of ten of th8111 today are· much above average in 
oommon sense, deoenoy and caution. and oommand the res• 
peot ot intelligent persons who know them. (p. 876) 
90. 
We have then0 , aooording to. Thorn.dike•. two groups 1. tho one which . i I not a. 
to be trusted ancl tho other which is .most trustworthy. • . And whon we 
recall that ~. • ,most men are robbers,": {p~ 582) and that r'manual 
• would today 1nake, playthings out ol, the f'actories and bon-· 
tires out or the schools,'•, . (p,, 580) wa must conclude that the good,-
e,ble, and trustworthy .group must be in the minority.· __ · This is more or 
less verU'ied by Thorndike's statement that, -
The most valuable consequence of freedom of thought fO'T: 
people in general is the- product 'produced by the top 
tenth of one percent of thinkers. (p. 381) 
Pei-taining· to values,. Thorndike informs us, : . 
So iflnce would begiri with the facts and opinions of abla 
engineers, city maxlagers and business men; of able 
penologists. educators and social workers. of able 
biologists and students or public health legislation. (p. 351) 
In: this instance, while the number or people consulted may be greater 
than the "top tenth of. OJ:18 percent." it would still inolude only the 
minority. In general, then. though Thorndike ia a little vague about 
who should be most trusted11 the implication is. that a few experts are 
to be trusted most. and then in a descending order ot ability, others 
a. fho:rndike plaoes a remarkable amount of faith 1n the native wants 
and neural connections of the so•oalled "able." For instance, be 
writes, "'• • • it would be desirable to tolerate muoh from persons 
ot groat ability. As a matter of fact, the errors and follies of 
such persons are relatively few." (p. 815) In another instance he 
writes, "The world*et greatest folly has been its treatment of those 
who are most superior to it in intellect• originality-. sensitive• 
ness and humaneness. Its most. prudent investment is to .find them 
out early• and give them 'Whatever they need to do their perfect 
work •. One good clue to 'What they need 1s what they desire." (p. 
370) This last statement implies not only that we should trust 
them but that we oan use their wants as criteria of' what is ao• 
ceptable. This tolerance ot the able may have deltterious effect 
not only on the less able. but upon those whom he ·would tl"Ust. for 
suoh a policy simply makes for less socialization on the part cf 
the able. 
should be trusted less and less, until we oorne to the masses or 
toilers or non""speoialists who .apparently should have little or no 
1'oioe in what- should be done in society. 
Of'• course• Thorndike does not pretend to have o onol uded .jua~, whioh 
types of persons are the,baat and most able• but we oatch glimpses of 
his suppositions at various points of his treatment• c,f Human, Nature· and 
. -------
the Social Order. 'For instance, ha writes .that "Goodness and. intelli ... ------- .. , . 
genoe are positively correlated••• ·•" (p. ·389) This would·· im.ply that 
' . 
a measure or illtelligenoe should serve as an index to a man•s goodness. 
Elsewhere . '?horn dike write·s,-that•. 
Of the great fortunes amassed in the United States, fff 
if any have · been :founded upon deception and oppresdion 
of. factory workers •. (p. 881) ·· ·. . . 
It must be that the possession or wealth is also an index to goodness. 
And even though Thorndike does not pretend to make a oonoluaive 
' .. 
list o:r what the "good and able" qualities of our natural leaders may 
be.; yet at various points in hie treatise he commits himself'. The 
following is a brief enumeration or representative statements in this 
regards 
a. The intelligent are probably most good.· 
· Goodness and intelligence are positively correlated. (p. 369) 
· b. Possession of wealth may reflect goodness. • 
' or the great fortunes ami:uuaad in the United Ste.tea, few if 
· any have been founded. on deception and oppression ot 
factory workers• (p. 881) · · . 
o. · Inventors are probably good • 
.Men of ability to make such discoveries almost never 
hide them. They are usually man of muoh good will to• 
ward the ~:rld• they.also want the satisfaction of see•. 
ing their ideas bear fruit. and of approval and powe:r. 
(p.,573) 
d. Public ... spirited businas,s men aro generally good. 
They (public ... spirited busines13 mntt) expect in 
business as well a.a in their private lives to do more 
good than the law. raquirel:I and less harm than the law 
forbids. (pp. 717•718) · 
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Somehow1 one gets the impression that Thorndike assumes that 
posaession of wealth,. knmvledge6 creative ability, management ability, . 1. 
or a position of responsibility is evidence of goodness. · '!'his inter-s. 
preta.tion is in keeping with a series of his publ ioa.tions on the 
goodness of community life wherein ha plaeos emphasis on community ex• 
penditures and income as rs.f'leot:l.ng the goodness of lif'a. If vre are 
to acoept his con()lusion it seems we must evaluate tha opinions of men 
primarily in terms of, their mata:rial aooomplishmonts. It mea:nL!I that 
the social order will be construatad about the wants of the so•called 
'II 
goo2_ man, for "What able and. good men want ts m.uoh more likely to be 
batter ror their community .... •" (p. 369) It means that a small per•~ 
cent of the population• the able,. will ba regarded as the chi.et 
determ.inors of' the aooial order. This interpretation or Thorndike is 
further verified in the .followmg statement, 
Tho God of science is revealed in reality,. and soienoe 
rebels against counting the votes of' imbeciles and igno• 
ra'.muses, who do not know what is for their own good, muoh 
less what is for the good .of .others ... .., 
7. Tho fact that Thorndike uses. the term "good" so frequently without 
an adequate definition 0£ it gives the impression that for him good 
is an absolute v1hioh. requires no daf inition, The impression can-
not be too muoh ambs when we notice that people on the upper end 
of. the scale in material and intelleotual aohievement are regarded 
by him as being ambu.ad with goodness. There seems to ba an element 
of perfectionism reflected in which Thorndike assumes that the more 
nearly ona reaches tha poak of ability in any tieldi the more like-
ly ha is to. be • good. 
a. Thorndike,. bity, A.'tlerioan Cities and States,. !!. oetera, 
Science will ba demooratic not in form but in spirit by 
ohoos ing man as int ell igant• wise, and impartial as 1nay 
ba and trusting them to decide as best they oan what the 
"truen values ara. (p. 351) 
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But at this point some one may well pose the quetrb ion,.'' Does Thorndike 
not plan :for the .future competence of' individuals?" That is 'to say, 
• • ' , ' ' • • , , i r , 
even though he .faces the reality of current inequalities in ability. 
doesn•.t he propose a beneyolent dictatorship for them only until such 
time as the majority becomes competent? ·· We should probably have, to 
reply in the affirmative to this question. But in so doing we must 
point out again that all h.is proposals Thorndike treats the :indi• 
vidual as passive. This is in itself a violation of the principle ot 
personal development, and oonsequantly we cannot expeot any great im• 
provement in individual competency. Bayles suggests that• 
Yet, if a pupil is to be train~d to think for himself'• a 
seaming necessity in democratic education, his conclusions 
will have to be those which grow out of th is thinking and 
. cannot be forced into pre•ordained molds., 9• 
But Thorndike seems to hold that oompatenoy oan be increased by proper 
impositions.· We recall that the bond • formation concept or education 
assumes that this is possible. And in a similar vein ha writes of the 
British rule of India, pointing out that despite its faults, it has 
. ' i; ' ' 
"••.in general done muoh better £or the inhabitants of India than . . . 
they v1ould have done tor thamselvss.u (p. 584) 
Probably our most significant clue to 'fho?'?ldike 's position with 
regard to developing more competent individuals. 1s to ba f'o.und in his 
statements bearing on the relative merits of education and selective 
' • ' ',•' ! ' ' 
' . 
breeding. For instance, he writes that "• • • eugenics is sure but 
9. E. E. Bayles. op cit, P• 9. . ' ,..._.__ . 
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~low, 1'hereas eduoa:tion is rapid but extremely variable and inaaoure." 
(p. 471) .ln connection ,with the devel.opment or leadership,. Thorndike 
writes. ". • •. the general drift of .the fac.ts of biology and psychology 
• , . .. -1·. ' ., 
is toward attaching more importance -to native .ability and less to train• 
ing• in both private: and public adminietra.t ion•" (p. 789) · We observe 
that .. Thorndike would improve oom.petenoy ot future generations rather· 
' " . 
than tho present, primarily by selective breeding. Re:re again we do 
not have a. picture ot individualt vigorously atta.oking problems, and 
by so doing becoming more skilled. Rather_. ~& have a picture ot indi• 
viduals as victims ot manipulated biological foroets. 
• . I 
We have another o lue bearing on. the problem or oom:petancy in oon• 
neotion with the distribution and utilization ot truth. ?born.dike in• 
torme us tha~ "• -• • _1 t is better to add t.o the truth than d ist:r ibute 
1t to more persons.•-~- ,.ft (p. 453} V/hereas., one isolated eenteno$ of 
thia nature ma~ not be. sufficient evidence to _support a contenti.on, yet 
we know that it .is consistent.with his proposed authoritt.rian teaching 
prooedures and likewise in ketttping with his oonoeptions ot competenoy 
ot those especially well endowed _with wisdom or ability., That is. 
these commitments are more, or less ac,nsistent with the position that 
adding to truth ia accsptable end adequate, since those who have e.o• · 
cess to .. truth will be able to decide what, is best tor the less able. 
I . •· . . . • 
Another statement 'Which ie not particularly clear but yet is moro or 
less consistent with this position is the tollowmc•. 
The aociat sciences are still weak and iusecu.re; the 
doctors otten disagree. Some can be found to support 
fantastic sohemes. But it is surely better on the 
average to take their medi.cine than that of !gnoram;sllS• 
(p. 958) 
Here again we find exemplified the. position that all of sooi.ety need not 
95. 
necessarily participate in the processes of problem solving .. · For some, 
probably the majority. the mode of conduct should be, ntruat the ex• 
perts.'t (p. 524) 
We f'ind implied in these statemente an.d in the general tone of' 
Thorndike's toxt tha supposition that competency i.s not neoessarily 
d$pendent upon a sharing of axperienoes. A relativist would hold •that 
democracy is the, best known social device for the mutual sharing or in• 
terests and experiences and that it is a :f'orm of sooi.al organization 
assuring greater oompetanoy of all its members., · But for Thorndike• 
society naad not ahare but rather store its experiences as it does its 
money, and dispense it only to those who are in a position to usa it 
tc, beat advantage. 
We must conolude, then, that both with regard to the assumption 
of oompetenoy and tho assuranee of future oompatenoy• Thorndike makes 
no adequate provisions for the masses.· He assumes that some. possibly 
the majority. are not competarro. Moreover. his devioes for the im• 
provemant of sooioty are not designed to provide for v-eater adequacy. 
nor can they ever do so in tha light of their basic assmnptions re• 
garding human nature. 
B. Is the Thorndikian Ideal a Planned or a Planning Society? - -
1. Are the Ends of Society Fixed and is the Function of Society 
Found in tho Achievement of These Fixed Ends? 
The question pertaining to the fixity of: social aims should be 
divided into two parts• (l) Are the ends of society fixed? (2) Are the 
ends or society fixable? If 'l'b.orndike has at present no fixed ends for 
his social order. is it possible that he looks forward to the time when 
ultimates can be asoarta.ined? In either event he is absolutistio• but 
in the one oasa his ends ~e,sattled and in the other the guiding 
principles foJ'I, disoov.,ring the ends are fixa4~· · 
··9a. 
. One approach tc, the problem of fixity ·or ends is that of examining 
values. Some items in a society may appear to ,have .intl"insio value, 
· and thus baooma tixed. Others 41 though relati va to something el as, may 
be fixed beoauaa the ends .to which they.are relative ar-e •1'1:xed.. Thus, 
an e.b,solutist may propound a relativity of values without compromising 
his position., For example,. Hitler, who speaks ,of the worth o.t' the 
individual, does so because the individual has .c"worth relative to the 
·, . The .point at issue here is, what does fi:dty imply with regard to 
democratic oitizenship and to democratic objectives or. education? The 
problem is raised in another oonneotion by Bayles. who, in evaluating 
the frame of' rerex-enoe se,:t, up by the Social Stu1.ies Commission or the 
Amerioan Historical Assoo,iation writes t 
4.,..,. 
"We need ,to develop -e.H:- allegiance on the Jart or the stu• 
dents for an effectual method_ of arriving at and continual""' 
ly· remaking life patterns rather than for particular · 
patterns i'i:xed in advance. lO• 
Th; problem' ultimat~ly tesol,;e, itself' into two' major 'queations, namely, ' 
"Is it possible for persons to disoover onoe and for all a right way to 
• ·1 .' ' 
live?" and· "Does development of the individual take place by his ao .. 
ceptanoe ~f th~ right ~a,i?'ii'' Bode answers the .r'trst · queatiOll as follows 1 
When some one "ITalue or sat ot values is arbitrarily 
selected as final and absolute, we have., the principle 
of dictatorship. The al tarnative is a policy tor th$ 
c.ontinuous extension of oozrJnon -intarests1, which doss · 
10 ••. Ernest E. Bayles, "Obligatiou. 0£ Teaching in a Democraoy., 0 Jour•• .• 
ot Educational. Administration~ ~u;e_~rvidon, nv~ 4., P,252. 
not give praf"orr8d status to any specif to' value or 
prescribe what people are to believe •. • 
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G1 ven some values whioh can be fixed and abstracted from. their context, 
we have absol utea whioh imply a dictatorship of some kind. If nothing 
else, we have a dictatorship of science or philosophy. 
With regard to the second question,, Dewey states, 
The strongest point to ·be made in behalf of even such 
rudimentary political .form as democracy which has a.1• 
ready obtained popular voting, majority rul.e and so on, 
is that to some extent they involve oonsulto.tion a.nd discuss ... 
ion whioh unaover social nisods and troubles. • • • De Tocque• 
vill11t wrote it down almost a. century ago in hie ·survey of 
the prospects of democracy in the United States. Accusing 
· a demooracy of a tendency to prefer medioority in its 
elected rulers. and admitting its exposure to gusts ot 
passion and its openness to folly. he pointed out in effect 
that popular government is educative as other modes of 
government m-e not~ It forces a recognition that.there are 
common interests ••• ; and the need 1t enforces for disouss• 
ion and publicity brings about some ola.rifica t:ion of wha.t 
they are. 12. 
The outcome of an arrangement of this kind may not be perfect,. but trom 
the standpoint ot the development of the individuals participating in 
discussion and problem•solving* the results are invaluable. To this 
Bode would add: 
• • • the supreme test of progress lies in the devel• 
opnent of the individual oapacitv and not in conformity 
to any authoritarian standard. 15. 
Briefly. then. in a democracy we should expect individuals to sat up 
"operational concepts" (hypotheses) upon which to plan a. course ot 
action, because there is tor all courses of action and all events no 
singularly "right1' way. In the,. planning of action and in ths ew.lu• 
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at ion of' rasul ts individuals become more competent,, Stated dif• 
ferantly. the fluidity of a field precludes the employment of any 
proposal vrh~.eh smacks or fixity and ul.tinta.oy-. And should soma one oon• 
oeption be so universal, and. its appearance ao ul tima.te, that it could 
be abstracted, its adoption ipso facto would lead to passivity and 
. ' ~' ' 
atatioity on the part or the individual. This situation would be dan• 
gerous both to. individuals and aooiety. Demooraoy requires the whole• 
some and intellectuslly honest practice or willingness· to oonsida:r 
alternate proposals. 
I:f' a society ha.s its plans pretty v.ell f'i>::ed in advance. then there 
a.ra fow questions to ba settled and its members vrill fall into lethal"~• 
But when sooial scientists insist that they have only partial access to 
truth. and therefore it is impossible for them to state in detail what 
should be planned for the i't..>ture we may find lurking another danger. 
Beoause suoh soholars speak of change,. or of much that is not known,. 
they are sometimes :regarded as pragma:tio11 tittle do most per:.ons real• 
ize that hidden behind their mask of uncertainty are fixed principles 
which necessitate an authoritarian outlook on lifee Bode describes 
some of' the Progressive Education peop~e as absol~tistio because they 
adhoro to certain fixed principles which they believe implied in demo• 
14. . 
oracy. Bayles found that the Social Studies Commission preaGnted a 
rela.tivoly fixed frame of reference. Such groups or persona speak of 
change, but they tend to accept certain ultimate principles as fixed. 
To thom change is simply the bending of effort and maa.ns of achieving 
' ! ' 
14. E. E. Bayles, nObligations of Teaching in a Demooraoy," Journal 
of Educational Administration and Supervision, X:X:V, 4, P• 252. - _.....,,. -------- -~ ' -.--
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certain fixed ends or standards. Consequently. as we view Xhorndik:e 
we must be alert to e.tty efforts on his part to fix praotioes and 
principles. We shall analyze his writings for fixing principles first. 
Then.,. as further verii'ioation., we shall look to see if he considers 
any specific modes of conduct as already fixed. 
a. Guiding Prine iplea (Absolutes) 
(1) Buman Natura 
The seoond chapter of this analysia of realism indicates that 
Thorndike is an absolutist. It was f<>und, for instance., that his con• 
eeption of human nature is absolutistio. Yet, in our analysis of ' 
Thorndike's faith in human nature., it was concluded that all hum.an na• 
turo is not competent and trustworthy. Consequently, if' human nature 
is an absolute, we must limit this absolute to what Thorndike regards 
as ngood and able" human natul"fh Yet., be human nature adequate or in• 
adequate,. he states that any trustee or board f'or hum.an welfare will 
limit its proposals to what is practical in tenn.s of known orig1nal. 
human nature. He writes., 
Be will try to avoid putting in his bill of speci£ioations 
items so alien to the original nature of man that they 
can be realized only at a tremendous cost ot external 
coercion or seduction. (p. 404) 15. 
But in another instance Thorndike writes that., 
A:rly man whose l i.fe and work satisfies soma deoent b'Ulil8.11 
wants and does violence to none may continue to mind his 
own business and leisure with e. good conscience. He is 
probably a benefactor,. perhaps more -so than he would be 
16. We:e,bserve here that Thorndike does not object to~ coercion., 
but" eoercion at tj tremendous cost. This indicates that there 
is a hierarchy of specifications to which a trustee must be com .. 
mitted. It is possible the elusive absolute "good'' is the final 
eouroe of appeal tor the trustee. 
if he triad to serve all good ca.uses.. (p. 540) 
That is., while on the one hand Thorndike does limit his bill ot 
spooifioations to what is within reach .or human· nature; ori the other 
' • '· , J j ' •• • :-· • : ' • : <, ,: 
. han.d, ha regards anything which fs related i;o· "good and able" human 
', , l ' ' 1·; : ! 
· nature o:r "decent human -.nts" as fit modal'··' tor' wha:t individuals 
. . ' ' 
should. do, "Good" huwui nature' and "decent human wan.tan become the 
measuring rod for individuals• soctoty,f and.' social progras1s.; 
i . ' . ' 
Thorndike applies the measuring rod of human nature to many p:rao• 
. ' ' , 
tioes now ourront or proposed., · Foot-noting a commenu. he rnllkes on . '. ·" .· . . . . •. ,; . _, 
mana.ger-uianaged reh.tions,· he wi:-ites .. ",~t ;relation ls not in and of 
Uselr alien to ht.unan na.tm<8••• .I! (p. 424) · tater he ploa.ds f'oi- con• 
'. . :,. . ' . ' 
tinuanoa of !'raedom or anterpri:ra en the grounds t.'l;at. 11 •. _, • pr'esent 
- '\' 
Jmowl edge of huiiau nD:ture ls ove~elmuigly in favor of freedom.,'."' •" 
: (p. 702) But. sinoo Tho;rndike regards the wants of. the poor and less 
. ' . 
. able to be distorted wt,' observe' that this meaeur'ing rod is essentially 
t~e praotio'a of"•.·. JPAX~iztng of the good lite for good people." 
(p. 474) 
Essent ia11y,· he' de sign~tes the unadulterated, good human being as 
the basis upon whioh society must ba constructed. In his introduction 
' . ' 
to ·Human Mature and tho· Social Order. ha express his concept as ---------
followu 
Muoh of the work of improving the ,fOrld consists in us:ing 
the abilities of men to gratify their good wantai and many 
of the problama which eoonomica. govermnent, law, business, 
philanthropy, and education refer to psychology concern the 
natul"e, causation, and modification of either abilities or 
wants. (p. 4) 
In applying this principle, .Thorndike outl 1nes several 5.mportant steps 
whioh should. be taken w·ith .regard to good and a.bl.a human nature. Some 
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of these are listed l>E9lows 
a. Tolera~e the wants of the able for they must be good. 
• • • it would be desirable to tolerate muo~ £.rem. pttrsons of 
great ability. (p. 875) 
Some able thinkers should be trusted in aohool and out • ..- • 
Th.$ most valuable consequence ot freedom of thought for people 
itl general is the produot produced by the top tenth of one 
:-p•rcent. (p. 881.) · ·. 
b. Plan a good lite tor th.a good.and the able. 
The min principle of allotment (of. funds) would 
be the maximizing ot the good life tor good people. 
(p. 474) · · . 
One test (of an economic. system) is to &sk, "what sort 
ot person is rewarded by the system in question?" 
(p. '121) . . 
Another {qu.eetion regarding welfare provisions) ooncerns 
the provitioa of person• of great ability, who though 
numerically fff• have a large share in changing both•· 
the ph;y.siotll world and hU1!18ll institutions 10 as. to pro• 
· vide more tor the good life .for more people. (p. 433) 
o. Plan a sooial. prcigram 122.: terms of' the wants of the good. 
· .by person.-•s want$ receive weight a.ooording to his known· 
or estimated score in a oomposite ot intelligenoe and 
other desirabl• abilities. (p. 372) 
Equality of opportunity fo:r-those equally deserving .does 
not. mean that a government will guarantee the sme op• 
· portunities to the children of its •rst as to the Child• 
ren of' its best parenta. (p. 886) ·• 
d.. Place the good in a position of' authority. 
In particular,. knowledge and .power thould be given in 
much larger measure to the able and good than to the 
dull and vicious •. (p. 418) · 
e. Cure evils by 'breeding for the good. and abl.e by the 
good and able. 
. Certain eomb inat ions of' genes are favorable tQ the 
production of feeble-t:r.dnded. insane;. moral perverts, 
grafters and others who do the world more harm than 
good. Selective ·breeding against them· is advantage• 
ous. though not so advantageous as breeding tor excel• 
lence. since idiots and delinquents probably do much 
less harm than their opposites do good. (p, 449) 
A wise trustee with power over the world would pro• 
bably. wrk chiefly f'or quality (ot human nature), 
during the next tevr hundred years and be unworried 
even H' the wo:rld'a population declined to a billion 
or even less6 if large gains were made :tn,tbe quality 
of· the genes and the, goodness of life. · (p. 441) 
By selective -breeding supported by a suitable en• 
vironment we can have a world in which all men will 
equal the top ·ten percent of' present men .... Any 
forces which increase the relative birth•rate of 
superior men should be treasured... • (p. 957) · 
f • Change . inf'eriol" men by $DC ourag ing situations con• 
ducive to the good. 
In planning a aoheme ot satisfiable wants ,for good 
men in a good.world, be ( a trustee of society) will., 
however., dare to hope to have a soo ial oi-der bl 
which undesirable tendeno ies in man' e mental and 
moral. inheritance are redirected or transformed or 
weakened.by disuse. (p. 404) 
The good 1:i.te for the good is the predominant guiding principle in the 
ThorndikiarFsystem of' th~ing. ··If the world is to be made better. 
good :men will do it. It the, race of men is to be made better, selao-. ' 
t_ive breedittg'by good men will do it. If men now living are to be im• 
proved., conditions oonduo ive to. the welfare of good men will provide for 
it. The good life itself is measured by the wants of good men •. Thorn• 
dike hoias good men to be intelligent and able men to be good (pp. 7020 
741., 882., !!_ cetera)~ In commerce, good men are presumod to be the cor• 
poration executives. "merchant kings.," "captains of'· industry.,.'' and men 
of wealth. Elsewhere0 the good are mainly scientists, great thinkers, 
' ' 
and administrators. The absolute, then, resides innately in the na• 
tures of the elite of society, and by their 'WBl1ts must eaoh social in• 
stitution be measured. 
As presented here., good human nature is an absolute~ But his use 
,103; 
ot good to describe the aooeptable aspects ot human• nature implies 
that in Thorndike's thinking there is a hazy and elusive absolute; 
namely,. goodness itself. Just: what goodness really is would be di:f• 
f'icult to ascertain, but this much is certain, those ?tho are pronounced 
in their ability and achievement are regarded· as having, an intuitive 
guidance into goodness., Hence,· wh!le f:,r e.11 practical 'purposes, good 
human nature is· an absolute;· 'it is only relative'. to ,the principle of 
' ' ' . . , ·, 
goodness. ,Whatevei- that goodness may be, ,Thorndike believes that the 
wants of the able will be our absolute criteria. tor determining :t.t. 
(2) Truth 
Objective truth, which is presumed to be in oorrespondenoe with 
objective reality, is another absolute which Thorndike sets up as a. 
· guiding principle. Ot oouree. the asaumption is that the able and good 
will have access to truth, and that they will automatically live in 
keeping with it. However,. for ,the less e.ble and less good, truth will 
be the, standard by 'Vrhioh they will be governed and the materil\l with 
which they \vill be· indoctrinated. · Following are some of Thorndike•s 
statements·perbinent thereto: 
.a. • Truth is an absoiute. 
The truth, in the sense or those ideas about reality 
which correspond to it. enable us to prediot it, and 
· ,lead us to adapt ourselves to it, and• it to wants 
which a.re satisfiable by it» is a pure good .... 
Whatever is in essential conflict with it is bad,· 
(p. 345) 
.... it is better to add to the truth than distribute 
it to more personsJ • • " • (p. 453) 
• be Truth justifies, •its own· imposition.··· 
·The God of science is revealed in reality,. and soience 
rebels against counting the TOtes of imbeciles and ig• 
noram.usas. who do not know'What is for thair·owngood1 
much less what is for the good of' others, as equal 
to the votes of the wisa and well•informed ... • 
(p. 361} . 
. . 
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c •. 'Xhosa leas able would profit by simply aooepting the truth. 
If a hundred moralists of today should set· up values 
upon eaoh. of 1;he oou.rses .of conduct whi~h a. person in 
· a given situation might pursue. there would be very 
substantial agreement •. If every ignorant and stupid 
person·should.aooept the.valuations 0£ thitl hundred, 
the world as a whole would profit. ·. {p. 344) 
Very specifically, than, as has already been mentioned in an earlier . ,. ' ' ' ' ', ' . ' ' ' , ,, 
chapter• truth to Thorndike. is an absolute. Now i.ve .find that only the 
intelligent and good· are able' to approach tr.uth with any degree of 
certainty, the masses must trust the experts. Thorndike does not ex• 
peot to find truth emerging from. among the masses. Moreover., truth, 
1n. the main., is so well fixed that experts can agree as to tts fund• 
a.mental aapeots. In faot4 . truth with regard to human nature• is such 
-r ' ~"' 
that it oan be accumulated and abstr.aoted as one would abstract and 
accumulate ore from the ground• . All persons .or forces which are 1n con• 
:f'liot with truth are nbad~t It. is a "goo&1if·1n and of itself, end it 
I 
men aaoupy thenufelves:·:tn addmg to truth,. they perform a worthy task. 
'. . ' ' ' \ \ ·: ; . 
Thorndike. doe.s intend that truth should be applied practically for 
• • • I • • . ' , . , • 
human welfare. but his tendency is to apply it as a. standard for living . 
. and a criterion for progress. That is, truth is no longer a part of 
the problem•solving process, a mrking proposition, but it is. set apart 
J · , , ' I , i , , ' ' ' • , , \ 
as en ideal to whioh society and individuals are compared •. And even 
• ,·, ' • < ·,' , ' 
though we were to presume that individuals are free to think in a 
1'horndikia.n ,society. yet they would not be free to .look upon truth 
critically, and in any event their modes of' conduct .would be based upon 
pre•established truth •. This• ot oourse, means that minds will tend to 
· .be. closed to certain subjtots to which. the label of truth has already 
been attached. 
(3) Production or Capital Goods. 
The creation of wealth is also an absolute in Thorndike.ts think• 
ing. That is to say, one of the criteria by lvhich a.n :individual or a 
society may be evaluated is by its prothlotion of' good~1!1l'The key•note 
to .this thinking is to be found in the following statement, 
Some events and acts are almost pure goods. Almost all 
of their oonsequenoes produce muoh ~a,ti~faotion and little 
or no discomfort. l'he discovery of 'truth by a man ot 
saienoe,. the composition or a fine symphony., the painting 
of a beautiful. picture, suoh make the oreator happy and 
enrich mankind. (p. 373) · 
But Thorndike devotes little apace to the production of "art 
treasures." Rather, he makes much of the importance of capital goods 
as being "good." For insta.noe 1 he v,rites 1 
On the 'Whole, man's activity in ores.ting capital. is 
bettor for him than the aotivitiea which it replaoos. 
It is true that oases oan be found where men sacrifice 
themselves and their families to pile up capital, 
whose possession later only debauches their heirs. But 
many of the valid arguments agait1st the creation of 
material capital are, really arguments against the 
creation of material capital at the oost of capital in 
the form of health, skill• and knowledge. (p. 574) 
That is1 the creation of capital goods is a good, and is a. question• 
able procedure chiefly when it is done at the expense of other.items of 
weal th. In his list of desirable goals fox- society. he states one aim 
as being •. tt!noraasing capital goods." (p. 961) In other words• pro•. 
duotion or capital g,,ods is predetermined as good. 
Further evidence that 'l'horndike places the creation of capital 
wealth on a pedestal as an absolute by which to evaluate a sooiety. is 
to be found in the following representative statements, 
a. Economic weal th as an isolated. factor contributes 
to the good l if e. 
·· The eeoond :important cause of welfare is income. 
(p. 431). 
After making this allotment {designation ot causal 
factors to the good 1 ii'e) · wealth and inoome are 
credited with 28 3/4. percent of tha causation. (p. 430) 
b • Economic goods as: suoh are benef'ie ial to all. 
Many persons havei no realizing sense o.f the im• 
portanoe for welfare of capital goods public or 
private. (p. 586) 
I have not the ability or the space here to make 
clear and emphatic the · increase in power which · 
capital gives man~•• •• (p. 686) · 
c. · ·~e owners and managers· of capital goods are bane• 
tioent to society. 
The poor in civilized countries nO\'I receive very 
muoh better value from the world than they give to 
it so tar ai purchasable goods and services are con• 
oerned. {p. 956) 16.. · 
With oapitalism• Europe attained by the end of the · 
nineteenth century and the first decade of the 
twentieth century the high0st level of· goodness of 
life for good people that it has ever had. (p. '700) 
d. • The inorea.sa of. capital goods should be a prime 
oonoern, 
It is better to e.-xpend the time and ·energy in in• 
oreasing goods than in equalizing them. (p. 417) . . 
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16. Exploitation or the working man evidently does not ooour to Thorn.,;. 
dike as a serious social problem. This seems to be apparent in· 
his statement, "From the point of vie.v of the general good• a,, 
reaaonable rule .. is that a. person should_. 1 ati:;er a period of .labor 
and its wages, bEJ ·at least no mrse otf in mind. •~rid body than he 
would have been without both.,"· (p .. ,605) In,a deiitooraoy, e.ven 
with a capitalistio system, it would be reasonable to expect some 
reciprocal·• relationships which bring ·about enhanoemant and great• 
er harmonization of the individual. · Dewey expresses this oonoept 
a.s'i'ollows: "Tha ultimate· place of economic ;,organization in ·human 
. life is to assure the secure basis for an ordered expression ot 
individual oapaoity and tor the satisfaction ot .the needs or man 
in non-economic directions,•• (t iberal ism and Social Aotion, 
P• 88)' ·. . -
• • • the creating of capital is usually a good 
thing to do for those who do it, and batter than 
what they would otheri.vise have done. (p. 675) 
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The relative value oi' economic gcods is not very clearly stated in 
'fhorndike•s writings. When VlElalth in and of' itself' is looked upon as 
an important contributor to the good 1 ii'a, when it is looked upon as 
a .fixed good,, when its managers and its producers are looked upon as 
unquestionably beneficent, and vman one of the important principles ot 
society is increasing ~capital goods" (p. 961 ). without regard for its 
distribution, then it becomes an absolute good. That the creation of 
capital goods is desirable is not questioned by many. The point is 
that by establishing it as a good, it beoanos an, end in itself rather 
than a means to an end, and in so doing it tends to block further 
thinking. 
' In summarizing the principles which Thorndike uses to control the 
conduct of sooiety ... he .frequently touches upon thi, elusive absolute 
whioh ha refers to as "good.," Its use has little practical signi.fioanoe 
except that anything described as approaching it will have an abso• 
lutistio value plaoed upon it. For instance, should any aot of be• 
havior be designated as ngood•tt it will become crystallized as virtu-
ouaJ it will beoQilla a modal by which other aots will be judged, and in 
so doing oritioal analysis of it may cease. That goodness is not de• 
fined and that Thorndike treats it so generally makes it all the more 
dangerous to a society that should have no glittering generalities to 
block critical 'thinking. 
Spaoifioally,. Thorndike does emphasize three guiding princHplea 
and justifies them more or lees .on tho basis of their being good or oon• 
tributing to the good life. Thay area {l) good human nature, (2) 
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truth~ and (3) economic goods. Stated differently. Thorndike sets up 
. 17. 
human nature. ·truth,. and capital goods as criteria. for all eooial 
programs. Whatever is done '!-n society must satisfy good human nature,. 
or it must be in keeping with or add to truth, or it must produce 
economic goods, and no further questions are asked. Theoretically, 
Thorndike a.ohiaves basic harmony among thasethree for-he assumes that 
good human beings will want and diaoover truth and will produce goods. 
But what about li"ving under a. .government whioh operates aoeording 
to fixad principles? When 'we ask if Thorndikian soofoty is to have a 
fixed mode of life• we do not necessarily inquire into the rigidity of 
its details• but rather we ask a.pout a general plan of life whioh Thorn• 
' 
dike seems to have settled fairly well in his thinking. We remember 
that a society may be progressive in soma respects a.nd yet be com-
mitted to absolutes. We realize f'urther that society may achieve., 
certain desirable results• but it ,v111 cease to progress wherever abso• 
lutes e.re introduoed• Df!i'lley points out that absolutes\resul't; hi blook-
1a. 
ing reflection+ In a society whore human nature., truth.,, and capital 
goods a.re absolutes• it seems that much of its -progress will be blocked 
1n large areas. 
(4) The application of absolutes to specific practices. 
In a further perusal of speoifio 0 goods" whtoh Thorndike sanctions 
11 • In a numba:t of' ,instances .Thorndike refers to the creation of works 
of art as pure goods, but his pri."lo ipal emphasis is .upon human 
nature, truth•· and ,capital wealth, in as muoh as they appear to 
have graater bearing on human wal.fare. 
18. ttThe person who holds the doctrine of. •individualism' or 'oolleotiv• 
ism' has his program detemined for him in advance. • • • He knows 
. in advance the sort of thing which must be done. • • • tt John · 
Deway1 Public !!! Problems, P• 202. 
, in terms -of human nature, truth at1d capital goods, we find the 
following representative quotation•• · 
a. Private own.e:-ship is in keepillg with hum.tU'l nature. 
,. 
Allied to the .t'antaq that the public made the _roads,. 
water works, schools.· and parks is the tallaoy of &up ... • 
posing that the public will treat its pf'op~rty as a 
priw.te owner tt'eats hia. ••• Indoed by the limi• 
· tations .of huina.n. nature ao million persona owning each 
one millionth or a property oan all ha.Te the attitude 
toward it which each has towat""d a property- ot which 
he ONns the whole. (p. 585) 
· It is signif'iout that the able and benevolent men ot 
affairs who have made gifts to the public almost never 
give to a city,. atate, or national govenaent. Eitmr 
they do not truat the pttblio to deolde what is for its 
wel.taro or they do not trust the elected representa• 
tives or tht11 publio to do what the public. asks or to 
act t• its welfare:. (p. 467) · 
b. Oapital.ism is i:n keeping with humm nature. 
Capitalism has the vary great merit of using re• 
wards rather th.all punish:inent as its main motives •. 
(p. 701) . 
The capital. istio system of private ownerahip, free 
e11terprise, · and operation f'or private gain has 
many defects• but the great merit is that it op~r""' 
ates on the whole in the interest of human wants. 
(p. 699) 
Except tor the doubtful case of the. ch~in store. I 
know no busineiut inventions attributable to the. 
ooopere.tives. * • . • (p., 652) , 
o. Society should b• laisaea•taire. 
As betm;exi. .freedom and restriction 1n teohnolog , 
and ·ta. business present b0Wledge 0£ human nature. 
is overwhelmingly. in favor ot f'reedom1 beoe.use it 
increases the prob~bil ity that beneficent vari-
ationa in the conduct ot business will originate, 
8Ul"Vive6 and p:rod.uoe offipring, and the probabil• 
ity that power will oome into the hands ot the 
able u • • {p. 702) · 
d. Freedom sho,1ld be grantod tho able. 
But on the who1e, what g,:,ee.t men have done .b7 
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- choice .. will pro:babl7, average much highe,.., tor. the , 
oomnon good than what they have done by pressure . 
- trom, employers, advisors o:r: the publ to.. (PP• '13•74) 
J..ny man whose life _and work- se:tisf:tea .some· de.,.. 
cent human wants and does violence to none~ may 
cont_inue to. mind· his . ow.ti business and·· 1eistire . . 
with a good ,conscience~ , He :l:s probab~y a bene~ ·factor~ ••. •• ··-(p. 540) ·· ·· ' · · · · · · 
e. U:ntait'. competitlon is not necessarily a pa.rt or' capital tam.. . . . . . ·• ' . 
' ' ' I oa,nnot find evidence ,to support the vieir that 
the evila of untair competition increased as . . 
capitalism grew and were oheoked ,and reduced· Ollly 
by the legisla:bion- of tbe ,.en.d·or the.19th and be•. 
ginnb'.lg ot the .20th oentur, .... - (p. 962) 
t. Competition ia an. important _motivator and equalizer.· 
•. · • ·• it: (the sohool) ha• maintained a .f~:roed com,. · 
peti:tiion among unequals when it had' a golden op• ·· 
portunity. to attain its ends tar better by WJing 
oompetitio:n'w1.th dne•s peers &Jld '1:ith;one's past 
record. (p. 425) . _ . · . • • , , . _ . , _ .__ . · · 
Extending educational opportunity thus not only. re• 
duoes th-, inoqW4i'biea of men in oul titre -and refine• 
ment. but also in :wages it oompe-titi011 is free. . 
· Eugenio aclva.noe _and what will preamriably ·aocompany · 
it may carry,this ::equalization:to the ;poin'b where 
most men a:re born ·naal"ly equal• and where. if' com-
petition is free.- _the pecuniary rewards are a.pproxi• 
matelythe same for most sorts or labor tor which 
there is any considerable demand. (pp. ~70•6'11) _ 
. . . . . ' . . .· . ' . . . g. Business shollld ~pei-ate,authoritatlvely in its 011D interest. · · · · · · · 
' . . . 
The •ltare of° business should be m•eter· of the 
_shop. (p. 602) 
Employees azi~ .consumers are likely to :gain more 
from the ab!lity than .from the good-·will o~ · 
ow--.ue,r~-~ , ;(p. 1689) , : . · . : : .. _ . : , , . _ 
-i ',·,:, ·; ..... 
h• The ~or _in. our eoonomio _ayata are no~ exploited 
•.' but•.they .receive benefits from society~ . . . 
The poor :in o:tvilized OOUlitries now receive very 
. much better value from the world than they give 
to it so ,far Jlt!I· purchasable goods and serviotts 
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a.re concerned, (p. 956) 
i, Few should rule the majority. 
First. thora is an enom:ous· advantage, in. having a thing 
done by one man rather than by two or. more, (p. 757) 
J' ' ' '· ' 
In -Uhe oap.italistio system of frea enterprise and 
the liberal system. of' government w5.th frel!cldom ot 
· action for all within the law, the load of initiative 
: and responsibility is divided t\mong individuals. 
There are dangers in the transfer• of the loact to 
groups. There ore of course many advantages, but 
it is far harder to colleotivir.e brains than pro• 
party. (pp. 757•'768) · 
To e. psychologist it seems absurd that we· should 
speoialize the pre>duotiva labor. (including the 
supporting soiemoes) of tho ,10rld into tc,n 
thousand narrow linea with great ga1.n for welfare. 
but should. adopt an op:i:1osite plan tor public busi-
ness·. Evan the reverej'd to1¥?1 meat ing seems rather 
e. symptom of innr.aturity in government than the, acme 
of its perfection. {p. 808) 
. ' 
It may further be taken.as certain that the \\9lfare 
of society vrill never be oared. for by soc iaty' act• 
ing by itself, but only by the aota of persons. 
(p. 720) 
j~ The able should rule • 
. The nhle and goo~ should acquire power. (p. 969) 
• • • knowledge· and powor should be given in much 
larger measure to the able and good than to the 
dull and vicious. (p. 418) 
People should know at leaet enough to trust the ex• 
perts ••• • (p. 524) 
' ' 
k. Truth warrants oo~roion. 
Coercion by nature is une.voidable, and cc-eroion by 
the truth is highly benei"'ioial • Liberty is not a 
panacea and should not be a fottsh. (p. 413) 
The acoepta.noe or impartial soientifio truth as a 
guide in life is certainly a safe and sane policy, 
and oan be a very idealistic one. (p. 390) 
'.l'he God! of eoienoe is revealed in reality~ and 
soionce rebels against counting the votes of' im• 
beoiles and ignoramuses, _who do not know· what is 
for thoir o'i'm good, muoh less what ia for the good 
of' othara, as equal to the vote,s of the wise and 
vtoll•informed .... • (p. 351) 
satonoa will ba demoaratio not in form but in 
spirit by ohooaing men as intelligent, wise, and 
impartial a.a may be and trusting them to deoida 
as best they oan what the 1'truan values are. (p. 351) 
The lower grades (or feeblo-minded) oau be atarilbed. 
Thoy would foel no disgrace, indeod they naed not 
know anything about the oporation. No~ need anybody 
olaa know. (p. 439) 
1. 'l'ha imposition of a ngood lif'e" in banaficia.l to 
a. paopla, 
Most moralists would aa.y that tho British rule in 
· Indio. was oonoeivod by pri'Va.ta greed, born of in• 
justioa., and nurtured and misguided by patriotism., 
but it presumably has aV'oidod destruotiva inter• 
naoina strife and in general dona much better for 
tho inhabitants of India than they would have 
done for themselves~ (pp. 533•5~4) 
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These spaoif'io s~ggestionn are simply applications of Thorndike's 
absolutistio oonoaption of human nature, truth, and capital goods~ 
They reiterate his lack or faith in the majority and his commitments 
to thought•roprasaing absolutes.. Ae such., th.sy imply passive indi .. 
viduals oonf'orming to an imposed authoritarian rule 01• the "gi~ed • ~' 
·Here# than, we have a picture very symptomatic of absolutisms 
Thorndike presumes that not all men are to be trusted and that in fact. 
a few oan rule batter than a graat many~ So ha suggests a. boa.rd of 
trustaea, mada up of the "able and the good." The Re trustees will 
attempt to do tvro things, i.m.prove human nature and specify objectives 
for the ngood lifa.," T'n.e improvemont of tha human race will be m.a:in-
ly by saleotiva breading~ but, aa an emergf1t1oy me~sure, he vnll ooaroe 
man into true. realistic., and a.ooaptabla behavior. By repetition and 
reward ho would assure its oontinuanoe. As for the :improvement of the 
environment, there a.re a number of specific recommendations• but the 
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most important of these is the oreatiou of more capital gpods. 
Ir this plan wore .put. into ef'foct we ,vould soon beoom& aW'tl.N ot 
several strikingly undt:tmocratic tondonoies. On the one hand, the 
masses would beoome mentall7 passive to th~ dictates of the rulers 
and would thereby lose the opportunity to ham through a vigorous. 
' ' ' 
attack on personol and social probl~s• .These o·onsid&red abll!t bf 
virtue of their ma·terial., mariageria.l~ or scholastic achievements would 
be encouraged to live au individualistic: iu•e., SU$Uming that what they 
' ' ' 
want mu.st be good tor tham and must necessarily be right. Mo:r-eav\n•.-
if they attend to the business of satisfying thelr rua.tural wants. 
their conduct will benefit the remainder of society. We maintain 
that this £ram& or mind would be delt.terious not only to tho less able» 
I , 
but also to tho ngirtedtt sin~e it enoouragsa a.nti•sooial behavior. 
Thus for one group Thornd~ke would havo laissez. tairism, . ruid tor 
another. authoritariru;ii•• Both aro absolutisti<>. 
An authoritarian sooiety whieh allows some fl'Gedom of thought m~ 
possibly become demooratio. Hareil:l' is Thorndike•s greatest weakness. 
Be not only proposos a psyoh,:>logiogl method which stifles ·genuine 
reflection.· but he also sets up a.boolutes which block thinking. i.iore• 
over. it an individual should engage in any reti'eotion regarding hi.a 
action. it would not be with regard to oonsequenoes i:r:t terms ot a 
. . . . . . ' __.,,, 
plan 2£_ aetion. but rather in terms ot 2 absolute. Only when the 
irl.dividua.l is free to think oritical.ly or the ends used and the means 
'Whereby he achieves these ends is he truly in a position to evaluate 
all or the eonsequenoas to his behavior. For whEJn he is committed to 
an absolttto. the indivi"clual can re.flaot only on tm, pointsJ namely• .~ ~- . '' 
most eff'loi.ent means?" The actual oonsequenoes to any proposed. 
. action a.re not open to review. 
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Briefly, then, an abaolutism based on inherent huma.n qualities, 
upon 'ob,jectiva truth, and upon .tho irrtri:nsio value of economia goods 
. ' . ' .· ·.' ! I:.,' . 
· does no't require a cons:t4eration' or consequeii?~S other than these 
three. . The direct serviulng of tho wants of human beings . determines 
. moat of the ends ot .soolety. The objective nature of truth and eoo• 
· nomio goods and. tha intrinsic value of oooh prescribes the ends ot 
many aotivitiea oornmon to mane· Moreover, intelligent social action• 
and · the weigh){ing of oonsequerices i a out or pl.ace in a. system wherein 
immediate i'eeling•sta.tes of the good are the. criteria, and wherein . .__..... -
most individuals behave in terms of an imposed wa:y of life;. Truly, 
the Thorndildan ideal ;.s not a democratic one. 
As to. the original question pertaining to the nature of' Thorn• 
dike•s oonoeption o.f' society, we observe that it is a planned rathe~ 
< • • .·, • • ... __,,. 
than a planning society. Its ends are set absolutes. And despite 
. -
any appearance or ohanga in this society,, ita efforts and energies 
will be dii-eotedto the aohievement of predetermined absolutes. More• 
over. we find that on the: bet.sis of these assumed absolutes, apeoifio. 
modea of· oonduot are pr,oposed1t For instanoe.·, since capitalism appears 
not to be averse to hum~ na.tur!3, and si.noe it rewards those who are 
able and good, etc., it must be a. good mode of. sooial conduct •. · Or, 
· beoauso the experts are :more l :Ucely to make fewer mistakes, and bo-
oause they aro supposed to be gooii and benatioent. and baoause few 
·rulers a.ro bettor than many., an·. atithoritarian ·society with the privi• 
' loge of coaroing the lase .able and trustworthy is permias~ble. 
We oonolude, :then,. that pertaining to sooiety as well as to human 
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nature and reality. Thorndilce is a realistic absolutist. It. will 
bear repeating, such an outlook is daoidedly authoritarian and un• 
democratic.. If we so!k to formulate a type or social organization 
that will develop the incompetent rather than take for granted their 
persistent incompetency, and i:f' wa saek a social ore;a.nization that 
will provido genuine opportunity fo1• pa.rticipatlon in social action 
and problem-solving, it vlill not be tbia one pr-oposed by Thorndike 
in Human Nature and the Social Ordor. 
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CHAPTER V 
So far ou.r analysis of realism has been confined primarily to 
ThormHke' a, Hunl.lln Natu.re and the Social Order, which eoncer.na it self --·••o1 ..... .......... ------
w~th a presentat1o.n of the .ttatura of the ind1vidu.al and the social 
order. Qi' course,. as Thorndike touches upon the perpetul'ltion and 
improvement ot society, he does deal with the educational process 
and s11bjeet•mattar. Thorndike's position with regard to su.bject-
matter and its presentation has already been touched upon in part 
i.!l this study, in corulection with his lnterpetation of the nature 
of the indi Vidual. However, a ettmt:nary of ·t.haae and other statements 
~e makes will ba presented toward the close o:f' this chapter :tor , 
purposes o! cornpari.aon with .Bobbitt's proposals. Since .Bi>bbi tt ia 
better l!JlQwn f'or a realistic treatment of subject-matter we p1·opose 
to confine our::H21lves mainly to a stud3 of his position pertaining 
thereto. our primai'y .sou1·ce will be Bobbitt• s recant publication, 
Tho curriculum for Modern iducatio11--
Let us first osau.re ourselves of Dobbitt•a realistic and 
ubsolu.tiatic positio,th We mu.st do this eapecialli in the light of 
the le..nguage ruid concepts he seems to use in his recent te:x.t, The 
1. 
Ourricultun Modern Bducntion, since man3 of these statements 
ond inferences appear to be in keeping with a democratic conception 
1. Paga references in parentheaes throughout this chapter refer to 
:Bobbitt• Gi The Cu..rriculum for :Modern Edu.cation, except in cases 
where ThorudlJce' a Human Nature and the Social Order is cited. --------
l. Science ;ts a utu<l,11 of relationshipa. · Scl.enti:t'ie discovery 
is largel;, the aioc(.lvcry of rel~tions. {p. 270) 
• • • the i;,1 iii(Hrt man is ha ~ho 1$ees the mo:l;t things the . 
it.OiJt clearly in the hr5eat nu.m.ber of relatiouauipa.. (p. 91) 
•• • 3oma o! them r 1Clantiatu, ate.} bu.ild out the seen 
1.nto con.tigu1•atlon.o tbat \tr:i!.1d~.nd tar ibto the realm of 
proti,..l)ility, 11ossibilit3, and hopEh lP• 405) 
3. •l'he h.umru.i roind otu.dies euut'h;u.ration:,, and tho p.r{.iblE.ua or 
learning is that of aaein.g ''~hole" eont'ig1,1,r&,t1ons. 
• •• it (huumn mindJ vi@u.1dhea thl:l ivhole as best it ce.th 
lP• 400} 
4,; Uttderstanding involves tho ubilit3 to aee relat'ionsllips of 
pbrts t.o the whole. 
When he· (im inf'ant}. has broken the contfou.wn up into a 
large number of eler~ent.111 and sees them cle,n:1.; in their 
natu.res tmd r(!lblt:1onohip3, then: he naa. t\ lar~e untHtrstand-
ing. (p. 91J 
5,. lSdu.ce.tioo. requires 'n.o~ merel;i ti"~ 1Ac-:1u.httiol! of £ix~d 
limo~ ledge, but. it l"equ.ires on scti vel)' alei•t l.eiu.·ne1•• 
?heh bs.dc t&sk. (the school' a) is not to t:tiru et his 
ma.star3 ot an.3 £1.xed body of x;;rrept-.1red knowlatlge, bu.t 
rather at the continu.ity of obae1·vatiou, :roM:11ng, aud 
,Uneu.$aion o.f' the rtffaira g£ tila i:H>oial ordet" that will 
bring him the noecied kno~ledge as he ~es al!).ng. \PP• .207• 
Z08J 
tri'hen a p(iram1 • a thought U.!e 1s ou·ried on for him by 
others, then in his practical p\tlr:t\u.·:.Mmce he t!rllst also 
r.lepi:md u.po.n them to vi tr.llze t1ia 'i'liill to execute the pl$nS 
th,Jt th.e3 ht.Ve mi.de :for him. {p. 00) 
• • .. all (agencie&J are c:ootd1.n~te, since the;:; e,re 
cooper1;1t1.11g pa1:u ot a due;le organ.11.un in promotin8 the 
2. 
well-being of the whole and or every pa1~t. . (p. 346) 
If we were to take these isolated starteinents .as ;representative of 
, . 
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l:lobbitt•s pt'eaen.t poillt of view, we wo~ld be led to the eonclu.sio.n that 
he has not only modified and changed his earlier, ... f.~alhtie poaiti~n, 
\\\ 
but he .also has .now adopted· a rehtivis~fc· outlook o;'•,,,e,:~ucation. His 
langu.a$e is .acceptable andhia phrasing .seems to be compatible with 
democracy, bu.t are we ready to aec.ept him as a 1"e:lativiat on the basis 
·. of' these statements? liiiall3 educators '-who have not been taught to be 
more than. superticial13. diacrimin.a·ting,,. frequently adopt practices in 
• ' 1···.· ·,., ' 
their schools because eu.cbpractices are clothed. in aecept£able la.u.guage. 
Similarly, the masses may vote for a political machi.ne because it pre• 
' . . . . ·, , . . . . . 
sames to pt•otect "God• Mother, and 00Wi.tr3.11 A cloak of words wins 
their su.pport. But• in studying :Bobbitt, we mu.at inqu.ire ·c~refu.113 to 
. " 
sae .whether :Bobbitt. really meana what these statements, taken tn 
isolation, appe,,r to. mea11- ~e i)ropose to do th1 s by viewing his 
I ' r;:• 
assumptions concerning the nature of' rtality 8.J1d hif assumptions bear• 
ing u.p~n human nature, society, and the education of society. 
,h The Nature of Reality and Truth, Aceordir.tg to Bobbitt~ 
In the chapter treating reality end absolutisms a number ot alter• 
llRtive positions regarding the n~ture ot realit3 were cit.ad. We have 
already obsa1~ved that Thorndike accep·ts a realistic poai tio.n, and in 
doing so he sets u.p rea.lit3 as en objective existence having fixed 
m.ean1.ug in terms of content or structure. For him, reality exists in 
2. Some ot the statements given hore are ,r~11ted in isolation from the 
paragraphs or units which, as wholes. are 11ot orgaJ1ismie nol' rel• 
ativistic· in their outlook. 
an objeeti ve, absolute form apurt :from an. obaexvi.ng individual, and 
realistic living .necessitates en adaptation to this reality and its 
verbal parallel, truth.. Oonsequentl~., Thorndike cannot accept the 
relativistic proposition that the meaning ot reality is fou..nd iJ:1 the 
relatio.nahips that au identity represents and that tJ:"u.th is a forrou• 
lated w(lrkiag hypothesis upon which the indi vidu.al bases a plan of 
action•· 
~obbit"t holds th:at realit3 is indape.ndeJlt and the mental pr.ocese 
involved 1n the &~perception or r·aalit;,y is identical tor all persons. 
1£ all persons saw tb.e same phenomena with the same perspective• etc .. , 
each wou.ld of necessit3 hfive the aama mental impression. Pertaining 
to the .tale o:t the six blind men al.id their various coJlceptionl! of' an 
elephant; :Bobbitt writes: 
The tro~ble arose !rom the incoropletaness of each.man's 
perception of ihe antmsl. If each hmi pirnaed hio hands 
over the entire organism, the.n each would ht.Ve bu.ilt his 
impressi(Jn to :reltitive co11:p1etcness and there wou.ld hove 
been a :tllll meru1u.re o! agreema,11t. (pp. 100 .. 101) 
The remedy for co.ntrovers3 is to. eliminate incomplete ... 
neas in the series ot impressions that persona get of 
things.• • • For an3thing there can be onl3 one true 
understa.nding ... {p .. 101) · · · 
As applied to the natut'e of truth and the means b' which .Bobbitt 
attempts to discover it, we find fu1•ther. manifestation of' a realistic 
position.. He tells u.s that "!flle test o:t truth is .not the we1 it was 
discovered, but rather the degree of its correspondence with reality•" 
{p. 1i1 That is to say, correspondence to objective or independent 
existence is the i'inal test of' truth• Therefore an individual may rorm• 
ulate a statement of' tru.th, but that otetemant can't ba regarded as be• 
ing true unless it describes an existence as it is. The statement 
itself' is not a :t'otmu.htion o! a workii1g hypothe$1S bu.t rather a 
description. of whHt is presumed to exist objectively. 
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Bobbitt holds turther that tru.th pertlii!H:1 primarily to established, 
obJeeti ve data. Be writel;I: 
While deficiencies in the ps~choloe;ical and social 
sciences t\re obviou.s, yet, ea a r."latter of fact, mu.ch 
:reliable knowledge ill tl1ese :fields has been eatablishad 
with a high degree of probability. lor each of them 
there is a le.rge amow:i.t o:f €)Stabli$hed tro.th ... and this 
of :t'u.ndamentals ... that, can be used with confide.nee for 
prectici,l guidance and as a touchstone for u.oe in validating 
fu.rther tru.th.. lPP• l4 ... loj 
This uniformity .is to be gained through tha following two eonditio.na: 
( l) The thoU[sht is to 'be U·u.th, a.s nearly as it can be 
escert.ained, • • • • iand (2) the truth is to be stabil• 
ized in terms tb.at do not v~r3 fr1.1i.1 person to perBoni 
i'r·om time to. time, or from pl.ace to plt.1Cfh {p. 271) 
We observe, tlien, that ·t:ru:th is presumed to ba o kind of 
It is et~tic, a statement of wb.tit is end not of whnt c~n be, and 
something co.acex•ni.n8 which there will be ag.teem."?nt • 
.B. :Bobbitt's Conception o:t Uu.ml:'IA Nc;.tu.re .• 
In ou.r study ~f watsoll 'Ne !ou.nd he C!Olli:!iders himself 
deterministic regarding hwnan nat\u·e. · He b.olda that fixed situations 
3. 
We also round this to be true 
3. John :a. Watson, .Beha'Viorism (1950) 1 P• 183, otatas that he 1a 
deterministic and he goea on to elaborate in ·the following manner: 
t1 • • , .the child 2! adu.l t 2!! ,:E_ ~• .!£!, onll wa:; 
he can be mrjde to set di:t'fereutly io first to untrain li.iw. Md then E ".retri'in him .. n-rrtalics are i.11 the od,gin~ .. } - - -
2. .HumtiJl n&tu.ra is paHiVtJ both EJ.B to snnetic forces 
~nd tha !iaod elet~rmta ot situations which t1old 
Ol" .torm the nou..r&l co.MeatiolUhr 
z. !f ,m, ectivit.V h iil1tit1ted by the i.ndividttnl, or 
tt behavior is guided 1n an:t i:ipeei:tic direction b3 
p1u"aonol ele~.nt&• thtit ill1tiution and th!lt 1.Urao• 
tion at'lit determined b3 wants or dd.veih 
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0.11 the btud.s ot the statements f.Uld pr&,rtices oi' fhorndike nud Watsc.>n• 
wko h!.iVe fqtWd m~u.n1t1g to Hill within the olem{:lnto of humM. nature and 
More thoo the3 r<?alize, Md la.rgol1 ill w.s3s other thml what the3 
seem to think:, the tatu.re ot oru• ndio.n rents with ite seboola., 
colleges, ana univa.raities. they hine iwparalleled opport.t.mi t;y 
to ea~wne leede1·sh.ip in tho ~dvi.\nc:a of society b3 le~dership in 
those >l~ys or intellectual UVing tht'lt will enable U1e mei::ibera 
ot the -&hole poI,>Ul11t1on to grow geuu.ine undel:'ata.r.uHnga and th!'}rein 
do their ow.a thin.king Ga self'-dh·e<:-Unir t.ree men ana ~0£:lell• {p. 218) 
triedom ot ienoico upon t\t'l i.nteUe~tt:i"l tu.ti.is. .lu.t let u.s comtH&re 
· thi~ atll!teme.nt wUh the folloid.ngi 
!f'eu~encies laid do\\ln .in th:e ver:, A$t~i·e of mM• u bt!Ag 
dw:ing agea of &1.1ceot.ral •aparienda have- ac~u1·e4 a 
ponr fJIU4 e ino~e.utwn. that 1e ·tne VtrJ essence ot the 
11£• procasa. (p. 26) 
o.u \\he l)&1u:11s ot the second stfll.\em~!tt, iiitl .might concJ.wle tbat in part 
'the illdividaal 1s not tree to act ozi bis 01'Jh It app~ur• aa though 
itiera \'Ut:t·e prtst.ntU.ied '.pat tor1u1 ot b&hlviot b-3 virttle ut he.retU. i1 • 
Tht:it 11 10 aa:,, the in<lif14ual 1e not e.l.'.rtirelJ free- to ~kc hh 01tll 
declsi®a tegnri.Ung beila'fi--=r• for aoIM t11lfia ot 'behavior Bre preaued. 
to be t~re-deterf!lined, oir fot•e•orllained, thr.oug4 . .neracUtJ• 
OA the ot11:t1.1ce it · may i':H:t~m w• are now detlli.U~t with tar-fetched, 
i:rrelev-wit ~t.tero, but we· ®J.st take eedou.sl.3 this taut ot tr,11.ns to 
tin::\ out .t:.eth&.e Bobbitt adiJ1to tht nece:1us1t1 o.f personal lntiellectual 
.freedom tor everyone rui4 plruis his e4uc~t lo&Uil program· ticcort.Uttgl3 or 
·whether he limits himeelt to ,he dsterminiwu ot tnbo.r11 driven and the 
impact ot etifAla.11 on· paaatve indS:dduals,• 'to aid uJ; ln .wtld.ag 011r 
4eo1e1on; we will• further inv<usUgatft lob'bltt' s eonce-ption ot original 
A&tu.re an.4 hb propositiorit concerning th.-01 tmttter ot ahrulging 
1fl pt;vc:1101011. and sin.es hie writings pertnin primar:t11 to- cu.rricu.l'u.m, 
1, it diff:leu.lt t.o ft.nd u.11 t1deq®te d1sc.,i;11eion pertaining to original 
h~ nat.t1re 111 his writinga. lie does. ho11ever, make some attteioonta 
which ltuui us to dei'in11it conolueions regi;t-dina hh concept1oz1 ot 
original hunu1n natu.,•tl as he writes about ler.ur.ning, plsi aetiviti&u, and 
other types or behavior common to the classroom. And on the au.rf'ace, 
these statements tep..d ta be abaol1.1.tistic in their implications • 
.Bobbitt appears to be atomistic and vitalistic, assuming that a deus -
!.: machina accoil.llts for the integration o:t' the elements. 
we, have already indicated that :Bobbitt holds innate tendenoiee to 
be essential to the human being. we find another statement bearing 
'4.POll thia same poaitioa whe.o. he treats play activities and. their 1110• 
tivation. He writes: 
Lett to his inner urges alone and pos sassed ot the means 
ot following them, man• s play-life tends to be a hungry 
seeking ._fter the inteneified forms of pleasurable eating, 
drinking, smoking, d&Acing., sex experience, gami.ng, gossip, 
eelt-eXb.ibitio11, social domination, and the like. lP• 39) 
He clarities what he illeane b3 "inner urgea11 in anothe;r connection. Re 
writes: 
The things that al'e abeolute r,ecessi ties, nature not only 
provides for in automatisms and iruier dri vea, but also put a 
them practically be3ond the power of h\llllall beings to 
prevent. lP• 214) · 
It seems quite clear that he accepts inner pa~terns or drives 'lS 
determiners prescribing certain aspects of hwnan behavior. ~he indiv• 
idu.al 1s comparati vel~ helpless in controlling them. Aa a matter of 
fact, in the discu.asion following the above quotation, .liobbitt suggests 
that one of the functions of education is tllat of u.ndorate.nding. these 
drives against which human nature ia powerltss to act. These drives: 
are p1:eaumed to be imposed on the mass of living tissue. That io' to 
say, Bobbitt implies that i~dividuals canno~ or will not protect them• 
aelves through an analysis of a situ.ation and b.Y insightful activit3. 
Therefore, nature (whatever natura ~ay be) places drives within him as a 
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protective agent. 'l:hia is a vitali:stic compromise similar to tha one 
we have al.ready witnessed in Thorndike •. Yet tllis is the 0.1111 reason• 
able position a realist can take if he .adinita there 1s orga11b$.tion ond 
design ,in humWl nature. But ,.in. doing this he separates th.a :ru.netio.aal 
orga~izatio.n of human .nature fl"om tne organism itself• 'l:h.at is to HI• 
twlctions are .aot a part <>t' thf3 organism itaelt, but th.eg ere imposed 
.But we cannot confine aobbitt exclu.aively to the drive or in• 
atinct concept ot hu.rorui »a1n1.re, for he holds that io.telligenee ma3· 
' ' . ' 
control sooie dd ves and make adaptations to others• '1:het is to say, 
he hold1:l that some instincts which guided primitive ·man in priinitive 
situations tAreu1ot :always sate guides ,for ruo<lern. mru:i living in modern 
situ.ationa, we read for· instance with reference to intellect and 
prfm!Uvtt tem.ler.des that, 
!.0:teliect was given to man tor the pu.rpose of co11trol ling 
every f.orsn o.£ behai.rior that could not safel1 be left to 
the p:rimi ti ve urges. Play cannot be discarded; • • • • 
.But play must be taken in h,and by 1.ntellect, an.a gu.ided , 
into and alo.ng the. ehennels that are approved by, intellect 
as !r11ittul and wholesome.. (p. 40) 
We muat nQte, h04-11ever 1 that tor ·the average pereo.n, intellectual 
control over innate drives is never presumed to be complete.. For 
instan.ce, Job bi tt impliea that i.aherent patter.a a. ot coudu.et persist 
despite average intellige.nce and that one should become reconciled to 
them. The following statement, although somewhat ambiguous;; does 
leave this· deterministic improasion: 
All that cnn be hopel\ for is. that e1:teh live with the degree 
of wisdom th&t it is posaible for him to possess. He is not 
to have his life plann.ed and IMnaged tor him • • • • This maatUJ 
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that the3 {1he mediocre} have a right to live that imperfect 
kia.d ot life that normally issues :Crom their natures. {p. 365) 
:But how or where- does ·sjtlf~co~tr.ol anter into this ·picture? If 
Bobbitt were·asked this, he ~ould prob~bl1 repeat~ common11 ex-
pressed though1i• "Freedom comes from Wlderatandiag, Gd in. compliance." 
'fha't is to a111,. in order ,o keep drivei, and impulses on. a high level 
we mil.st undel'stand them, recognize thelr presence when making adJust• 
mezit s, or even go so tar as to avoid certain dri ve•st.S.rnulat itlg si tua• 
: . ' '. . ; . 
. tions. ls this ·freedom of ~he \Yill; or is this .just a high level ot 
. p~ssiviti to the iaevitable? 
Bobbitt informs us that freedom comes <>1111 thro~ Wlderstanding. 
. . ' 
. . . : ·i'.< _,· ,' , I. . -· 
Ke also expresses _this idea·_i.o connec:t'ion ·with eJUOtional eo.o.trol in 
•~tu.at10.t1s manipUlated b; "charlatans· ~d dem~oga.es.•• ,. Imwi1t1 to . . .. ' . ·, 
· their techniques can be obtained o.nly throqh"• • · •. e.xperletices· with 
real1t1, out of which alo.ne soW1d ude1!stand1ng grows."!· lP• 108) 
that is to say, emotional con,rol lies·111 understanding, and it 1s 
. . . 
upon the basis of 'Uhie Wlderetanding that intellectv.al control' can· 
be exercised over innate behavior patterns. ·»ut if understandi.Dg 
is simpl,1 ano:the-r .name tor condition.illg (and we shal.f soon see that 
. . 
_it ls J theA the c.,peration ot 1.ntellige.o.ce 11111 b~- only ·an adaptation 
. of dd ves to the& stern realities of lite. .mmotiot1al · control is onl1 
the raising of the t_hreshold. to emotio.nalll at1111uiatiag situations. 
We observe that· .Bobbittls use of the terms intellect SJ1d -wider• 
standing imply a l!Wld passive to exter.nal stilllUl.1~ ior instance, he 
points out that knowledge or -widerstanding of reali t1 will n • • • 
aris~ auto~ticall1 out ot a aufficienc1 of particulars that are clear 
a.ad significant." (p. 99} In another $.nstaoea Bobbitt. writes, 
The more vivid the impression of the reality at the time, 
the more quickly and firm.13 as.eociated are word. and mean• 
ing. t P• 247) 
• • • if impressions be weak, or u· they decline too 
much in frequency, the idea grows relativel;, anemic and 
ineffective. a1:u1 wi tbou.t •repeti tio.tt of any sort, it 
dies away beyoncl recall. b• 89) · 
lSriefl.v, the11J we m9.3 oharacteriz, Bobbitt's ps3eholog3 as o.ne ot 
.mechanietic aasociatio.niarn. ae does not describe the reflex arc 
as a 11ecessary part of hia system, bu.t this omission de>ea .no"t mean 
that he is let,s mechanistic than Thor.ndik:e or Watson. He simpl1 
easumes that the persistence of impressions, a repetition of ex• 
perie.nce, will stamp into the passive mind certain cou.necrtions or 
associatio.nth It appears theJl, that l3obb1tt has :iot changed 
essentiall3 from his earlier realistic' commitments. Ou.r task, 
now is to ascertain Ju.st what this realistic position implies 
·' . . 
wtth regard to certain oducati,,nal praijtices. As to vitalhm,. 
Bobbitt makes atom:ism and vltaUsm bed•fellows, Ju.st as fhorndike 
does.. $his is another symptom of absolu:Usm which should rei'lect 
on hie educational practices,.; 
o. TJ:he Nature o:f su.bJect•ltattar. 
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'Jhe subJeet-matter o:C education snd the manne,r' of' its presentation 
are closel3 l'elated to concept.ion.~ regarding reality and human nature. 
The absolutes more ox- less determine the natlU"e of subject-matter; 
and the conceptions of human nature more or less· prescribe the ma.on.er 
in which the abeolu:tes are to be achieved or sou.ght. But. Jast as 
12'1 
abaoluthtic c~w'llli tmeJltS reflect up1 .. -u., one• a (Hl!.w.ept.ioll of n,:wma 
Aa~u.ra, GO aluo wil.1 ti\iHJW!lption:i:1 regurdfot3 mul)Jijet•mt\tter :ind it& 
presentation be lnextricn'bl3 boun<l together. Hor our purvoee, it 
will b8 best to trer.it tho two topics ot ·5u,bjcct•matter and lllf.fthodolo ... 
e3·· t1Jep~;ate11, Jet 11: ?.ill soou be ·c:u.~1cov1:H:·ed tht,t there will be a 
gtetl<t 4ea.l oi" overbvpin.g, nince ooth are i,tu•i and parcel 01· tha e:stoo 
an.al.,yoia ot ;Bobbitt., 
Pertaining to au.bJect~trtcu·. erirliar in hh career :.oobbitt 
wrote trwt n_s(hieation. 1s a jfjhaping p1'0Cl!HHi ttu much as the iMJlU.i'iicture 
4. 
of at~el railth'' .t1Ud 1.n order to i'aoilitate thh a.Qlding proc!!las 
lui)w.·gad the 13choola to take the :tollowing four atepiu 
l l) • • • we need f'i rst of f,ll l to draw u.p in detail for 
each uoeitll or voe&tional claia o~ stmlG;1to 1,n our cb.iu:ge 
· o U.et ·or all the, ~bilitioo and aspects ot p~n·sonaUts for 
the t1·dning o! g,uieh the &chool is reapoaslble• (2J • • 
• deterr;1i.ne scales of ::ieaau.remont in ,arms ot \vhieh tnase 
ffllllil3 1.atte1·en't eapeets o:f the persoouli -ty c~n be measi:u-eit. 
U>l we must determine the arnawn of tr,dn1ng thilt' is so• 
ciaU1 desirable 1·or e1Jch of tl1eso 81bilitiea Md. state 
theiee WiiOuntu ill tel'ms ot th& scales of Jaeliu~u.rement, l4) 
We ma.st luwe progreaoive str.md ... rds of att&inment tor. each 
stae;e ,of lildVf.ln.ceui(int at each ab1U.t3 in q1.uu1tio.n.;;... 
To pu.t it s1ropl3 • .Boobitt advocated te!.lchiAG people to do better 
,dint ihoJ will be required to do au3wa,. 1:hla poaition 1u chanracter• 
htie ot trends in .rcr11iatic cu.rriculWD. eottstru.cuon. llobbht seems 
4• 11·,:anltU.n Dob'bht, ••:Jome uanar!i.l h•ine:i.plei uf ~llBgement i\ppl1ed 
to th.o ,Pi-obl~m t>f City-School S3atems," §.:t2~rv.i.~10ff o! Oitz, St:,~oola. 
f{\rt I T'1eltth Ye~rtr.:,t.>k, Naiio.n.al Sociat:. tor the stiia1 ot rid"u-
cation, P• 12• · 
6. lbida P• 49 -
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contemporar1 leadere. some of the recently renovated and 11 progreasively 
modern.bed" schools have emplo_yed this technique of studying activit3 
requ.i:rema.nts ot society in order to determine what should be 
For instance Stephens college fot woment one of the more llotable 
e::uunples, employed Charters to make a au.rvey of the.· poat .. gradu.ation. . . 
requirements of it a students in order to deter.mille what it should 
teach. To sa:; that t¥,a approach is one ot teaching the learn.er t1 life" 
is. beside tne pout. ~t is essentially teaching him specific objectives 
which were decided upon bJ soine authority. I.n other words,. it is an 
eu.thoritarian adu.cation. A.nd, as far ae the matter of 0 1if'e" is con• 
earned, it is li.fe "as is" rather than a wa:, of life which assures a 
:reorgeuiizatio.11 of the life that is now extant • 
.But, gr!:illt that td one time .Babbitt advocated the teaching , · of 
lite "as ia1 we bave no assura.nce thet he currentl1 proposes· similar 
I 
obJeetive1h . His moat rece.nt publication Curriculum for Modern Edu.cation· 
' ' ' . ' ............. 
i.e _p2arkedl3 dissimilar frofnhis earlier writi.ngs both in language 
and the concepts used. tet us therefore examine some oi' his recent 
~tatewe11ts regarding ed.ucational objecti vea. · 
With regard to parental responaibilities in educution be writes, 
'110 set their children properly educated, the fil•st res• 
poAsibility o! pare11ts is . .tor: them to live the. good life 
themselves on at least the le'Vel thirt they desire their 
children to attain; the second is that they cooperate with 
the schools in the latter•s epecialized leadership _111 
gu,idunce of Ju.venile li v1.ng • • • ; and the third, that 
they see that the wa:; a mode clear bJ the school are follow·• 
ed by the children in their latter's ou.t-of•school living. 
(PP• i05•l06) 
In other •ords, the first reaponaibility of th.a home is to furnish an. 
acceptable model of the life that is to be lived; second, cooper• 
ate with the school; : third, help the school to follow through 
with respect to "ways made clear.tt The point he :ma.kes regarding 
home cooperation is comnumdable, but the parental choice of a level 
of the good life and the school's making a way clear suggests en 
authoritarian choice of specific objectives • 
.But someone ma, interrupt at this Point and state that Bobbitt 
writes, 0 Bo one can know what any man• s understanding ten or fifteen 
years he.nee is to be • • • •"· (p. 138} 'l!his refers to changing situ.a• 
tions. For the present, however, he is not averse to deciding what is 
currently requil·ed. A.nd we shall see later how he handles the matter of' 
adJu.stments to changing conditions. Right now let u.s see how Bobbi t't 
regards hu.man needs as wortbJ criteria i'o:r choice of subject-matter. 
For instance, he informs us t~at., 
fhe edu.cati ve proce sa begins with NE.liIDS • The basic task 
of edu.catio.n today iB to discover with. the greatest possible 
degree of certainty the lo.og series of things that each · 
right .. li vin.g person n;esds to do and to have; l P• 228) 
J4oreover, hP.adds that, 
'?he basic reason why a well-balanced and comprehensive plan. 
ot general education has nowhere 1et been tormleted is that 
no school or eollege has yet developed its thought about 
la1me.11 • s .needs. Ro official general statement of them that 
is even semi-adequate yet e:d.sts. Educational history will 
be roe.de by the first institution or system that has the 
intellectual virility to work out a balanced, verifiable 
statement of laymen• s needs. (p. 229) 
Thus while .Bobbitt indicates that needs may vary considerably, he hQlda 
that some general state,neJlts of needs ca.u ·be made which will furnish 
a basis for general education. 
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We observe, however, that the .needs mast be those ot *'right ... 
living persons.ft Here, then, we have not only a statement implyin.s 
th«t a veri:t'iable list of basic .needs can be eonatru.cted tor purposes 
ot directing edu.cation 1 bu.t we also htiVa an indic;,tion that those 
the n~ed.s of the goo<t should determine the nature of educe:tion - at 
Let u.s direct our inquiry into tha' natu.re .of' the acceptuble .needs. 
Earlia1• in the t(n~t in question., Bobbitt states that 11 In the education 
of ooy person, the good lite is both the objective and the p:t.'ocea:h'' 
lP• 5) Du.t he becomee vague in describing the "gQod life,n indicating 
thnt it is more or less the beat living possible in sixteen general 
. ar~ea and two specitic t vocational l areas. Elsewhere we read that, 
The i'ou.ndational Jl'Jattar in good citize.nthip, the one that 
conditions .ruid deter.nines all others, is !or each person 
to be wllnt he ought to be na a hum.an being and to Uve as 
he ought to U. ve. h,1- 562 J · 
It would appear here that the good life is mo1•e or leas living on the 
basis of n felt needi:i." Jut :Bo.bbitt dispels 1:u pert the lsiasez-faire 
implications involved here by stating 0 When wants and needs diverge, 
the only way to bring the two together is to change the warlts.n (p,. 362) 
.And shortly thereafter in this con.neetion he mentions t'right-livi.ng.0 
Th.u.s the needs relative to right living become his criteria,, We read, 
I! the gro•dng individual will rightly live his life, 
according to the sanctio.na of. science, in. the smaller so• 
ciet3 of the family or in the lsx•ger one of the general 
social ordai-, the experience itself requires him to get 
s true view of a thousand factors as he deals with them; 
the satisfactions and diasati$factions involved will give 
the things the proper ai'fective colorings and im:pu.luions. 
{p. 107) 
The J:ight is the no'l:'mal, sanctioned by science• The w1.·ong is 
the departure from it. one can know and hold to the normal. 
withou.t ever having heard c:it the depm~tures.. (P• 326t 
-:83 now it is probably pretty safe for us to aanu.me th.at for 
Bob°i::)itt aome of the objectives of education ai-e set by so-called 
objective acieuce, which speci:f'ies the nature of the good life or 
the right wa3. but ~e still know little abaa.t Ju.st what science 
will speci:t'y except tor clues such as the follorring; 
Onl.Y as pupils are actually livi.ng and daalin5 with things'·. 
in normal• vital ways can '1.l\~y have the needful in.tellectur::il 
and ern.otional 1mp1••H,ah>n.s. lP• lOoJ 
The good lii'& of mM co1rnieta of a cou.ntleas -.inuaber ,eiid 
n11•iet3 of f\Ctivities • • • • It is not derived froro ru1:, 
special s;,stem of BilU.cotional theory, 'bu.t o.nly .frorn, look-
il'l8 at the li v~EJ of bumsn beings as th<,y go on from d:..3 
to d.ay. \p. 6) 
When n&tu.re goes to ~.he trmlble ot lmpl!,riting instincts 
in her creatures and of dangling before them the lures 
0£ pleasurea, tl).is is clear p1•oof that the sct:tvity is 
a .needful one. lP• 177} 
Underlying these statemen:ts are two assumptions, that ob.ject i ve 
reelit, requires some adjastment to it, and that innate hwmm nature, 
another realit;,; requires reconciliatiOn to it. On the mai11, a reality 
situation seems to determine needs, ruic\ hwnan Matu~e; p1·es,cribea wauts. 
1:r there ia a con.tlict between needs and wani;s, the 1'M.mer ere the 
mo1•e tru.stwortey. lP• 3o2J Herein Hobbitt reiterates his i'aitb. io. 
qu.ired by the reality situation rmcl 'by the rea1it3 of' human impu.1.aes., 
On the surface Bobbitt appears to accept Ro1.tsaeaa'a p~sition, but 
in the end ha succumbs to activity ana11sia as a cri~etion tor 
subJec\-l'Illilt,er. 
'~here are .nwn,lproua lirgumenta tor. ~d againet thia 't,1pe o·f 
criterion tor au'bJeet-iaane:r. }l'he llOat ob,ioua o'bJeeUon is the 
€,ttJSWilptiOA' .tht.t whist evet exists mu.it be $CCEJ,Ptable. . Iha etatuo 
SW? oppeora .10 Ju.stH3 Ua\\lt. Apparent.ly Bobbh\ ttoes not obJect 
to the status 9W?, for he j~utlfiee CIU'l'(fflt pr~cti~fos on the bt.udu of 
. hia absolutes, reality 8Jld h~Mt t:M11. !hua. he wri tea. "Whe pu.:bUc 
OfAn have what it .needs whe.n it wtm\s wht1t .it n.eeds..,11 (p. 141) Or 
ehe•llere·hewrites, 
It perHllS a:i:•e living t..be good Ute. the7 a.re malting dem?mds 
tor the .. dg-ht kind of things Wld th.11.a Giving' to each i\g~nci 
the i1eJht things to 4th . lP• 56lJ 
:By the same tOkmlt · tnsU ttttioD.s and practiceo .uot ctf!eU.:og geau.ia:e needs 
and wants will simply C$6tSe to Jt11d, tie can collclu.Oe that what-
ever 4oea •,~lat Jnu.a.t exist bJ virtue of its ~etiq basic bu.awn requJ.re• 
meut,. le.nee •. wha.tevei- exists ·mu.st be neees1u1r1 ,md sood. 
· · A '.aeco.o.d ,deftlocrstic obJeotie h rel~ted ·co the first, ~nd in a 
striking m~ruu:tr, •. iol>l:titt l\imeelf :tUu.atrales the puint. the :t.udividu.al 
wh? .is commuted to the propodtioA ihat 11whatevei- ed.sts tm1et be 
f.ieceptable" will close his m1Ad. to. a critical N1el.7ata, of ex!ating 
, -· .· . . ' . ' '·' : . ' . . . 
egenciea, 1aat!.tut1ons. tmd ·practices. ':hia itt tdat'lfobbitt has don.a.· 
Be cloe11 not, appe~r to. question the exii,ting order,. Of courso, he 
recognize; man.1 ot 1111 imperfections, bu\ he :t:eela tha, somehow U' 
• • • ', 1, ' • ' _.,_. L 
those impertection.o are s1gnU'1cant• they will be es:oadica1ied by the . ' \ ' ' ' ; ·- ' .· . 
t~rce of human tvJeds &nd w.,_ta.. ?iith this frame ot refe:c~nce,. the 
1nd~v1du.al will not attempt io •ke raquiro<l cluu1gea so long as ha can 
tolerate ,hem. In other wo~ds, J~bbitt• a poeitioA ad'loc,ltes eo1i.lmltmuta 
to ab$olutes in such a manner that there will be a tendaue1 to per• 
petu.ate the stat\lS suo. Later• as we examine .13obb1 tt' s proposed t·esch• . · 
1.ng techniques, we can be assured that· the .status 9.u.o ·will persist. 
Ill other ·v;ords, in follO"Ning Bobbitt, 'aig.nU'ieant change will be prt1c-
tically irepoaaible. 
lt luu, already been pointed out thi1t in a democracy trainir1g -in 
pro bl e1n-aol ving at1ould have priority• · Only by developing competency 
and i.nde_pe.ttdent learning a'biU.t3 can 1.ndh'iduelS ·be adequ~tel3 prepared 
£or life 1.n a problem.--solvi.ng society., I.ti order to solve' problems 
individuals must be eompete.nt 111 the use ot tools and tecl'lniqu.es. and 
mu.et have in.eight. :Bat tools, teeb.niqu.es, and insii;;hts are acquired 
in the p.t·oceas of solving problems. The so-called fu..ndM1entals, the 
tools and understandings, sre .not ends''i.n thetnsei ves bu.t are l.n• 
separable t:rom the problaro-aol vins process or lite and tn"~ a.e<~u.1red 
only i.n the solution of problems. 
:au.t ·it gu.i<ta.uce in problem-solving is the chief obJeetive in 
educstiou. the aubject•.-mattor of the scihool mu.st contribute -t,o this 
maJor din. J,;a;,les ,poi.ate out, 
• ••es.ch unit of stttd:, must repr~sent a satisfaetor.v' 
answer to the qu.e,rtiona. (a) ;0 .0oes it eontribu.te toward 
enhancama.nt of odloolt'in an~ (b} "Does it 0011tribu.te toward 
harmonization of ou.tlook?t1 • , 
1Iheue two erite1·1a for su.bJect--matter should lead the learner to a 
greater facility in his reorgaubation. of exparie11ce ,t,o ( l) greater 
underatuuding ot \Vl:urt has happened, (2), an ·ability to predict what ma)' 
be a consaqu.enoe to any aimilar conduct or aeries of. events, Md 
6. :t:. E. :B&yl.es. "U:ha llelativity .Principle as Applied to 'i'eaching,n 
Univ~rdtl !!_ Jisnsss !ulletill !£ Education, Vol. IV, .No. 4, P• 7. 
\IJ greater independence i.o. copin.g with novel situ.atiant:h John Devtey 
informs us that; 
~n1 that bbe wi~est .taa.n. can ,10 ii ·to ,ibser"'1,e 1r1h~t itJ 
going o.o. more ttidety and wore 1tdnutely arld then $elect 
tn!n"e catefltll, frQm wlurt is n?ted ju.sJ those factors 
which poi.o.t to aomethiug to happe.n;..n - , , 
It the educative p:rocass hua An::/ ju.ati:fication, it ta to be found in 
observe that its ftlll~ey ie not onl1 in et~3atallizing the status gtto 
but also in Hs lea_~i.ng to 1l false t11.daptaUo.o. to the assumed .realities 
of cireu.matauaes and hruoru.1 ,n9tu:re with/ a conseque.t:rt · loss ln nbilit;, to 
11,,vel $itu.atio.ns. fhio we aha.U sea exe~11'}1ifiad more ndequatel;v 
as we touch upon. the .nature of ttu.bJeet-matteu.~. 
The propcu.· cu.i~ricu.lur.i of 11 child oz-· gou.th canzi~t be 
-~ ready•-..mede bla.nke't of physti:i}d li vi.ng to be imPoaed 
upo.n him. l't cannot be .i genarul 1:~cipe thn'b a eehiJ<)l 
of:f'iciel or committee of' taQchars can ti.mnk:et• for the 
ge:1.erd e11d ~qu.al p1~ocassing of all pupils. \~• 314) 
._. ________ ......., __ ·~----....... -------~-------
However, he adds, 
If. there is a printed curriculum th6t bas baen imposed• 
it can propf,rly do no more than to· present a generalized 
statement of the scienc8 • - •. Tbe teache~ needs to be 
so much a master ot the sc:ience aa. to be able to apply 
1 t to the pupil' s .n.ature and si tu.a,ion. and therein see 
what his speeif'ic eou.rse ia to be,.( (p. 315) 
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fhta means that Bobbitt does .t1ot Aacessarily obJect to the specitica• 
tion of what should be learned, bu.t htf objects to its being generallJ 
applied to all learners. The reeder ~Y well ask then, how can .. 
.Bobbitt be classified as an activ1t3 analyst if he insists on a special• 
ized. program f'or each individual? Thia qu.estion. is beat answered by · 
DlSking a brief ac.alJsis of Bobbitt• a conception of the curriculum• 
we observe, firat ot all, thttt .:Bobbitt designatEis eightaen areas 
of activity which comprise the ·"good lite." Sixteen of these $re 
general and nppl3 more or less to all peraons. Two other areas are 
also d.esignated as part of the good lite, bu.t they appl3 especially 
to the acquisition o! skills and training pertinent to occupational 
. . 
proficiell<:3• Bobbitt intend$ that peraQns undel! the guidance ot an 
educational program shall live as eompletelJin these areas as is 
possible. ·ne writes, 
The pu:rpoae of education is to bring each human being to live, 
as nearly as practicable, ill. everJthing that he does in a 
ws1 that is best for him• {p. 5) 
That is to say, the areas of the good life ahall be outlined for the 
learner. And, as has been 1·ndicated earlier in this chapter. the 
details of any educational progrrun. will be. based u.po.n needs. 
(P• 22iJ the needs pr~u;umtibl3 pr$@Cribe the areae of. '1Ctivit1ea of 
eJ:.Por1c.uee l'trther tnna the specific letr.ruluca to be acqu.ir<Hi• tre read 
tor i.ne1ia.t1ce resat-di~ the uenool.s tb~t, 
fh~i~ present t.ssk is . ·u, di $<:HJnt:1.tlue 1h9- iitt.tunpt tt1 
dllliVGJ: t0&djt•[~de t\tUlOr-$tB.U.ding$ to uu, JOWlf! people 
and "1 1 ta fJtead to gt\iue the pru(u3uatHi lib1Cb. have always 
ilvan, and ~hiob eO!ttinu.e to ,give, hU)Dn belngo their 
actully ·operative Ullderat.anding.- (P• i!.161 
Or more specifican1, "!he ctlrr1oulwa of ,.my person le the cut1rse that 
hit 1.t1dividu.1l u.1.·~ rwu-..·" · \"P• 29&1 
On the 19w•1:ace the previoul1 cited reference e•~ka of Rou.sseatd.am, 
'bti't aatu.alJ.1 its Clanger U.ea in 1t1 a\ltborit$r1an1sm.. .oobb1'U rmt,kea 
,,. ., 
tteQuent retel"euce to "r11h.t~• modes O·f Uviq whan he discu.eeeft"liVillg 
1ife•" · lo other wor<hr, uUimtiel;v the cu.rrtcu1um i& a •e.1 of life im,. 
posed bi the tchool. It. 'this connection. we obstrte tlwt .Bo'bbht is not 
·, averse to su.~h a plan., we . rec till ·th~'t· · he stotea, 
It there is >I\ printed euJt·ricu.lwn til&t tuu, bll'.:e+i impoi:uul, 
i\ C&rl prupe.rl1 do no 1t10:-e tbJin t.o present a· ge.ueraUied. 
st.~tement of ihtl aciene•h {p, 3ltiJ 
At faea velue this implies tnt\t if a list ot right modes ot conduct can 
be compiled, its itapoaition is Aot at all ®l ot the wa;;« 
»ut »obbltt makes more ttwl a pu.•roiaalve al101uu1ce tor, the im• 
position of · pre-selected eurricu.lar aetivi~ie,h He p1toi,oaea them 
and impUea their neceatr1t1• lu .nwnerou.a iatstences ha ·.tndictttee that 
edn.ua'Uoa sh~U.ld t•ach tlle .. right 1flat1 of living.· itor inaiance, we 
read, 
111 1e the tunctian ot edu.c~tloo in human ioci,aty to act 
itself a.gatnst error 1n @'ftU\Y form. Its pu.1.•pona iB to do 
wht~t 1n rxouaible to prevent ma.a•, 'tit"aveUJlg the wrorig 
n>t1d • • • • Th& method of tl~nlinB with m1 eto.ks.n we3 a can• . . 1. no, be one of imiiosi.ng <:e.usorships tUid proM .. li~1ons, • • • 
The onl3 wa1 it can be effective is to bring the pop• 
ulatiOJl to au.ch a mode of living th&t tlle3 will want to 
use the radio, motion pictures, end the current press 
tor the superb services that they can give. tP• 18~) 
Of course, here llobbi tt tends to discr&di 1; coercio.n, but he pro po see 
making individuals ,uw.t the right. This is simplJ a subtle t;pe ot ----------
coercion which implies that predetermined good conduct can be imposed 
without the iadividw.al being tu.Uy aware ot what is re1.illy taking place. 
I.n other instances Bobbitt again refers distinctl3 to the "right 
ways" of living. For instance, he mentions that the twic'tion of the 
school is in a sense parental, ,,herein n It 1$ to belp children and 
youths rigl1.tly to do everything possible for themst=tlves •• • • lt 
{p. olJ In still an.other place he wrttes1 . 
when 'the right ways are ·the only onea that children ever 
see, when they are simply taken for granted aa the onl3 
possible ones. and wbe.n the qu~ation of their rightness 
is never ao mt1ch as raised, their edttcation is s.ccomplished 
·more or less automaticall1b31ihe .natu.ral educative processes. 
lP• 326J . . 
Shortly. thereafter Bobbitt adds that ttThe righ\ is the normal,· sanc·U.on• 
ed b3 seience." lP• 526J It seems obvious frtun these statemell.ts that 
there ia a dght way of livizig which is to be t'5ught or "put over" under 
the gu.~se of learning. The right •ai is preaumabl3 ascertained b3 
objective techniqu.es and will be taught as having the sanction of 
science, the learner is not required to consider alte1~.u"te plans. to 
test hJ'pothests nor to evalu~to them in terms of consequ.e1.1ces; rather, 
he will simply eon!orm t:o predetermine~' standards. 
Here again some mai state in defenae oi Bobbitt that he doe1 not 
believe that there is only one right anawei• to an3 problein&tic situation. 
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).-ight ways as there are persons." ( P• 56!3)" l3ut 'he follows by stating 
that tt'It is relative to the nature, hi stor1 • status; and situation 
. ' 
ot the. individaal+" lP• iG:i) The.n he adds, 
Other persona of loiaer native ability and t:ruder tastes 
will live correspo.ndinSli simpler liVes and tor the 
·.purpose will require fewer things. smaller amoW1ts, and 
· less expeneive qualities. (P• 365J 
From thia point 011 he me~tions freedom ~nd explains that applied 
here it merui.s the ~dioere0 • • • have a right to live that. im• 
per~ec~ kind of life that .normall3 1aau.es £.tom 'their natures." ( P• 565J 
fhe point at htsu.e is .not a co.o.aid.errition. ot alternate ways of l1vi11g 
but rather a choosing of levels o:r rigb.tnesa• Bobbitt will expec'Cl 
the superior to go tar in their 1ad~ptation to rea11t1, the mediocre., 
by virtue ot their innate nature&; will be expected to gravitate to '· 
e lower level of adaptaU.on. Thi$ is an argument tor a graded curri-. 
cu.lwn or a homogenou.s grou.pill.g of pupil a, and .not. for a considere.t 1011 
of alternate wa~ of living. 1.n other wordsr·all learn~:re will be 
expected to learn the tight WS,St bu.t tbe superior will be expected 
to ltarn more right ways a11d to learn them faster. 
But, if 13obbi tt apecit'iee ttr1g11t Wa$s" ot living,. what are thet? 
··In other words• Juat what evide.nce do ;,e have of his specific eu.r:r1-
cru.lar requirements? Lot u.s mention first· of all that Bobbitt does 
.not claim to know apecifical13 what shou.ld be taught• bat !ollowi.ng 
are some item, lle mentions. Whet we nm.st not lose sight of is that 
these items are essential13 modes ot co.ndu.ct which are to be '•put 
over" on the learne7• and 1Jl. so doing the learner will not have 
opportwait:, to make his own decisions with regard to them or their 
eoneequencee ill hit life. 
It has·already baen mentioned that Dohbitt stresses lett1rning life 
as it is now. .Actually, as p:r:esented by him. 11:te becomes su.bjeet .... 
matter. Be writes, 
The world of today he needs to know "now; Umt ·of. ne7..t 
year, he needs to know next. yttar, · and so o.D.1 • • • (p. USS J 
The eomple:x.ities of the wodd today demand that .men 
and woman· .have sound understanding o:t'" things aa 
tha3 are. lP• 115) 
That is, the real! ti of todsy, the world uow facing the learma~ is sub• 
Ject--matter, Of course; this means that today's 1·ealit:, is wi nbaolu.te 
that mu.st be pu.t over in the clansrooa{. 
The torm that the re11Utiee ·will take ill the roind of the learner 
tvill be that of und erstandinga coneerni.ng it. :Bobbi ~t ,.v,rit es1 "Among 
man ts needs, none today is more imperative than understanding." (p. ol) 
Understandings are praeu.med by him to be the resulte of' experience. 
He t.iJri tes, 11Tlte reeliti9s involved in hurnt:m living are tt, ba leorued 
. . 
at the places where t,hey enter i11tu human 11 ving.'' {p· •. 108 J ihe 
aoso.mptio.n is thE,t complete experience· will lead to• tr~e:;.fuiderstandings. 
We read, ttfhe remed.y for CO.fsh'0Ve1·sy is to eliminnte t'_ncompl ~te.ness 
in the series of impresaiona that persons get of tlt1nga.n (p. lOlJ 
Hence, subject-matter is a living ot pre-.determip.ed segmants of life. 
pr~rnwned to lead to true ~deratandi.ug. Experience i;)_ assumed to be an 
absolute in that it guarantees a g:i.ve1{.and, ·a t.rua understanding ot 
objective reality. :Bobbitt writes, "The remedy for controvers3 it to 
eliminate inco~pleteness in the aeri&s of impressions that persona get 
of things.n (p. lOlJ . Be assu.mes that reality has indepe.nden.t mean• 
1.tlg and absolute stimulus value and tha't the ind 1 vidual ie paasi ve 
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to sensor1 perception. Re st.atea t.hat n lf a person has full experie11ce 
wit~ the thing• of a class. nothiJlg can P,rev~.nt that fu.sion of the.m. in 
his min~ •·. •"_ (p. 99) The point is.·. :Bobbitt holds the position that 
-
experience will lead to defi.nite result a regardless of the goals of the 
experiencing ind1Y1du.ah 'This me~s, that lite or ·r(jalit1 ·as it .now 
exists. can ba impressed upon the learn.er bi the .expert who will arrange 
/ 
for the right· experieriees~ 
. Shou.ld one question this 1.nterpreti.tioa of :Sob\litt. other references 
Call 1·eadll7 be produced which .are in keeping witb. this general 'theme. 
,,. ,._!•" 
·,,, 
For instance; Bobbitt writes, "The little child most .needs to be shield~ 
ed ·trom ever1 error.'' l P• 1&4 J Tha, ls, Bobbitt is .not willing to 
. permit the immature to make independen.t decisio,u:s. Elsewhere he writes, 
"It is the .fua.ctio.o. ot education 1n mrin&A socii\ltJ .. to set itself against 
' _r , ' J. 
error in ever1 torm.tt {p. 184) In other·wor<is; 'the teacher ·ot parent 
mu.st. decide which und.er~tendings are the l"ight ones •. 
Best evidence 0£ l!obbi tt 1 & authori ta:rianisnf are his stateme.n t• re• 
~. . . ' .'\• ' .· . 
,fer"ing to the rtmu.sts" of edu.c:ati@. One of the .neceaaari lear~ings 
proposed is the tu.ndame.a.tals• For instance 13(,'bbitt writes, ''Bat lat 
,·/' 
his ge.neral education ground him sou.ndi1 in the fundamentals that appear 
an.d reap:i,ear in h~ affairs• • :• •" (p. 5~1) one area· in which ;fun• 
. . . ' . 
damentals are to be acqubed is history., ot which he writes, 
The desig11 variee, but the tebde fs al•ay s· wovea 
. ot the :same materialth It is because history c:on• 
.ti.nu.ts to repeat and show these things ·endlessl1 
and ,from all anglea that hiatorical•mindedneas is 
imperati·ve, ·for hua~ guidance.rt lP:• 143) 
!J:o .Bobbitt this means that certain i\lndamentals must be acqu.ired. 
It also means that right answers or :specific mod.es of .con.duct mu.at be 
taught, !ecauee the pri.nei:ples involved in histor1- will be ascertain• 
ed by the exper~, the lear.u.er will be required to learn them as au.ch. 
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fhe number of personal decisions regording fundamentals will be few. 
llu.t .Bobbitt does not limit his curricular requirements to the f'u.lld ... 
amentals. Be also 1n.dicates tbat ceJ."tai.11. of our cu.ltu.ral tools are 
neeesear_y.. For instance, we ·read that 11 Good spelling 1s a .needful 
accomplishment•'' {p. 25Zi In rebtio.1:1. to mathematical combinat:10.1111 
he deplores the practice ot teaehing.thein at the earliest ;year possible. 
· and then states, 
A more rational mode ot placement is to discover. the age 
level when the pu.pil ·muat begin to ttse the operations in 
_his intellectu.al nnd practical activities, and to .give 
the drill as needed at that point. (p. 282) 
What we observe he1·e is that llo'b'bitt is .not willi.ag to leave the lear.n• 
ing of culto.ral tools such as spelling arid aritbmeUc to chancth If 
he believes that experience will tench what 1 s neceas1n·1, then he should 
not be concerned about when or how much of anything in learned at 8Jl1. 
one. time. 11.!he rounding Q11t ot experience will attend to the distribu• 
tio.n Md intensity of the material to be let,rned. Bu:t, here ~llso• 
Bobbitt does not leave the teaching ot'> cu.1 tu.1•al tools to the ~,qu.irem.ent s 
• • p • 
ot experienced life. We observe that he holds that the neceteer1 tools 
can be ascertained before han.d. His only :restriction in this regard is 
that tbese tools must be ess~tial to life as it is now.. (p. 158) iut 
in the classi:ricatio.n of anJ cultu.ral tool as being .necessary at aJl1 
stage of a lenrne~'s development, thi~ becomes ritl impoaed absolute. 
'fhere is another manner in which Bobbitt reveals th..at su.bject• 
matter is something thvt muat be "pu.t overt' on lhe learn~r• ln coruiec• 
.. \- . 
r 
tion with the teaching o.f inothematics he statea t_hat. 
It is good for mru1, dwelling as he does in the sloughs or 
imper:f'eetion, to heve aver before his e:;es the portrait of 
at least ou.e thillg that is perfect. (p. 286J 
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Thia stb.t~me.nt disclones an absolu.tisti.c ooncepti~n o~ some ·thin.gs 
{ariGh.me·UQ i.n this instance) and on l:hat ba~is Justifies their pre-
sentation a~ .models., For Bobbitt i~ may be _s.rithmetic,. for, ·atlother 
educator ,it may be the ~e.n Oouunandments. t1n.d f~r a _third it ;~ay be 
arithmetic, thE3 Te~ Oommandmsnts; the life of George Washington, and. 
a host of other things. fhu.~ Bobbitt ilr,plies here tht~t. perfeetio.n is 
an acceptable criterion for. s~bJect•matter. The assumption that an:3-
- ' . ' 
thing can.be perf'act and. that as such it can be.taught is absolutie,tiC• 
It would be logical to ax-gue fror11 tbi s point f'or a comphtel3 
au.thoritarirui edu.catio.ti. 
It there remains a question of :Bgb'bitt• s position regarding the 
_pre-determination of ne~easery su.bJect~mat·ter~ one can dispel that bl 
\lh~t is said with regard to th1;1 iunctio.n of the family i.n t.he education 
ot the child.. :Bobbitt writes, 
/ .·, 
The first duty o:f the parents is, fo,:r themselves ·to live the 
good, lite. · !L'hey do it, not as selt•denial, but as aelf• 
realization. ·In doing so, t·hey· properly conditi.an lite 
within their:,·fami11ea.· 'fhu.s · they set the standards of 
-tiht,us}lt and• action tor all the rne·m~ars, •• •· •" . (p.- 325} 
'?hen in another. inst:;.nce .Bobbitt writes, 
fo get their -children prtiperl;v educated,· the firat re-
· sponsibil,ity of parents is tor them to live the good 
lit.e theinsel ves on ct least the level that 1 '.t)ley de$ire 
their children to att&in; •••• (pp. l05•l06J 
Both of theae references imply th&.t li Villg the good li!e is more than 
experienciJ18 acrtivities in all eighteen areas mentioned b3 Bobbitt. 
'By reference to self-:.denial ·and level of attainment,, Bobbitt, suggests 
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that he has a notion of the good life ae represe~~~.o.g specific modes 
ot conduct which can be labeled as "good•" Here we find as we did 
with Thorudike that tllere is an elu.aive absolute, the good. which pi•eu-
e:dbes apeci:fie \leha.vior. llis refar_enhe to "at least one thing that is 
perfect" {p. 2861 tends to ver1t1 this(. co.nclu.aio!h Thtit is, Bobbitt 
does l\~ve absolute wh1eh ha fails to me.utiou spaei!ically bu.t one 
whieh is re:flected in b.is edu.ca'tional program; that a·baolute is good.. ·-
This m.ch ie certain, llobbitt holds that ao1ue modes o:t: bahavior can be 
pre-determined as rig~'t-::.~r good, and as au.ch they shall.~ be taught to 
the developing indivifi1)._~l• · The fact that parents, !or 1.natauce, are to 
live _tbie good lite ~-bef·ore the child:; is admirable, bu.t v-1e observe that 
J;Sobbi tt• a purpose in this -·~commendatio1i"''1s ta impose it aubtlY UpOJl 
·the learner. The point is, that e;ince'.the parents live. in.· th.is m&mer, 
it mu.at be good. The supposition is that children will .not be critical 
of their parent's choice. 
We must conclu.de that Bob\)itt holds that some subjects are .necessary 
end mu.st be taught. The3 Jnt\)" be the fundamentals of reality, the3 tna:J 
be the essential tools of our cul tu.re/ or tbey may be eleme.nts ot the 
good life. And though :Bobbitt specifies that they be related to cu.rre.nt 
·life rather than the fu.ture, they can ·be pre-determined and set u.p as 
obJecti vaa to be achieved or "pu.t overtt i.n the classroom or hottia. And 
as far as the learner is concerned, he is to trust the judgment ot the 
experts (t~wchars, curricu.lum experts, parent a, 2_! .c~ternJ • Their ob11fl 
jectivea will become the objectives of the activity pro;~ram imposed 
upon the learnara •. 
Shou.ld one be ao generou.s ao to grant thilt the objectives set up 
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the learner will acquire them and 1·etain t.hem as relative. In some 
measur·e one or more of ·the 0 necea:sa~1'• ftmdamentals, or specifies of 
the good life will be tau..ght as absolutes, :and the learner will retain 
them tas e.nds in themselves. F,or inatanc:e, it the model behavior of the 
pare.ut s rei'a1·red to were tt pu.t over" without. the learn.er hni1;.g 01,por• 
tunity for inaking a crltieal anolyBh, it will be· good .i'or him because 
his parents did lt ,and .not b!SC~hlse i't stn.nda on its own merits in 
terms of his ot1n lite. or, to t1se a11other exrunple• .Bobbitt. indicates 
that a basic .need for the learner is n·• • • know the realities them• 
selve• • • • •'f {p. 130) Elsewhere ·he writes, "The complexities. of 
the world today dero!filnd that men and \lliO.t'D.en have a sound understanding 
of things as tbeJ e.re.11 (p. 115) r.fhe realities which are the com• 
plaxities ot the world ·today, ere things that .Bobl>itt oould tab• 
ulate and enumerate 011 frequency tables aa th.i.ngs to be learne4~ That 
the3 must be taught will crystalliae them in the minds of bot;h teachers 
and learners as ends in themselves. fhe;v requi;re no other Ju.stification 
' ' 
tor teaching than ·the .fact that they exist. U.c:uiet au.ch conditions the 
learn:er will acquire them ae abeolutes• and as su.ch1 ha will be ioathe 
to think cr1ticall1 of them. Thu.a; eve..n tho~h su.bJaet-matter mat 
possibly be t'egarded by some as relative, insistence upon its acqu.isi-r-
tion will pu.t, it ill the positio1l. ot· an. a·baolu.te both ·to the i.u.atru.ctor 
and to tbe learner. 
If au.bJect•ma·tter must contribute 'to· the harmonization of an in-
dividual ta 'outlook by tHlSioti.n.g him in' the~aolu:hion of con::f'licte, and 
in developi.ng hie ability to handle conflicting situ.atfon.s (problem 
eituationsh we are forced to question the contribution that :Sobbitt' s 
educational au.bjact•matter will malte. As it appears, Bobbitt would 
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have the learner acquire the important things ttns is11 without an 
opportunity for critical. aualyaia. Things determined as right will 
be taught aa such. 
So far, our chief dif;f'icu.lt,;y with Bobbitt has been one of dis• 
oovering whut it is he resl ly means to sa,1. That is, his Ou.rriculum 
for Modern Edu.cation is so well strewn with relativistic phraseology ---------
that it is dii'fieu.lt to believe that the statements which have an 
absolutistic tinge are representative of hie position. But if he is 
abaolu.tistic, our ruiaylsis ot his proposals for teaching should further 
substantiate the aaaumption. Thtit is to sa,y, the methods one eielects 
iJl a claaaroom should be fairly good clues to what one wishes to achieve 
If .Bobbitt does have in. mind some nbsolu.tes that mu.at be 11 pu.t over" ill 
the clasa room, we shall find evidence o:t some sort of coercion 1 sub-
terfuge, or undue concern for teaching predetermined conclusions 
correctly in his methodology. 
In numerous instances :Bobbitt protests against au.thoritaria.n edu.ca-
'tio.11 and insists on the other hand that the individual ahould be free 
to make his own decisions. However, we might well bocome su.epi.ciou.e 
when we read a phrsae such us this: ". • • the states of mind to which 
words have been bonded, ••• •" (p. 136) fhere ia in such a statement 
i,nd its implications a striking resemblance to 'fhor.ndikia.n bond psy-. 
chology • !f Bobbitt raeans what he says here, we have good reason to 
doubt that he con plead tor free play of intelligence. That is to aay • 
bond payenology is in direct conflict with any position. which advocates 
making in.dependent decisions. tet u.s pu.1·sue this mutter tu.rther,, 
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ll'irst of' all, we observe .Bobbitt holds that the mind ,is passive to 
stimuli. li'or i.nsta.nce, he states, 
Because of the way hie mind is molded by what is before 
his e,yes, it is tnentelly wholesome :for him to have a 
compellin.g e.xllibit of an all•IBrvasive reality that is 
:faultless, definite, a.ad implacabl;y exact. (p. 285) 
We recall thEit in another connecti o.n :Bobbitt wri tea, 0 The geueriiliza• 
t1ons arhe automatically out of a a1.1ff'icie.ncy of' pnrticuhlrs that are · 
clear and significant." lP• 99} And elsewhere he states, 0 ·~he remed3 
for cont,roversy is to elimin111te incornplete11eas in. the series of impres• 
sions th~t persona get of' things." {p. 101) That is, the impressions 
that come to the mind thx·cnigh the sense of vision mold the mind. :ii!ore-
over, the understandings or possibly what may be called 'bonds, arise 
automatically by virtue of the number of particular atimu.li that impress 
the mind. .1,.nd when ..!$obbitt implies that the basis o! controversy is the 
incompleteness o! impressions. he must mean that stimuli make the same 
impressions upon all minds. Thus, stimuli are p:i:eaumed to have absolute 
or fi::ed valu.e and mind is preswned to be equally passive to ell stimu.U. 
The impact of an3 segment of objective reali t.Y is supposed to :t'orrn the 
same mental bonds or associations on all percei viug minds. We mu.at con• 
clu.de, then, that Bobbitt' e belief' in specific educ:atio.nal objectives con-
:firms a belief i.n th.e pi.saivity of' the mind. These abaolu;te qualities ot 
objective realitJ will result in an authoritarian approach to education. 
In fact, it v,ould be dii'flcu.l t to anticipate any other since the learner 
is not presumed to be active i.u weighing consequ.euces, but rather passive 
in the reception of sense impressions. 
1.l:he assumption that reality ia fixed and will make t.he same iinp1•ession8 
on evers perceiving mind becomes i'or :Bobbitt as it ia !or 1rhorndike a 
basis for his teaching procedures. He too seems to believe that a 
repetitive experience with &fly reality ~hou.ld lead to a leax•.ning of that , . . 
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reality. A complete experience with any reality shou.ld result 1n. a 
complete knowing of that reality. Bobbitt writes, 
lf a person's first impression. of a thing is as true as 
it can be made, then he hue made the best possible ota1·t 
toward a sound w:iaerstanding of it. If the second im• 
praasi.on. that superposes itself upol1 tho t'i.rst ia also 
tru.e, then no truce of i'alsitJ is introdu.eed by it, and 
the undei·atand i.ng remains aow1d. If' the third, fourth, 
and all su.cceedi.ng impreasion8 co::.·respond to the reality 
itseli' and introduce no error, then a tru.e concept is grad• 
usll3 built up and matured. (p. 163) 
\Ve can infer from what J3obbitt atates here that u.udereta.uding is simply 
a bond or an association produced by a mu.tiplicity or similar impressions. 
And we note that the individual, undergoing th.is repetitive experience 
has no choice about the interpretation he would pbctt upon the things 
sensed •. Moreover• repetition. here simpl3 deep~-is the same impression. 
This notion is certainl~ not in keepi.rig with concepts o! experience 
f1•om a relativistic point of view, the position :Bobbitt endEHWora to 
emu.late in his phraseology. Actually, repetition ehou.ld lead to deep• 
er insights, a ref'inemant of u.nderstan.dilleh an improvement in facility• 
.That is to say. ench experience becomes reo'6anized by the learner in 
relation to previous experiences and as a res11lt new insights or im-
provement ot techniqu.ea develOp:ld• 0:£ course, stteh a concept of exper-
ience requires the learner to be mentall3 alert; grasping for improved 
meanings in the situation experienced. Moreover he will be comparing 
wid contrasting these meanings with those acquired previously. This 
is impoasi'ble it reolit3 has :t'ixe<1 and 1.ndepe11den.t m'=lanings and the 
mind is simply passive t,o the impressions that reality makes upo.n it• 
Yet this is the heart of Bobbitt's proposals. That ia, if the meaning 
of realit3 is fixed; the mind. r.in1st !! Esasiye to it, otherwise, how 
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can there ever be an:, egree.me.nt about iii? 
Th.at objective roa.U.ty is presu.meci' to i-etain f.l fixed stimulus 
value is good .re~son fot teaehin.g ,reality as it it• this aceou.rrts tor 
.Bobbitt's iJlsistance_ upon teecbi,ng reaut, ae it is preauJned to lHh 
111e recall :that .B()hbitt states that the !unction of ,education is to . 
he writes; 
As :tar as ca11 be mf.lnuged. a child should never even know 
•"!tat there h11s be~n a wrong way u.ntU his knowledge and 
character have 'been :t'orllled, on ·tlie right W$Ylh ~e right 
ia. the .normal; sanctioned by science. 5:'he wrons is the 
departure from it.· one eu know and hold to the no:rm,l 
without ever huvi.ng heard of the .deJ,iartu:res. (P• 326J 
' .. " ' 
Uere we see how the asswnption that realltJ ia i'ixed leads to the con• 
' '·. ·• . ' ., ,, . 
clusion t}lnt Jnstru.ctio.n should be "right answer" 1.nst:r:\U!tio.o.• there 
is no question eboat reaU.t3,, there is n.o question abou.t one• s .necesa• 
ar3 adaptation to it, an4 th$r4 is n1, need for a1,'bnitt:ing in:etru.ction 
of an,ttbing ·other tha.n the rt right a11swer .ft th ... :, absolutism leads to 
absolu:ti a tic methodology. 
vre obaerva here two rathet• serious eon~equ.e,11ees as, tar as education 
is concerned., ln the fi .. i:at plaee; the learner is depl'ived of the 
privilege of tthearing the other side" or of considering al ternatas. 
Suppose some sta.tistichnr, eciimtist or teucher has made a mi atal!:e 
abou.t the nature of reality? The schools will perpetu.e.te the errors 
ot to...<Ja3• s thinking. Do we need another Galileo to climb Pisa• s 
tower to sh\lw us the error of blind accep~aoee of the uu;,posedly "kn.own"? 
'l'!h~ second consequence is no leas del~teriou~. :a, an absolu.t1st1c 
approach, to tetlehing. by the p,:irsbt.ent practice ot t(~och.i.ng the "right 
w&3s.tt learners will l>a deprived of what they require most; namely, 
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opportu1:dt3 :for and guidance in pi•oblem-solving. T_his loas la one 
which will reflect not only on the effi0ienc3 of the individu..al, bu.t 
also on society. Moroover, it will lead to a frame of mind ~uite 
pliable to the coercive tenehiuga of charlatqne (llld would ... ba kings. 
The p1·otectio.t1 we require to preserve a den:ioera.tic societ7 ia to be 
found in 1.ndividuala who are capable <ff critical thinkinglfi •J:he assu.r• 
a.nee we -have of progressive refinement of both individu.als and society 
!a to be found in an ability to think independently end reflecti velY• 
some will assert that Bobbi t·t proposes th~ '' right answer" technlqu.e 
of teaching for tho child only in its formsrtiva period when he ie too • 
Joung to uae good Judgment. :au.t v,ho is to -say when the child or adol• 
esce.nt is old a.cough to use his own Judgmc.nt'l Ignatiotts TJOJOla is uaid 
to have placed accountabi.lit3 at tha ege of aeyen. bu.t experience shows 
us that rnost colleges and universitiei.:r are ·unwilling to place var;y much 
faith ill the compete.nc3 of the Judgment of the u.pper half of the popu• 
lat ion even ~fter they have reached the ages of sixteen to twenty• 
Uben, then, shall we reeugnize individual reaponsibilitJ tor .making 
Judgmen:te"t Moreover, if we cannot tru.st children to make decisions on 
their levels of living, how csn we tru.et adults to rnnke decisions that 
affect to a great e.:xtent the wau·are or others aa well as their owll well. 
being·, 11:ru.lz,1 if '18 desire an. nd~lt soaiet3 capable ot independent 
leart1i.ng,. cnpable and willing to atte.ck problems, we must begi.n with 
the small child• Bobbitt is correct in his assumpt~on tnat we must 
introduce right ways of' living during the so•aalled formative 3eurs of 
a c:hild' s life, bttt ihos e right wa~s mu.st_ not be BbsoluteS,t but rather 
a !orm of problem-solving geared to the reflective thinking level of 
·,iut b&rn.~r.. Cb.oictJa mu.at be •de po:1a1b1e even ha.re. 
!ut let us cootiiu1e with, iobbitt. lte ~dtesi 
• • • as el'.tJ'Oneo1.s· impreaaiona. 'l;a-te~ come, b,t, ean 
diecerA their fah1tJ 1n ·th~'.U'{i~1~r1r1~rtd:t3,. the 1t.ind 
reJ~ete them. eo sutoiMiti<:•111 . .fUltl' iAn·tan:tlJ tl:u,t tnei 
aft~ li'"ttn n~ ohanet. to <!®f\tst ~te,.rtt;1'4t1ditlfft 1iru.th 
1_.,..uihes against eitror ·and dtp1•he1· U, ol power tor 
h,artnl bu.t, to do,'$(,>, 'Ille tiru..th att\Ot bG MfPilU.ltSJt@t$d . 
and u.n~~•.tlfti$$d• lPP• liSl•lM) . , 
· · uerein tbs a ae.r1ouu c1:iU;cUm ot ·t~ tlb.solu'tii:1tt1c pou1tionij, tn· the 
Ugh1t·ot tb.11 roochwU.t)\iC btH1d"t'l'.»ttraat:ttm proeaaa ~bbitt de1c1tibes, ·the 
reJectiott ot ~n i~eontrWl>'ll& 1raprt$tlon tAU.at ba l>y an automauc r&ther 
' ' 
than a retlije\i ;,re 1,r:oae1H. !llh.fi\ l}ohbh'.t U.$$$ the te~m$ t;timprez.1.sion" 
and •• autotllfttic" in thit ·cqiuuHrtion implJ.ea tb~I h• puts the reJ(tetion 
on a m,ch.r:uilsti;c: tavet. Bu.t even 1f. OJH~ eht:Jild ·. p.remuae trJ.e reJectio.a 
to be Ott a biehe;r level, it l1Ul b$ non.-the ... leea $!.U.tow.rtic for alternate 
and eeendns11 coaft.itdag id.c~a will be reJncted becauaa tlie1 ax-e ditter• 
' ' 
e.at. from tl:un1e ehtt11d1 tattsht auth.or1tatlv011 tts rtrieb.t.tt fhu.1. ao 
absolu.thrUt: trau~e, ot t'.&f•i-er.ee and teacbillS t~cht11que fl0c'1otoma the 
. learnel:' to expm:t 0J1l,1/ 011¢ dgbt aUSD$l't u.st1al1;· ·the 011e. pre~exlt.9d bJ 
a teacher or piu.•r:.itts't on '~good utttb.orlt;,.l' , 'A!oraotier, 'the abac.ltttiatic 
app,t·o~ch does tu,t. acqu.oitit tbe lo~:,.uer with, the .uee@0dt1 ot con,ider• 
iag tither ,pointa ot Yi{!W or altaruate aolltt!..onu. !Ia.nee .he will reject 
a new· idea because U ,1, incongroiu, ;,r <:onfuui,1g 1~ tlui Upt of author• 
ita~h'e.13, Biven attGWft&1 t1Uld iiill not bt in 3 ttwne of mind to eotudder 
. ' 
anothatt uswer nimpl3 . ~e~u.so ht ib•et,d3 hns .pnEh t'e r~pga,,t1 tluan, tbut 
p:reeent a'Ue!-.n1te or "co.nfus1.ng' i~lJ:it'"tuu1io,ns. Whether th~t be true or 
fai se is bees.de the point ~ust no~. lfhitt is iropo:rtant is thu·t the 
' ' 
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tical results. !hat is to say,. the abaolttt1!3tic or authoritarian 
"right antJwer11 technique o! ~euching tend; to clone the minds of the 
learners to e..ny but authorita·tively presented ideas, 'the ttright-answers.n 
fhere is ru1other poit1t involved iu this ttright•a.ttswer" technique. 
When we read that none can know and hold to the nor.1.1.al withou.t ever 
having heard of the departures," IP• 326 J we observe that Bobbitt has 
no. intention of being fair to other poi.nts of view. Of course, he 
has.the mistaken impression that there will be .no disagreement about 
matters if every on.a has equally complete ex:perienceih Let u.q su.ppose, 
for the moment, that this might be true. Ju.st now the1·e is ir.uch uisa• 
greem.ent, even in the so-called euet sciences, and each person holds 
his interpretation ot t•eality ia most right (he must beUeve this or 
he wou.ld not .accept the idea). Bence each tee.eh.er will preaent his own 
conceptions of reality ·without admitting alternate possibilities. This 
prectice is in dil'ect co.u:tlict with the democratic idenl. In a demo• 
cl"acy, each individual has a right to know, and mu.at know, a number of 
reasonable aolutio.ns to his prol.>lems before he cen make hia own deci• 
sions. Row else can.- he decide? A single answer requires no choice but 
rather an adoption, That these ideas me.3 be confu.sing is beside the 
point. The)' are important for the individual to know. l.n :f~ct,. the 
relativistic point of view holds that eo.nflieting and co.ntu.sillg ideas 
are the bases for motivating reflective thinking and for mental growth• 
:Be that -~s it ma,,, in a democrnci iniUvid.uals must have before them 
all the data necessary in makiJlg decisions regarding institutions and 
modes of behavior with which the ·i1HlividU.al and his society is concem-
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ed. m.oroover, we repeat that if a demi>erac:, requ.il'es a competent 
eitizanr3 capable of harwoniziog conflicting points of' view. we mu.at 
insiat u.pon i.o.tell.ectu.al honesty in the elasa room. 1J!hat is, the 
te5cher ml4at be willing to au.omit a va:det2f of eolu:Uo.na to problems 
le:.r.ners to accept conclu.siolls other thru.i her own. 
to edu.catio.n ia basically designed to m&ke tbe len.rners willing listen• 
in th.is technique wi.11 be i'mmd ;i..n how autom...~tic are the right responses 
end ho~ i.iu.tomatia f.il'a the :reJecUo.ns of other irupI'eesio.ns. ti!'e• s 
activities are utilized as a meru1a of tn,\1:d:dng 1·ight impressions in the . ' 
order of frec,u.ency life !N'y require thom. That is to say, the frequen.-. 
ey of en exp@rien.ee in living to•day' a li:t'e is a measure of how much 
4;,1 bond will be required. Bobbitt haa int.rodu.ced lii'e into the cu.rricu.• 
lum not for purposes of rdsin8' problems, but to aosu.re the proper con• 
trol ot repetitive expe:rienee. 
Let u.cr pursue tb.i:;J topic ju.st n little further. Bobbitt wri tea, 
l!'or a 'book of travela to be effective it mu.st be long 
en.otlgh to px•ovide a. similar abundance a-nd. .repetitiousness 
of e.x.parieneea with co.ncre'tia things. (p. 12~1 
B;J this he implies thv.t not only the experience, but also its recall 
deepeJ1s impreeaionll. Bu.t tha thing to note here io that a criterio.n. 
for a book is the ar:v.>un.t of repetitive experience it 1urnishea. ihe 
book is .not evulu.ated ill terms of the eritictll thinking it provokes. 
nor the ,guidimeo it i'u.l·nishes in the solving of problems. 'i'hia af!orda 
U9 Just itnother specific e~amplo of Bobbitt's notion that learning ia 
tha gathed.n& of repetitious aenae itnpreasio.ns, .and. that in. the learn.• 
external sti~li ui,on the aen111t. 
.t•ertttiil1ng to th.e vividness ot im.pretnd.on,, l\o'bbi ti wr1.tet, nthe 
v1vidn~au of impi·tuu~ions 1a determined 'bf • • • ,21 the feo:Ung aacom• 
pai,1ment. of the 1mp1.•ei,1:1ion • • • •n ( P•· 86H fhlt f~eUr,g ilC:<U>tnpii:ni• 
ment is tha tuut;1& thil.lg thnt Watson ~d ~,horndike mention. in one mNlller . ' 
or nno'ther ae e1 bond ttrengtb.ening .It :h eUhel" a cb1nae or 
a phm.nod .. for feaUng state t?wt soi:1ehow l.lecnmeu 1Hsoeiatod •1th a 
pa:rticu.lar im1n:eth1-ion, a.mt t~oll, to ·a'lt~ch 11.solf thtn•twith, th.us 
et.ren0~hen1ng a bond and tenelin.g to t-ac_ili-tate that respo:u,e. 1' ia 
true that .&oubi ,t £requentl3 me.nuons 'tha:c the reward ell.ou.ld be in• 
.· .. 
tdasic .to the activity, bt1t he doe, a.~t in:t1otJ tbiit~be 10. As 
~obbitt deacr1bes i·t• 8Jl1 2!eel1ng nucoinpan1me.nt associated w1tl\ u 
impression 'liiil.l determine the dt?gree of its vi.vidnees. He does not 
require th~, tho pleaeure of •Chievtng·a £oat be tlle re"ur4 in and ot 
1 taelt. Oonsegue.nt11 we must assume that. Jobbitt' s r~aaon f,-r want• 
1.og the feeling ata,_e to be evoked by the impi·eeeio.n itself ta. to 
p-1ake it moro au.tomauc,. !hat is,. i.f a certain rdtu.auo.o. no\ on.13 
strengthens en imprees10ll, bu.t also evokeo .toelitig states. tbe ~ea.cher 
or parent will 1101. b& required to ~u.:rnlah retriu:da t:trtltteiall1• more• 
· _over, after the individual 1s co lone;er un<ter the supervisioA ot un 
innru.ctor, tha atren.gtbening ot tbe.l)ond @d•t-ha couunu.ance of an 
acthrl ti t1Ul p.erolat. lbtre 1• llO assumption more vifciou.ii than thia, 
in that it tends to cr1ataUiee behavior and perpetu.etaauU.nd ree• 
ponses th.rough all association ot feeling states with· impressions •. 
l3u.t some oru, tasai.n iutorrnpta to utate 'tb6lt tbla i.nt4rpre1H1t10.n of 
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Bobbitt iJ unfair. In respon.se, let u.s cite l3ob'bi.tt with re:f'ar(¾nce to 
play aetivittei., .• 
:Bu.t the purpose of play is 11ot the gratltieation 01' the 
:f;-.:eli.ngs. .Its pu.rpose is to condition the gr~wth · 
. of' . .nsedful uru.ctu.res and tunct:io.na. The pl ea au.re 
· is onl:, a lure that nature uses to'dre.w eaeh of lier 
creatures into action so that he ma,3 iet the practice 
neeassapy for the growth of hia power,. {p. 36) 
In oth0r viords, iu~tu.re is presumed to ~ve implanted a potential re• 
warder ,,hich is -ii'o strengthen bonds without ,:ogard to au. individu.al.'s 
i,urpoaee. In tact, the individual is pictursd as being more ox- less 
halpleas to the strengthening o! bond1r through these i'eeltng states, 
\ 
We :Jee ~otheJ:'. variation Qf this application of.' f'eel:tng states 'to the 
·; ,•·· ,;·;_I 
forinative procees with regard. to commwiication. :Bobbitt writes• t1 And 
perhaps rnost f:requ.e.nt ot all is the vividness prOdu.ced when. speech re• 
l.atine to 1t is warmed, as 1.n conversation, with the glo\v of tne social 
emotions." h>• 247} In other words the u.se of el1iotio.nol .colol'in.g to 
_ '.. , C _ i 
make vivid·an impression. ia both possi~le and permis1i(ola. 
-"'J ' ' . . . . 
i1s presented here, n concept .need iiot "stand on its own fe&t." 'fhe 
teacher desiring to ttpu;t it over11 will; associate it with emotional 
feeling states. Th'ls 19 precisely what' propagl.\ndiats 8ttempt to do b3 
wa1 of:,mentd coercion. Moreover, this is precisely wh~t wa should 
guard l!l~~illet .in o\U.' educational prt:,cei:lu.re. Ii' an.v znoae ·or co.nduct or 
BllY .. idea is acceptable, it must be able to stand !he test of $xparience 
before it iS accepted. And if thu.s tested, it requires no emotional 
loading to "pu.t :tt over."' Obv:l.oual3 Bobbitt's u.se of ,the co.nc-ept of 
feeling states is to f'urniuh rewards tor activities in order to ;fix 
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firmly in the mind .of the po naive ind:tvi',\ual whnt is deemed "right" or 
-~ ' ' 
"good•" ).11 so doing, he makes it very cleiu:- that hE't accepts a.t1 au.th.or• 
if.arian poaition i.n. ~duc&tlo.n1 Md believes that ce;rtelin ":right a.nswers" · 
may be imposed au.thori'tati vel). ltoreove1"~ he ju.sUf'1es their imposi• 
tion by e·roking :feeling utates rat)ler thf;!l di~lectics. · 
· We must conclude, th~m, thot Bobbitt• s proposed metb.odolog,y is 
,gu.ite :i:.n keeping with the .raGlisticJ 1.\tl.thoritar1SA posit~on &scribed. to 
}iim·. · !y a lll.achanistic si:rc..u:igeioont of stimuli and' ~xtrinsie re~ards or 
eztr!naicallJ, ~rou.sed feeling states ho hopel] to mol.d ·the learner into' 
prescribed p.-..Gterns of thinking Md good con.du.ct •. · The heart of liobbittt e 
• • ".••: a ' 
methodology is to get the :indivi4ual tQ do what is predeterllli.ned ns 
"right•" · Tlia assumption., of couroe, ta "t;~at a person do~s makes him. 
what he i:;t.tt ( :P• 21) 
1.i:he key to Ilobb1tt• e ,positio.n thf.lt a child cnn. be molded is to be 
1'ound in the f ol.lowin5 atateme.n1;: 
:Begin.niug e8rl,y enough. a paroo.n can be shnped b3 his 
experie.ncoa into i'orms that lie poles apai~t. lP• 21 l 
child has too much to aa1 about it• '.Chis is very mu.ch like the pro ... 
position that Watsoil p.resentc in auggestill.g ths.t he can fashion ch:l:ld• 
ren to be the kinds 0£ persons he tgishea them to be~ The learner is 
asswned to be i.0.1.allectuall.y pa&Bive to both ropetitiou.s experiences 
and mWlipu.lated feeling atatGth 1.ehe individual is not aecou.ntable, nor 
can he be held accouo.ta'ble tor what ho' dues, for ha h not presumed to 
make his ow.o. deciuio.na wtt.h toreaigb.t of conaequences.. It wou.ld be 
dit't!cult to disti.ngu.isb. between. Bobbitt end Wats011 in this regard~ 
We fi.nd in .'Bobbitt., the.n, an example of absolutism in nmodern11 
dress. The teaching of absolutes 1$ ultimately the purpose ot edu.ca• 
lotl 
tion and absolutes are the au.bJect•matter of education., An absolutis• 
tie or atl.thoritarian technique is itr, methodology. 
E• uo.mparho,n ct :Sob bi tt and Thorndike. 
Thorndike's Hwnen lfatu.re :and the Social 0.rdor contains considerable: -------- ,__ ......... -----
reference to ·teechi.ng tecbniqu.es 1 but leas nmterial -;;1hich applies to 
the nat,xra of tu.bJect-matter. llowave:r~ we will find sufficient mater-
iel for 'this purpose of· comparing his posltion with that of llobbitt. 
cation should be a process of teaching "right answars.n He writes, 
'Ehli ideal giner.nmeut, as in eduenticu1 and indu.:1.rtry, · is 
never to let miutuk:es occu.r., Tbie is 8$8)1 to say bnt 
hard to dt"> even ill so indifferent tmd settled matter 
as a tew school boys le~rni.ne; to 1·ead Latin • • • 
':fhe teachers· of the past who hanrd,'.pupils recite and . 
eo:crected their mistakes are being•· replaced by· tea~u~s 
who pruetice their pupils in e:,:rorleas work:. ( P• 831} 
Here ,,e have the key to~ 'xhor.ndike' s conception. of "sttbj<:Jct•mattet; 
and methodology• 1.he basic aaaulnption': is· that "right a,nswersu can be., 
.. 
aacerta1nf:id in, 1.idvw1ce. 
the teachicg of them is simply t1 proce·~s of. imposition. It ls not 
cles-r Just ho:" these 11:dgllt answers" are acquired,. but it must ba pre-:-
sumed th:.:.t cu.r:riculum. experts and teHch1.?Jra will btive access to them, 
It follows that if x·1ght answArs a:te to be imposed, tattclrlng \'Jill 
be a n1~~ter of drill i.u the cu:rrent re'sponses. ~horn.dike 1t1rHea, 
n • • • evar1 error is coatly.0 (p. 831) Re suggests tht'rt iin educa• 
Uonal idee.l is. 0 • • • never to let mistakes OCCUl"•ft (p. 851) 
SubJeet~matter mu.st of' necassi t3 be tlle u r1gh.t an.sfiera, tt which are 
pre,..determined as necessary to impose u.pon the lei:u:-ners, and if "right 
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answers" are known, the selection o:f' te~,ch.ing techniques is ltirgely 
e. matt.or of' selecting the most effective devices for iropoai.ng the pre• 
determined essentials. Imposition is in the last analyais the techni• 
que to be a~plied• This position pa~nllels thnt of Bobbitt very close~ 
ly as he writes, 
.As far as can ba managed, a child should ttever sven know 
that there hos been a wrong way u.utfl after his know ... 
ledge ruid charsctar hiive boan !ormad on the right wayih 
\P• ~2S I 
In this respect-> both :Bobbitt and Thorndike are agreed that there are 
certain thi.ngs which are essential, and which they are willing to im-
pose u.po.n the learner. \Ve eonclu.de, then, that both of them are abso• 
lutistic with regard to some aspects o:f' subject-matter, snd th01t they 
are both w1lli.ng to impose these absolutes u.po.a the learner in an 
a~thoritarian manner. 
:Moreover, while the demoere.tic conception of tef.1,ehing is one of 
considering alternate hypotheses and evaluating them in terms of con• 
sequences, we reoall that Bobbitt does not believe in confusing the 
learner with alternate Ilaswera until a auppos9dly right one has been 
learned. This ia implied in the previousl1 cited re!ere.uce to teach-
i.ng the right answers. !!.:laewhere he wri tea, "'l)he road ·to truth is 
made di!fi1:u.lt whenever it begins with error.« {p. 153} Re means here 
that established truth alone shonld be ·p1·osented, cmd that oven for 
pu.rposes of comparison alternate hypotheses are out of place in the 
.··· . 4 teachi.ng program. ~obbitt then p1·oposes that incong~ous and confusing 
impressions will be rejected automatically if only the correct im• 
presaio.n of anything 1a give.n ot'ten enough• {p. 164) 'Ay wa:; o! com-
parison. we read in Thorndike•s Human Nature and the Social Order: --- ---- - ---
lf. t,b.e 1'.liD.ateln ~<ru.at10Ju1 ae tif';ell3 1ru11w:te<1, d1ato:rt!:!d. 
and nr-1tilata,4· in the popncl.ttr mUtO. lHttuuri• a belief that 
••the _au.re•t tht.01• in octe.ncut wiJ be insocl.ll"eJ • .,. .• the1 
would lletter h!i!Vtt- 'D~911 tett tf> tno tJole p01aese1on of the 
mathematiebns and td'l;;eicitta wbo c~n appt~• them propert;.n lPP• . 
fhU,G we rt>gettt, tae_ absoltit1GtiC poaUto.a. h~ld b3 both Bobbitt ad 
'fhorndike 1HcUhltita1c a pJraeticfl'· of pr:eaenting onl,;, the approve4 
tlUltJ'fH'tftll to an1 · so1u.t1on• en.4 IMke tmprictfoal the in.tellectu.ully 
' ' 
honest l!iDd detooul"aUcaUy $OUJ'ld 11·actictt of pr,Hientins al:ter.aa.te 
h3potheG1Uh 
Aa to aped.tic ·t~l'.1<::hi&S techiliqueei it. he.a al~e~d3 boa noted that 
both fJrhorndike ~nd itibbUt eonfort:a to ,be :teaU.aUc poaitioa ot 'bond. 
torar,,t.ion, all4 eubi~ iatroduee tht vt't&Ustic phat\u•e-pdn pdnciple 
. . . ' 
· Gt a rea.forc~r ot the lion.ti.aw; Joz. iiur;uce1 Thorn.dtte vzrH.aui th.et, 
', . : ' ,'::·· . 
",he mtro: OIHlil"~Uon ot tt tt.nl'le-.1u::1 ·etr1ngine.n1 it soille'lba$ • • • .,,, 
(p, 958J .ind 14 auothar place l't$ •Yl'itse • 
.. ·.· ' /ti. ' ' 
"Wet:• t'.reiiu.enet ot ocotu•~c• 121., howe1ar . a teliAUyelJ 
week at.re.r:urt;t1~net oi: cozwer:1.10110, · It more lm,portrnut 
· f&C'tOX' is their . i'iiCCOm,atti~At8 0~ :b~t'Jedi.n1e attar•: 
et'.i'ects.n lP• 14 J 
~~ins a. 11\ile dU!tareat ph1l'fUlti>\og,y1 but 1mpl;vin,g the samia th1fl8, . 
J:o bbl tt wrl tee, 
ll:he thUSB th.at are thus grettttl;, tmtio.iutUJU'Jd tite the o.ues 
U.1d are seen. ,»et vividl.f DJith, · tberefore" acqui:r& the 
St."!!lat,cun depth tUld, parn1W1ener ot iti!prt&ai9n,. *ihe3 ~re 'the 
·_ ones to~ftt4 which s J$raon' s thou,ht teude, to turn, 111th 
the result that tiH~, 1:111e frequ•ll1ilY ~il !f.nte repetUi'On. 
d~'1lpa.no mcu.·t Olld ®t·• both tl:U:I ,. co~1.Uve and emot:to.o.al. as• 
PtClll• tP• 10:Sl . 
In rul.()thetr pl6ce he writee in a 1JttAUar voia reaard:lng wordG ,mu the 
· realiUa~ the3 Y~nprt:Htnt• We reri4• 
Bia bade .tl$ed is, not to kn<>W th9 wor4e, sot thro~-;b 
talk. or books, 'but 'io ,lmoiai the tteali"tiea t.hem1Selvtut .trom 
imp:re,iions go\ trom 1.atitllate at.ld 111tereafi!ng coutncts 
~Uh thtm th.rough 1tfti)..ro ot· .repQ\i tioua .iliG_pression :!'orm• 
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ing. \ P• USOJ 
thaae two .ref ere.aces from :Bobbitt• s Ourriculturifor Modern J.;du.cation, ~-
are esssn.tiall3 a rephrasing; of Thorndike• s laws of repetition' and 
et:t'ect• wherein practice and pleasant ·reeling states strengthen bo.c,ds. 
lJ.lhu.s, 1.n. thb respect, :i>obbitt and Thorndike are agreed that letlrni.og 
is a process ot bond :for.l;lation througll repetition and an arrf!.ngema.nt 
of the teali.ng states •. fhorndike could llar;1rtil.Y agree tiith :Bobbitt 
that after all nr.rhe pleaat.U•a is 01111 a lure • • 111 •" (p. 36J device 
bs which an i.ncHvidual' s l~te can be arranged tor him by forces ot 
llatu.re, by oircum$tat:1ces, and by teoch,irs, pa.rents, et cotera. 
·- -----
In this respect, both Thorndike and .Bobbi't.t r'epr-asent a determi.rl• 
l.stic position which par~llels close11' that of Watson. Thorndiket 
states that ":By a11f:f'icient skill any respo.nea ot' which a p11rson is. 
capable ca.n conceivably be .sttached to: ail3 stimulus to wh.ich he is 
· se.11.sit'ivet lPP• 19•20} Bobbht does hot state thie position quite so 
bal<\l;,, but he arrives at the same con~lusiO.th. For instance, he writes 
tlld "2:he objactlve of education 1s a eoutilJ.Uit,Y ot Z'ight doing." . . . 
(p-. 19 J He follows with the statement' that uwhat a perao.n does makes 
him what he is,.tt \P• 21) .And the~ he concludes., 0 l3egiru1ing ea:rl1 eJ:J,• 
ough, a P"rson CM be shaped by his experiences into forms that lie 
poles epart." \P• 21; Since the teacher or parent ,nu.st deciaa tor the 
learner wh~t ~re the necessary realities and de;ht behavic>Jl' patter.na,., 
the tenehar or parent is presumed b3 .Bobbitt to mold the child into .. 
tn.a t_ype of responding 1.ndividu.al desit-ad. Esse.ntiall1t .Bobbitt and 
Thorndike are in a5reeme.nt that the ehi.'ld muot be in.tellectu.ally 
passive to ths impoa1t1on of right wa3s ot living. Moreover, we mu.st 
conclude that tor both :Bobbitt and Thorndike the l~arner doeaLnot 
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choose what ia best i.ll ·term$ of' cOllaequ.e.n~tUh PreaumablJ7 the learner is 
not conscious or co.r1eequ.ences, bttt rather of accompanyin.g i'e811ng states 
,.u:r~ged b1 the teac:he-r+ 
"B:t now, it is quite clear that the ai!foreru:tuJ between 1thormdikets 
r..1.1d l3o\'ibitt•~ conceptions of lee.l'nitlg nre negligfble•· Botb. propou~ 
. ' 
ani atic process of _etatUping i.n bonds between stimuli $lld responses. 
Both ,uun.une tb.ilt the lMl'.ner is po.asive &D.d possesses: a tildstic mind 
ei.H.1ociated with g?~lo or. aehi~veman.t of ends. · 'l:he1 are simply connec• 
' ' ' ,•; '•:~·,, .. ,,.,~;,...,.' 
ti.one which Call be'manipulated objeeti.velJI nt 1:ill to strengthen other 
bondi,. Ju.st bow .. th9Y do this 1a not cle,u.-~ 
wherein ,do .Sobbitt ood. Tho21n.dike dii':f'er? . There a.ca several tU.f• 
fere.nc~o• l3obl.1itt does not stress control of the l':11.nute detaila quite · 
so much as: does Thorndike •. fhor.J:1dike would utu.d3 each minu.ta detail 
ot o ~equ.ired response and ·would attempt to stamp i.n each speci,fia ra-
il.ex arc required i'or th£tt total response. To ·t11ia end he introduces 
' . . 
his ayatem of rewardu and punishment& to help matters along. :n,.,bbitt 
ia satisfied that practical lite ncti vi tiija 11ilI au:tomatical ly stamp 
in the neceasar.v bonds to the degree that they will be requ.irod" As 
sitU.&tionn c~11g~t,. nai'l bonds will be autonurtic~ll; formed., @d old ones 
will become i.uopert:1tive through 1.Ususe:;. :S,Jbbitt also baliavea that 
' ' . . ' 
situations er~ often aelf .. rewarding. ~t he ia not opposed to t,ha 
arraogeme.a.t of rewards to gu.arantee proper responses. 
'l'he 1'u.rletio.n or parents and teachers ou.tUn.ed by Bobbitt io to cfOti• 
trol ex.pei"ie.nces so that a livable 11good litett is lived aud thu.s learJ1• 
ed by the i.a.dividu.al• IJ?h9r.udike tends to stress the ideal ·good life." 
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Bobbitt hol9-s that the mediocre ean live in ,, measure of the ftgood life," 
bu.t Thorni:like appears to hold little hope for the mediocre. Hence, 
:Bobbitt stresses edu.cation for all, a.ad Thorndike stresses selective 
· breeding in order to improve the human strain. 
ln general, the differen.ces between )o_'bbitt and 1 horndik:e are 
superficial o:nes. In .neither case 1a the learner co.n.oidered to be 
me.o.talll7 active in formu.latia.g and testing hypotheses, ·and in neither 
ease is it Possible for the learner to reorganize his experiences with 
a view toward developing new insights. tearning to both :Bobbitt and 
Thorndike is a passive-x·esponse r8ther ·than an active and insightful 
or a reflective problem-solving procese. It realism has no better pro-
gram to ofter thru.i this, it is .not su.ited for educati'on in a deroocracy. 
F. :Relativism in' Oontrast to Realism. 
At numerous points in this study1 mention has been made of ·specific 
reasons why realism is in.adequate for education. in a democracy• By we.s 
of contrast it has been. pointed out that relativism is more compa1iible. 
we have noted the undemocratic implicatio.ns or a realistic edu.catio.11e.l 
program~· .At the risk of being 1·epetitious, let us s111nmarize a relativ• 
ietic point of view with regard to items mentioµed in this chapter. 
First of' all, -we chould notice ·that a democra_tic educational program 
may not appear ·dif:fere.nt from on.a p·roposed by :Bobbitt by way of subject-
matter of!eriJlga. That 1s 1 if Bobbitt's program is constructed about 
the life activities .of the learners it will undoubtedly include such 
) 
subjects as apelli.ng, ·arithmetic, geograp~, ;!! cetera. Similarly, a 
relativistic program may well be expected to touch upon the same or 
nearly the same subjects. \Ve have alre:idy observed that both Thorndike 
·1e2 
and noobltt •olll<l teach 1Q.bJect...:;n1tter .. ae ~right answers" or cOA• 
el.tf?.ton.a pretteterd.aed b,1 tho testhe;r.; · ,Obbs.tt•s the&ie ia that th~ee 
eubJeeta ,hou.td be ta\lght at the ti.m$ wht;1A th• learnar will bav& imtlC• 
d1a1lt:J a,~ for them. lfh& poaUtoa holl1 b3 rela.U.vlata is thttt $U.bJ•ct• 
mat.-tf/1" flhOaJ.(l not be a i!hlU."ittl ot 11redeter1.n:tne4 tefi.C\U~iOAS teiught to ' 
· ,neet 1~cUate or 1\1.tU.l'e .n~e4o, 'but tbu.i 11 thOl:lld be a ser111 ot pl't'Jtlf; 
'blem-so1ving ttituatiotts 1A the u11ua1 tu which tho aehool WlJ gu.tde 
p~oblem.•1;'1:olvtq 1n41Yi4u.al•• iveti u: th• $-Called mow-a "l'ieht.- u ... 
swer:11 a11e obv1ousl1 the beat., ihl!I li!.t!1lrn.~:c maut tU""dYe ;>J;t tllis eo.11• 
clt.ltd.-on Mllselt\, . ~· tll1a coJ;l&'leetio.u .. vles wt:4~e, 
. . . ' ~-
· A m,sie principle otcfJlaUtUJ pt,13cholo1.0 ia th£tt we a~ 
. 0011 perceive tnd eo~;;it-eh~nll thint:s l!.I we; ~,e them rel#J<ted 
to \-or notiti-aoud.. wit~J other thinga; we C!'l.tti:iot qoncaiv• or 
Utlt.1prehW1.4 thea &$ thiDe;l:l-iA .. thtm&'3'1VflS• itt 1solit1on t1•0J'tl. 
ou1~r 1idll8lh Quite 1,trobabl~h too, :thore l~ no u.ttS.mate~ 
r:te;ilt an.nu to tiSl1. qusstio»• Wb.O' 'right it1un1&r. at a ei ven 
Ume la onlJ tho beet ot tho6e avtdlul.lltJ ··wt. the UM• Jf 
we •r• <:Qncarn.eu ~1th· d4JVtlop1ug ill(let)eudeut tMn'k!'!trt, we 
•st 1il"a1n pu.pUs to chooa• tlie o~at 1'r.0$ llf! ma.a~• inrrtend 
ot mu·e13 co121:i..ug t • lmow oa.e in 1 sob.Uoa. • . 
I • , • 
u: th.a above propf11dU,on !$ii 'Uuc, \h~.n sl.lbj01.rt m~t;~r r,r, .!! b.~• no 
value Wlleu U is 4pplititd 'l#o u.e £.~~b~,em, !!. !~~•. ~,;ad th:! ottla me!llls 
. . 
wh~z·eb1 tbit a•• •teris.l ean b1J u:.uJdl·isai.u i, through a g:roeaae · ot 
reor,:ard.z•tlo4 ~..nil iucorp0railo-a ~1th other- 4&ta 1n ,artlG of eonse• 
'J:here. 1• uotMr aig111tioimt appli.cf.lstiou. of 1"el&t1VU,:v to 3u'bJect 
utteli iinplied 1n the above. pni'8i.;i:l'tiph;"il1wnel3• eu.bJect Niter is not 
,o fixed and settled tl'wt tea.chers •1 opera.:te 1.n t.he ain1u.m.e4 capsa1t,1 
a. srueurt •• llfl,Yles•. 0 the Bel.tlt:ivi ti .Principle at /ipplled to ~eachltIEh'' 
~1iirer.!!:l. 2.f ~~.t;.sa! !:1~1.~~ .. i! &~-t~r.:,~.~ ~!!• Vol-. !V, No... 4~ 1111 1a. · 
or eUdG di3l}('Ul$JJl3 oraeltHh Th.Cl~ 1o to In)', ·1.c the democrat1f',J)roeeea 
ot ~ou.catfon there 18 the ~acumption tll~1> uo pet-Bon or J;l@X'SOOS ktli)W the 
u.l'tim~t<:; ®d tl:u;.t Wll..i 'by t) pt·oces·s. ot pt:zlgre$~ivt po1nu1at1on.. tt.rnt• 
inc. <and, ::ed<,fhd.ng (?i.; goals coo ~t•ugr~aa b,, tllndta ThhJ rMlMt thai no 
' . '. ' . .' 
p:c:i~ciplo. d:;t.um, er t 1J~e, r.ai',y be :'t~':lght t'fith :a view ttrw!lt•d truin1ug 
'.,, · ..• ·· . 
p-11~ils t~ live. in fi:!:~d r,,t,tte.rns r;i: eondu.ct di:.n:dtiateil 'b:, .thted 101al-
ties .. •. 'l:h; totli>~i.D(~ exptesaos thi:: !deea 
The llet1rt of prepu:rl'Jt ton 01· .e pt"oepeeU ve ci't,1se.o. fol· 
deii,oc.:z·ntie c:tt1sonahip ab.oald be' the pro~otl!ln or i.w,:n- · 
. peten~e i.n thQ 1>1·ogr.~!iSiVC ru1d cou.tint~0~8 1,'QCOnatru.ct:tun 
of' pt,1tita ol" view antl eoursoi of M"tit::m; 1.0.: llhor\• pi:\ttertua 
. !or t!v111e • ... • ~• b.aviLno flu)J at .knQwint! wi.:th pre.; 
· cis10.11 Wh$1: our ettul&J.itU• ah®ld oeUeve t.\nli h.Ott th~, 
should net ~ani.rtt:, ... !1YB 01" nri, yer,ri.'a hence. 
' . ' ' - ' ·• f 
· • · . Thtt&;i. a, t!uM:her ill n .denl.Qettac; is ~ot .iur,U.fie<l 
in aJ\v<,e9,tillfri ·~3 p.¼.rUcuJ.ar vie.it, b~Uaf',, or e:i\u•~e of' 
. evon etu.d:,ing it tt, tbwi t'll(ClU.ttion ot Otl'll:tl'fh 
ii ~-,. . . . . . . . 
' ' . - ' . 
:.tiderable a'tite.oUon to tho lesil'tj;fog proeeat. Th~J define it au 
• ti pr,ocess f)J; dGlvelopius brni'gi:.t, heCl¼U1ft l'elJ.\tion~W.psJ 
10 •. 
~hitt 1tnpli00 ~n acUve !ntel;ectual pt~oc~~s 1n l'lrl.¢~ the 
. . 
thi:tJ lil?ei : U.m.:·e is tne prtlble1A-idrlilt.i.t'i1rnt;on. nate i'o1.J..owed bJ. a 
zcttinfS up o.t' Al1:.9l'.'nate n,potnee•a; ti.c gt.tn•.u·ltlg ot \hrta to te~t '" ,• .· ... · . . . · ... ·•' u. 
hJpotheiu11;, l/ind i"i.nt.Ua the 1·orri:1\4lat1,,ni ot c0Aclu1ilion1s. 
•• ·• "' ,wp j I •1,tlial t,.,_ 
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These cQllclu.aions are both insights and bases tor further action. iu.t 
· they ·are ·not classified aa !ind conetusions. Rather, they are tenta• 
tive v1orki.ng or work!_lli hypotheaes. 
lf a r~la.tivistic con,ception ot leartii.ng is accepted., there can be 
no "right an.swer'1 teaching .... Ba:;les writes: 1t.fdoreover., a pupil's com• 
prehension o:f' a gi van matt-er is !~r mote adequate, and perhaps more per• 
12. 
mane11t, if he U."!derat~da wrong answers and wey they ure wrong • • • • 
"Wrong l:'\Jlswers" ·· are important to learning. They a1·e the altern,xtive 
ilJl,)01.heses which seem. lass eatiui'actory to the illdividual who b.aa com.;. 
pared, co.nt:rasted Md tested reasonable solutions to a problem:. Ill this 
,fr reflective. atu.dJ which !'t11lows the setting 01' a problem • 
· implies 'formulation. and co.nsidei-atioa of alternate auswers 
to the· qu.estio.n raised. i'he to:rmu.l.ation o! various possible 
answers· co1·responda to the forrnu.lation of hypotheses in 
scientific tninking, Ona-anaVJer lright-anawer) teaching 
naldom achieve.a reflection•level thi.nking on the part of the 
..... 13• 
Wi'tll 1·egl!li-'d tto,. specific course :roqu.iremanta, Ba.;vles wri tas, 
ReiH.Ung· and other forms .ot'.. out aide studs &t'e as im-
portant :for refective studies as tor recitational 
preceduse. ·but the st~dy is carr.ied on in order to 
answer pu;iils!; qu.estions, rathar than to satisfy re-
quiremen:ta of a teacher. 14. · · 
lt follows, then, that although tho subject ·matter topics ot· a rela ... 
tivist and a realistic absolutist may appear to be the same, i;he3 , 
differ g!'eatly because their couceptions of au.bJect .. matter a.nd inter• 
12. .Bayles, ·"The .llelativit3 :Pri.nciple £ts Applied to 'l'eaching, 11 
O'Aivetsit.Y of Konsas. :Bulletin of ~du.cation, Vol ... IV, No. 4, P• 12. 
13, lbid• P• ll- -• ... . . . . -
14. Ibid, P• ll -
pretations of the learni.ng process are not the same. For an ~~aolu~ 
tist, su.bjec::rt.•matter ia n list of data· or predetermined conclusions 
to be impressed upon the lea1\ner. For a relativist subJe.ct matter is 
a aeries of pz•oblerna to be solved · n.nd data are simply instrumental 
.:.,2. learni:!1§ rather· than items to be learned. By this means the pu.pil . 
becomes, n. • • an in.dependent· learn~r. while developing an enhanced 
16. 
and more· harmonic outlook on life.11 '.rhia is why relativists ca.n• 
n.ot properl3 set u.p a hierarchy __ · ·of· subject matter as absolutely essen.• ,· 
tial to the learner. Jior certain pupils bu.siness arithmetic, for ex.• 
ample, may contribu.te a.a mu.ch to the developtneut of independent learn-
ing, and to fill eD.haneed ru1d h.r!i.rntonhed ou.tlook on U. fe as cal cul us does 
:for others. 
lf we accept ~he proposition. that learning is something more. than 
the acquiai.tio.n o! tn.ft>Ject-niatte:r, {VG bave little d_11'ficu.lt3 in deny-
ing tllat. learning ii simpl~ the ac·quisition of specific ·neural con.nee ... 
tio.ns, organized reflexes, or tixed-habi t pat:terns.· It we accep't the 
proposition th&t learning 1s the development of abilitJ _to solve pro• 
· blema; we must reJect the drill concept of ed.u.c;ation ;which. asawnes the . 
learner to be passive. A letn·nar made st.utceptil)l~r to _only stimu.11 a.nd 
exti'1Jlaic rewards is not solving probl°ems in terms of' consaqtiences. 
· Neither is he expected to act with foresight of consequences. OA the 
other hand., from· s relativistic point ot view the learner progresses , . I 
as he becomes more pi:oflieient in solving problems and predicting co.n-
sequences. The discovery of ralationabips is finding out. whtAt will 
15• 'Ibid, P• 11 -
Md "rewl.rd anti ;;Mislll!nft.nt" :ill 01'."(hn: tJ1ttt tlia . right an S':'.'Jf!lr i,:n:t lm · 
stBcti;£'r~d: in. cm.d the w:rooe& one ata1i1pGd or:i.t"' i>&ylea w:d. tea! 
let i! a pu.p!l is t;;, bs trainart to thi.nk :frJt MJnn~lt, 
r.~c~;:ins r,t{CfHlGit,y tl:i (h:Htivc.ratic cdtte;:.itio.u, his con• 
c luol6n:z \11:l.l 1 hbvl\l to 'be those whitll'l gr:0'11 ,,u.t .eit' t nb . 16111 
tltlt;;kixig. ~ntl cr.n,i1eit be t:oreocr iut,o · t1:i:·e-o.1.•dliliueo. ;j;l.>ltlii• 
1f'hl$' lmtf.'.\'li.t.g 1)1.'MfZ\SSt iaiC:COl4 dint .. fi. :!.'ftlti!t.iviat, is one in which tlle 
1.:-t~dent h r~nti.'etiv~l,')' t~etiv$ tu Ult'thl'V'itd.ng rel&tio.uzhipo which hava 
\l1Hn-·i.ng tln tbt aods he lHi,a 1at 1'o:r hilil;\\il:C. :rlua aituaU~n which ~iivaa 
rtse to 1,~f!r.air1,s _ia 1:1 fb-!J .i!folu:tis.m cott•1u, Q.llly .~a s r~su.lt 
ot· an ,,5gri~sdv!' attnck :;,por1 the ptbbUt:i+ 'l'o aol ve :tt, thg lett::·ner 
C~.1Vlii2;1$•!Ul th~ l)l'OCF,f,bl,E) $.>lU.tio.n~, taata theft\, no.d 'f!.tmllJ t'~H"rfiUbtee. 
~ach ltUH'Ai.tlB fli'Ml~tioa ill d1t't0rant. 'lh~ in• 
,, : \ 
ai~hr.a 1,r,n1.i.011;,1l3 acg .. d,:,;·e,i otu1t »~ ecv,p.1.u.r.rted to aoe it thay lilPPlJ to 
1,}14) ll~l\',I .tiilu.~ti•.)u, QU(i to :U.scov~i thfl ~J;l.SA~. to v+lltCh ihey n~pl3. , 
t11.~., th'1 ,10:J.U;tio;.i of the pi'Qi>lei., b .ti,,llolfod b; •. retUutive vhnae 
i!'.1 wl,ich th.e ii.t.divlduol e'J!t'ilJUi1~H:l ectiH,,.HJ.i.V~a~~s ~1-ti11. vt·&Jictti~na. ;in, 
"~ 
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quence. a reorga:niaation of experience. · In order t4, poatula·~e the bast 
poauible r1le.n o.t action, and in order to evalttate prosross E.U'ld reor: ..... 
and active. Somehow realists :tail to grasp this anci are S!\tisfied to 
preeu.me tbat most efficient leorning takes place b~ a paselve 1·ecep• 
value of 1·epetitio,1? We hnvt11 aeeu th6t realists hold that repeti'tion 
te.nds to dc~pen an 1m:preaeion upon the plastic n.erv!.ll.l.S s,:vstem. In 
thia respect, it ia qu.ite c1oa1. .. that the i'irst impression roust be 
correct• a11d ·that r)very impreaaion fol101iing the fir at should be ide.n-
t-ical in order to strengthen or deepen the firsih However, r(?,lati vista 
hold that repetition is a goal-insight activity leading to .refinement. 
One doos not ·pr€\ctice to t•epaeit the £11.•at pe:.--:to1·r.1ance witll. greater 
---~ ... •1 
facility, ·but rather in order to impro~e u.p,on first and everi per• 
for.man.ca following. That is, iaven. in ~he routi.na prs.ctice oi: acquiring 
a simple manipulative skill, the learner eats his goal, and ·then reor• 
It follows, tbDt plaasnre ca.u be dad ved. frt>m one' o evaluation of 
progress. This is 1>1·ecisely n 1·elati viat:tc inte:t•pretation of rewards. 
There is no need for the art1.fical nr.ra.ngement of i•ewt.rds. The learner 
who is conscious or his eosl and who plgna to achieve it, receives a 
genu.1.0.e aatisfa<:tion to the extant tbat the soul b uchiev·ad or that 
insighta Dre acquired. In the situation where a goal is not achieved, 
a lesrne1~ who c~n 1•ef'lect upon .his procedu.t·e and can determine the 
reasons !01' his i"ailu.re acquires greater u.nderatauding, ,nd therewith 
receives a degree of' ple&sure in the newly acquired 'insight• Then, with 
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greater coni'Hience land. b~tter 1.uuhn"tltanding, the ·1~•r11u· oeta out to 
attack the problem with erea,ter eest. 
,s~ch io a •~elfttivistic t10Deeptic.i~ 0£ eubJect•1aetter ~na the 
learnit.tg proc~as. We reptiat, in. f;. 'ftoc1et_y ~bf!l•e tl1e in<U.viduel 
' ' 
mu.st makB his aan <iecioion$ ~nd 'whet-e !le ma,, b$ t.i\·n1re of: the c:onee• 
quences• ~d.UI wol'ld'llhBre thne h ~eld0111 o~t 86l~tio.u 
to problemati:c aituaUotlet a ratativJ.atlo ',otttlook ia most compatible• 
BJ the eame token. on cbuo1u.1iatie iuterp1~etation of human tH\ttU."e, 
re@U. tJ,' tUld the edu.c.ativo p,l'OCU)$S is least, fliCCi!:tPl~ble. We J:1tUJ't eon•. 
elude,, ,tltti.t ik>bbUt• a a'beo!u.t1sr;ic twd ai1thi.u•ita1•itl\n conception ot 
ORAP.?Bll ll · 
St.OOIARt AID OOIOWSIOBS 
that the ncceptM\SO ot a.n1 practice implies an aecep1H.1.nee of ita. under• 
ltins tuJau.mptio.lln. In. otruir ·~ords, evor:, adu.cat ional prtJctiee rotlocta 
a point of view. D~tore it ia ~daptod or appliod, ito obJectives · 
should be aucertoinad. iode point~ out thut tbo ~::uiu.mptiona und~1"l1ins 
ri,D.j abuolu.tism are ause1rt1al13 no.u.•decJJc1·At1e., ~no that the prt'Acticeu 
evol vin,s trom ab1olu:Uut¼»S ,jill .not be ot U3B 1A auhia\fing der:.c,ot"ttt1c 
td.r.1S, .Bu.t we ot:u:Jerv$ th.tit 11,ealiiniic l.lbaolu.tists su.ch na Breed• thorn• 
dike, .Babbitt, and other&, do not oeem to nccopt thia p1•opouit1on. aa · 
beiug trU.(h l.n ta.r.t'tt Breed implies that ro:a.liem ie mote dei11ocratic 
thmt are other posU lo.uu. thei·e!ore, 1n the light· of the ma.n1 current 
pu:bl1cat1ons 1'\1PffJ$iS\1l'till8 iii. reaUGtiC po1.t1t of view, 1t wou.ld be wull 
to str1.p tew ot \ht.'t mt)a1 repreaant.-.rt11'e o.f theua ot· tlloir n modern 
ve:rbul r.h."'tu&11 and to rt-evaluate their nmstu.cpticu1a ~cl implications 
In this co.unect1on1 we ~re confronted ,ii tl1. sevard tiueet1oruu ls 
realism ~betoluti'st-ic :c.nd it uo, does r'edisrn, as. on ab1?olu:tis:a, cie• 
;rrhe toc1ety ot 1ndiV'idu.&ls \1bo are (.li1pf .. blo or i1~rJ:.icipnting 1tt a pro• 
sr~Jsive and r"-#fi.uing societ,;,? In order to make tn:l~ stu.d1 ~peeifl.c, 
ffhorud ike' n Hu.men ffa·ture .and the Social· Ord or,. and lloobi tt• s ihe -------· . . -
Ourricu.lu.m for, IiLodGr» .tducntion were selected. aa rep1:ese:1\ative ------ --------
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realistic texts, the former tret\tiJ!g tnainlJ the problems of h\1n'lan 
nature and societ3, and the lat·ter _'the matter of edu.cstional aubJect• 
mutter, We n.ote thirt these texts are not treatises on philosophy bu.t 
au·e rather specific proposals with regerd to educational and social 
practices .• 
First of· ell, we observe that Thorndike is eommi tted to specific 
absolutes. For example. he attributes' the elements of obJective real• 
it:, with £1xit~• an.d independenc$ of mei,n1.ng. · Objective reality, then, 
is for him an. abao'lu.te. In a similar manner., hum~ nature is presumed 
t·y ThorDdike to hdve· fixed element a (Vi@ta and bonds). In this rntU1ner 
he reaord-, human. nature as :111 absolute also. In other words, ThorJldike 
implies that we nre ·to accept the realit3 of the situation and the 
reality of human .nature as 1'1,lted and settled matters. 
'l'.'horndike reflects his absol,;tistic bias nm:rkedl.7 in his anal3sis 
of human nat~re. Be aaaumes that hu.man nature can be disclosed by re-
duc~ng th~ individual into hiu con.stitu.ent par~e or elements, as though 
the_se parts: or elements have lndepet1deht and fixed meanings. Oo.nae• 
qt1e.ntly,- he describes nu.man .natu.re a~ an accu.mu.lation of stimulus• 
reaponse bonds_ and, elemental wan.ta or drives. We observe. :f'tu'-ther., 
tlult the human e_leine.ut$ tbonda .and wEmts) ~u:·e 1•egarded aa being aend-
tive to speeitic, elements conatitutibg the situ.ation •. Thus, particular, 
independe.nt, · or fixed element$ ot a situation are presumed to GVf>ke 
epeci!ic mo<.\es of conduct. Personal interpretation oi' a situation in 
the light of. accumulated and reorganized experience is ruled out. More• 
over, tlle individual is rega1·ded as pasai ve to the elements of the 
situation into which-he has be8ll placed b3 chttnce. J,, J3., Watson 
postulates a position similar to this and frankly designates it as 
"deterministic.« !,J!hat is to aay, Wstsoo. holds tha't the individual 
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is pt:rnsive to circumata.nces and in.nate .neu.ral co.ilnectiotuh Thorndike 
preter1ds to allow f'or individu.al' choice and initiati va. bu.t a careful 
analJsis of his position as applied to human motivation, learning, 
and social relations, forces one to conclude thijt he is no leas deter• 
in1nistic. In other words• realism, as represented b3 Thorndike, is 
absolutietic, and as such, does not allow for individual freedom of 
choice. lt is logical to presume that any edu.cational prog1•am based 
upon this philosophy will not provide for a reflection upon conse-
quences, for such a program would be dee.med "unreal1atic'1 and "pay• 
chologically unsound" or inexpedient. 
We find a good example of what realistic absolutists expect to do 
b3 way of education in Thorndike's text• First of all, we note that 
learning is accounted for ma.inly in terms of modified and reorganized 
atimu.lus-responee bonds and native Watl'ts. '!he acqu.i~ition of entir_ely 
naw S•B bouds is granted by Thorndike, but apparent13 is not a.ntici- · 
pated to a great exte.ut. llu.t whether learning be the acquisition of 
· new bonds or simply a reorganizat_io.11 ot tb.ose already present, in 
.either case the individu.al is placed i.n a passive position. Bepetitioo 
and reward determine what connections will be formed ~nd how firmly 
they will become bonded .together. Oo.nsequ.entlYi the individu.al · is not 
sel :£'•determining with regaJ:d to any one aet .nor with regard to the con•· 
stellation ot S•R bonds which are to be formed. Thor.ndike• s assertion 
that 0 by hook or by crook!' a desirable act may be evoked and may be 
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bonded to a situation is suggestive of his determinism applied to 
education., A coneideration of consequ.e4cee doea not determine what 
is learned in this instance; bu.t rather the blind repetition of an 
act and the accompruiying bu.t not necesaarill consequent feeli.ng•states. 
Edu.cution ~a described 'by '!horndike m.a.y ver1 well ba described as 
seduction• 
when we describe realism as.;: absolutistic,. we impl3 that there are 
some thi.ngs which the individual will ,not ·raadil,y re•evalu.ate since they 
are presumed to be settled or !i.xed once and for all• Democracy is 
founded u.pon. the principle that no OD.$ baa access to anything so 
settled. Moreover, since democracy ia ·a means of solving social pro• 
bl ems, societ3 must not be hampered. by any •• sacred cows.'1 liothing 
should be regarded as so fixed and settled that it will n.ot bear further 
inquiry. 'J!he individual end societ1 mu.st be constantly on the alert 
for errors, must be read3 to achieve new insights about things be the3 
ever so familiar, and mu.st be read3 to project into the fu.tu.re working 
proPositions baaed on honestly eu:rived at co.nclu.aionfh l.tl other words, 
ever:, member of a de.mocratic societ3 must be willing to think about all 
things that coneer.u him. An absolutiatic eociet3 doaa not 1.ntend this 
shall be so, fox.· the re-e.xam.inatioD of the absolutes is to an ab.so·~. 
lutist either impu.dance, a waste of time and energy, or a sacrilege. 
Thorndike appears to hold that time spent in discu.ssing "settled. 
matter-,''· is wasted time in the learning process. . the learner is re• 
quired simpl3 to accept passively what the experts have predetermined 
as good and acceptable. The learner's responsibility is to trust the 
experts. All that ie required is a passivity to the controlled situ.• 
173 
ation thro\lgh which a teacher may conceivably attach ani response.to 
any stimu.lu.13. :But we o·bserve that learning does .not take place in th.is 
manner. moreover, there is evidence of harm v1hich comes from accept• 
ing passively and unqu.estioningly the eo11clu.aiona of others. ~be appli• 
cation of this methodology makes ot tl1e 1.ndi vi du.al fertile ground tor 
the cultivation of au.thorl ta:c1wiism. ~he individual 1s not 1U.1<le aware 
of the consequences of his action but rather of the approval of the 
tr~ated experts. What more could ani dictator ask? 
That Thorndike's proposals ara compatible to an authoritariab. 
society is further verified b3 his treatment of social problems. In 
the first place, he aaswnes that mani people, probably most, are not 
competent to make their own decisions, aspecialll io. matters pertain• 
ing to social institutions. On the other hand, he points ou,..t thet there 
is a small group represented by industrial, financial, and scientific 
leaders who are especially trustworthy both on the,basis of capabilit3 
and honesty. Thorndike's dangerous conclusion that the capable are 
. , 
the good, lends him to suggest fu.rther thut the capable should be 
allowed freedom 01· action in proportion to their ability. He assumes 
on the one hand that the3 will contribu.te moat if they are unhampered. 
on the other hand he aaaumes that if they ere un.reatrained, ·their con.• 
duct will yield a pattern which can be studied and crystallized for 
purposes of teaching the lesa good and able.. The conduct of the so• 
called gooQ and able is given the status of en absolQte which is to be 
imposed ~pon t~e masses. 
At this point we observe two aspects of Thorndike's absolatism 
reflected in his proposals for society .. On the one hand, ha assu.m.es 
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that the innate nature ot the able is s~lf-directive end good, That 
is •. the· able are pz·asumed to have within thernselvea the motivation 
tor good conduct. So certain is Thor.ndike of' this, that the conduct 
of the able is accepted.' as a crite1·ion for ·the condu.ct of others.ii M.o:re• 
over, Thorndike also assumes that a knowledge of what is good. is poss-
eased by the able• Therefore, the Judgment of the able or ·the experts 
is to be trusted. Thus, both by virtue of apperception and i.nnate 
nature, the able are presumed to have access to and to be reflectors 
of the ·good. It is for this reason that he argues. since the able are 
the px•odu.cers of capital goods, ·the accumulators of' economic wealth. 
and the discoverors of truth, ·these activities must be essenti.ally good • 
.Moreover, carrying this, line ot argument furt_her. Thorndike informs us 
that we ahou.ld tolerate anything the good and able do, and. accede to 
their wishes since what they desire will benefit u.s an. Su.rely, this 
is not a picture of democracy in which individuals plan and work to• 
gethe?' for mu.tu.al ·banef'i t, and in which i.ndividu.als become more compe-
tent through their active particlpation in governing the agencies which 
touch upon their lives • 
. Qnthe surface !horn.dike's social program appears to be d3namic in 
that it provides· for mechanisms which will assure society•s continuance 
and a menau.re,of improvement. However, it, is:e~sentially a static or 
planned 11ociety in .that_ it has a fi.xed point of reference; namely, ob• 
't ' . ' ' 
ltt 
Jecti ve reality. The re.au ty of human nature _is especially emphasized 
io. this connection.. HWlUln nattlre, as it is, especiall)' the nature of ---
the "good and. able11 is the focal point about which Thorn.dike's society 
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would be built. Society becomes corrwitted to the lite activities of 
this select group, and as the activities of the more able become more 
known, tho commitments: will beoome more specific. Such a society ls 
abaolu.tistic in at least two respects; namely, in the unquestioning 
acceptance of so-called good and able human nature, and in the im.• 
position or the li!e activities ot this group upOA the ma:::H,es. Su.ch 
a society is .not conc.erned with progressive refinement, bu.t rather 
with the implementation of the SQppoaedly kllown. ~he conduct of the 
"good and ub1e1t is the "sacred cown ot this society, end toward it no 
one should attempt to direct the •finger of inquiry. 
A related point at which we observe tbat the Thorndikiao ideal for 
society is absolutistic, is with regard to the problem of universal 
participation in the resolution of social problems. A democratic order 
is built on i'aith in human intelligence. No one individual mu.st be 
regarded as being so gifted that he alone can decide what is good for 
the others. Moreove1·, each individual must have the opport11nity for 
!urther development in competency by actually tackling the problems 
of state. The m,Jst beneficent dictatorship is ine.dequ.ate in that it 
£nils at this point for it develops dependency rather than competency. 
Thorndike, by suggesting thet the good and able take over the reine of 
government, errs no less. 
We mu.st conclude, then, that with reference to two criteria for a 
democracy ... that it is a plruming rather than a planned society• a.nd - -
that it is bu.ilt on a universal i'aith in human intelligence rather than 
simplJ the judgment of experts .. - Thorndike's proposals i'or society are 
unacceptable. Except for the apecifie techniques and devices enumerated, 
'11.Mrudike' s recommendations bear a striJk:ing reaemblunee to the 
structural outlines of any au.thoritarian society. Moreover, we mu.at 
bear 111 mind that these recommendations are simply the logical applica-
tions of abaolutistic assumptio.tUh Grant that certain absolutes can 
be ascertained, society must tru.st the experts to discover, elarif;y, 
and implement them. O.n. the other hand,. deny that any one p~,rson or 
grou.p ot persous can decide what ou.r absolutes should be, then we mu.st 
ot .neceasit3 have a democratic problem-solving society in which each 
member is entru.ated and obligated to share responsibility in its planning, 
ope:.t•ation, and bearittg of eonsequ.encEUh It will bear repeati..ng, because 
"-
'rhorndik$ distru.$tS the Judgment of the masses, he recoinmenda social 
deviees which t11ll depdve the less able ot a means for achievi..ng 
greater compe'tenc;h thus; Thorndike argu.es tor an authoritarian society 
in 111hich the dependents become m~re dependent and those susceptible 
to propaganda become more susceptiblth 
Thorndike Justifies hia autho1:itarian approach Oll the basis of 
its sciei1tific appeal• One might designat, it as •• scientific manage• 
ment.tt The expert is presumed to be cap3ble of decidi.ng what is the 
nr1ght. answer" to a social problem. The dutiful citizen is expected 
to accept this 1tright answerfl wi thou:h further deliberation or delay. 
In this respect, tehorndike•a social program parallels his edu.eationsl 
psychology of ·attaching the right bonds to recUI.•ring stimuli. The 
tu.nation of the school is to "put overtl 'the social dogma end impress 
upon the .nearal systems ot, the lear11ers acceptable mo1·es, 
At this point we .note t·ha.t Franklin Bobbitt, who is aUo a real• 
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istic absolu.tist, has much to say ragardi.t'.lg the !unctio.11 of edu.eation. 
He informs us that we mu.st study life ncti vi ties, es1,,ecially those of . . . 
the mo1·e gii'ted i.ndividu.als. These activities are to become the subject• 
matter or the "l'ight a.nswera" which the schools rust "put over .. " 
:Bobbitt assumes that. the life activities of the individual spl'ing from 
inherent drives or vmnts and in compliance with the demands of the sit• 
uation. The underlying assumption is that if an activity occurs in 
ll1essurable frequency, it mu.st be legitimate and acceptable. Stated 
otherwise. llobbi tt holds th;:it on activity or an institution will cease 
to exist if it does not serve a legitimate human need. Oonsequentl3; 
the presence of an activity or an instit~tion is its own justification. 
And its oceu.r'.tnee is Justification for its inclusion in the educational 
program of the school as ou.bject-matter. Ou.t of this line of reasoning 
emerges the statement, "Teach people to do better what they are going 
to do anyhow." 
one can readily see how l3obbitt•s position; if applied, would per• 
petuate the errors of oar time. !t tends to cr3atallize whet is --
!::! !!, .!!, and fails to draw attention to shou.ld ~• This is es-
pecially true 'l1hen "right-answer'!pedagogy ia applied. Bobbitt cau.tions 
the. educator against e.x.posi.o.g the learn.er to alternate or cont'uai.ng 
solutioils to perplexing problems. ~y this means he eloaea the door to 
inquiry 1·egardi.ng the Justification o! nacceptable'* activities. If the 
learner is taught authoritatively one and only one aolu.tion to any pro ... 
blem, he will not only uccept the one answer aa God-given, but will 
also be lesa critical of MY authoritatively imposed social program~ 
Throttling the channels of communication, in this respect',., deprives 
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the learner ttot only of information he should have -in aolvi.ng the 
problem on hand, but also deprives him ot opportunity tq. develop a 
critical frame of mi..nd ·a.nd cnpaci t1 for harmonizing conflicts .• 
·on 'the su.rtaa'e Bobbitt does f!llow for Jndividual in:l.tiative in the· 
solution of o.t:1.e• s. problems, but the -seclllliqu.es he proposes do JJ.ot "pro.., 
vide for lt. lioreovar• a detailed examination or :Bobbitt's position 
will disclose that this initiative is permi-tted mainly for the more 
able or select individuals• And when. we recall that .5obbitt parallela 
11lorndike closely in holding that the able are more or -less subject to 
their good lm~\l.lsea, we find that there· 1s no actual allowance f'or 
i.ndividual 1».itiative, .l3obbit·t simplJ places implacable .faith in the 
. . 
deu.s ex maehi.oa presumed to be gover.ni.ng the rnoro compate.nt. Ha takes -- . . . 
for gra.oted that some higher power or authority will guarantee ~he 
actions of the more able. 
The lite that the more capable live is accepted by :Bobbitt as the 
i.good · life.'' Examples of 1 t are presumably found in our more select 
communities and neighborhoods. He would suggest that this life be 
studied and made the subJect-matter of the schools tq be imposed upon 
the learner. »y repetition and pleasant awards, this life is to be-
come impressed u.pon the learner. Here, ·agail'l, the learner is .not ·deem• 
ed qualified to act with foresight of consequences, but cerely in terms 
of sense impressions and implanted stimulus-response patterAS• We 
have alread.Y noted that 1D. a true demo~racy a learning situation 1s 
one in which alter.note solutio.ns to problems maJ be .evaluated in terms 
of consequ.e.nces, :Moreover, it must be noted that in a changi.n$/Vi!<>rld, 
individuals mu.st be trained .not only to meet change• bu.t alao to eon-- ...................... - ------- --- ------ ------ ---
_ tribute change. llldividu.als: trained to accept on.e predetermined 
set of solutions,. a.re incompetent to face entirely new situations, 
and cennot ,co.ntri bu.te fully to a raco.astructi on ot the ai tu.atio.n or 
society. 
Realists may well argue thilt for the irwnedia.te fut'1t"e we aim high 
if we ca.o. establish for the less compete.at a way of life equivalent to 
that which the ,uiore competent enjoJ • :Bt;t let us .recall first ot all 
that the way of life the competent enjoy· is a by-product of' the econ• 
omie. status they enJOJ• Activities surrounding their situ.ation are 
symptomatic of their economic well-being. ~he less desirable activities 
manifested by the less competent are J~st as symptomatic of their econ• 
omic insecurity. When we train in terms ot these secondar1 aspects 
of Uf'e, we neglect the all-important factor of assisting both the poor 
and the rieh, the competent and incompetent, to become more adequate 
in sol vi.ng all types of problems facing them. If we could auecead in 
developing learners capable of matching wits with social problems, vest• . 
ed interests, dogma, and preJudice, we would surpass an;ything that the 
ngood and able" have been able to do so far. A demoortitic society needs· 
above all things, universal competen~y in.meeting::and ;solving problems. 
It requires that all of its members participate in social !!,formation 
rather than in a realistic co11£ormation. However1 this limited study -
of realism leads one to the conclusion that a realistic absolutism re• 
quires above all, a passive and uncr~_tieal conformation. For this 
reason, if for no other• one mu.st insist that realism ia inadaqu.ate 
for a democratic society. 
stated simply• the problem of the adequacy of realistic absol~-
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-t~sm for a democracy is cen.tered in. the ·faith that can be placed upo.n 
hunlaJl intellige.ne·e. Demo,rree3 is founded on $ faith i.n bu.rne.n 1.ntalU.• 
gence; that each indJvidu.al mu.st solve for .himefelt his own problems, 
n:o one nor a:13 group can decide t,Jr others whQt they · should. do. This 
will yield the most in terms of social ref.inem~mt, increaeed. indivi-
du.81 coznpetenc;y, and greater hnrmon1a.at1on ot outloQk on life. This 
faith requires, moraovar, that the chru1nele or con,ttnu.nicaUon a.nd ex-. . 
change of thottght ~111 be ltept opeu, u.nin.tex·ru:ptech and, U!lth!',ottled. 
It. implies that indi vidu.al.s ,1ill bo free to dalibet"ate oa all problems 
. 'With the e.aeu.rence that no inf'o1·mation ia being k~pt from them. It 
im9lie8 -Ei communi~1 ot interest through a ~orrununity 0£ u.ndersiianding. 
Berain absolu:Usm is found to ba most wanting. liealistic abso_lut;i.sm, 
Juat aa any other absolutism, harbors u "sacred cow'' which in itself 
' ' ' 
impai!'S a free play of' intelligence upon some huma.n problems. More• 
over, the "l'ignt .. answar11 pedsgog.y ot 1·ealism ob$tru.cts the channel& ()f 
eowmunicatio11 $.tld prevents a re$d,Y ex.change of ideas and o eowmu.nity 
th(;J deve'lopment ot individual protieienc:1 in $olvillg problems, in the 
application of a pragmr..tic approach, and in opportun.i t3 to :reorganize 
experience i.n te:nno of conseg_l.l.en.ces. One is forced to conclude, then• 
that realistic absolutism is not adequ.i,te for a people st:i.--iving to be• 
come more democratic. 
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